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Attempts at specifying the basic assumptions underlying 
accounting span a period of over fifty years. Despite these efforts 
no generally accepted list of accounting assumptions is available.
One reason for this is a lack of understanding of the nature and 
function of basic assumptions in deductive theories.
Accordingly, the objectives of this study are (1) to des­
cribe the nature and function of basic assumptions in a theory or 
discipline by a detailed analysis of the techniques of theory con­
struction; (2) to demonstrate that the above is applicable to 
accounting by constructing an outline of a theory of financial 
accounting measurement; and (3) to demonstrate the wide applicability 
of theory construction techniques in accounting by applying these 
techniques to a diverse sample of accounting topics. This study, 
conducted in light of current thought in the philosophy of science, 
led to the following conclusions.
Basic assumptions are necessary in a discipline in order to
avoid either an infinite series of assumptions or circular reasoning.
Normally, reduction is employed to determine basic assumptions.
Because the real world is too complex to totally describe, basic
assumptions contain idealizations. Idealizations are descriptions
of real world determinative factors under distortion-free conditions.
Though they do lead to accurate predictions, idealizations are not
xvii
xviii
literal descriptions of the real world because many insignificant 
distorting factors are ignored.
Five conceptually different types of basic assumptions were 
identified, without which a discipline cannot be fully developed. 
These are objectives, internal axioms, bridge axioms, internal 
postulates, and bridge postulates. Objectives indicate goals. 
Postulates are assumptions originating within a discipline. Axioms 
are assumptions borrowed from other disciplines.
Internal assumptions (axioms or postulates) contain dispo­
sitional concepts (nonobservable characteristics of observable 
things) and theoretical concepts (nonobservable characteristics of 
nonobservable things). Because internal assumptions involve non­
observables, neither they nor any theorems derived from them are 
directly verifiable. Bridge assumptions are needed to connect the 
nonobservable aspects of these assumptions to observable phenomena 
that can be measured and tested.
Various methods of obtaining general acceptance for a set 
of basic assumptions were considered. All were rejected except 
the empirical testing of theorems. But because positive empirical 
confirmations are not logically valid, they cannot be considered 
proofs. Rather, they serve to gather evidence increasing one's 
confidence in the underlying basic assumptions.
In accordance with objectives (2) and (3), the techniques 
of theory construction were then shown applicable to accounting 
theory construction. This was done first by identifying several
xix
key assumptions in a theory of financial accounting measurement, 
illustrating the use of idealizations and the five types of basic 
assumptions. Then, in order to show the broad applicability of 
theory construction techniques to accounting theory construction, 
several examples, chosen from the broad spectrum of accounting, 
were evaluated in light of the earlier analysis of basic 
assumptions.
Conclusions drawn from this evaluation indicated that the 
nature and function of basic assumptions have not been fully under­
stood in accounting theory construction. For example, the absence 
of bridge assumptions has made some theories incapable of application 
in the real world.
The discipline of accounting consists of all generally 
accepted accounting theories. Because the accounting discipline is 
so broad, it is highly unlikely for any one study to be able to 
identify all the objectives, axioms, and postulates of accounting. 
Future research should proceed on a theory by theory basis. The 
Financial Accounting Standards Board should concentrate on iden­
tifying the major assumptions underlying its theories. These 
theories can later be refined and fully formalized by other 
accounting researchers. This way a gradual but open-ended list of 
the accounting basic assumptions will evolve.
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION 
Nature of the Problem
Any survey of accounting literature over the past fifty 
years reveals the great inner struggle within the profession in its 
attempt to develop an acceptable list of basic assumptions. 
Accounting literature is replete with attempts by both well-known 
and lesser-known authors. Despite these efforts, no generally 
accepted list of basic assumptions is available.
In addition, the literature has not fully explored the 
nature of basic assumptions and theory construction. In only a few 
cases has a framework been advanced by those authors who have dis­
cussed assumptions which underlie accounting. With more and more 
emphasis being placed today on empirical research in accounting, 
understanding the nature of basic assumptions in accounting theory 
construction is vital. Until well-formed accounting theories are 
constructed, their empirical testing has a questionable basis. A 
brief look at the volume and trend of the research on the basic 
assumptions of accounting indicates the importance with which this 
research is viewed.
Historical Development of the Basic Assumptions of Accounting
The volume of research directed at basic assumptions has
1
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been increasing. The American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) reorganized its research effort in 1957 to 
center on developing a sound accounting theory structure.
Research on the Basic Assumptions of Accounting 
A study done by Kiyomitsu Arai cited at least fourteen 
attempts by significant accounting authors to specify the basic 
accounting assumptions. These fourteen, in chronological order, 
were as follows:
(1) 1922 Paton. W. A. Postulates . . . .
(2) 1939 Gilman, S. Basic conventions . . . .
(3) 1940 Paton, W. A. and Littleton, A. C. Basic
concepts . . . .
(4) May, G. 0. Postulates . . . .
(5) 1952 Study Group on Bsuiness Income, American Institute
of Accountants. Postulates . . . .
(6) 1953 Blough, C. G. Assumptions . . . .
(7) 1957 Committee on Accounting Concepts and Standards,
American Accounting Association. Underlying Concepts . . . .
(8) 1960 Arthur Andersen and Company (Spacek, L.).
Postulates . . . .
(9) 1961 Moonitz, M. Postulates . . . .
(10) 1962 Bedford, N. M. Postulates . . . .
(11) 1963 Prince, T. R. Postulates . . . .
(12) 1964 A Study Group at the University of Illinois.
Postulates . . . .
(13) 1965 Grady, P. Basic concepts . . . .
(14) 1965 Pattillo, G. [sic] W. Accounting Standard . . . .1 
To this list might be added the work of other accounting researchers, 
including D R Scott, Paul Kircher, Yuji Ijiri, Richard Mattessich, 
the AICPA1s Accounting Principles Board, and lesser-known authors
^Kiyomitsu Arai, "Accounting Postulates: Their Historical
Development and Conceptual Classification," University of Florida 
Accounting Series No. 6: Theory Formulationsj ed. Willard E. Stone
(Gainesville, Florida: Accounting Department, College of Business
Administration, University of Florida, 1970), pp. 1-4.
such as Givens, Newman and Mellman, and Arai. The great majority 
of this research effort took place from 1960 to 1970.
Reorganization of the AICPA's Research Effort 
In the United States 1957 marked the beginning of a new era 
in research by practicing accountants. It was the year in which the 
AICPA reorganized its research effort. Prior to this the American 
Accounting Association (AAA) and the AICPA, two major professional 
accounting bodies in the United States involved in accounting theory 
research, had followed two entirely different paths.
Earlier Research by the AICPA 
Previous research efforts of the AICPA had grown out of the 
now-famous correspondence which took place in the early 1930's 
between representatives of the New York Stock Exchange and a com­
mittee of the Institute. One result of this discussion was the 
recognition that the Institute needed a standing body to study 
accounting principles. A committee, appointed for this purpose, was 
subsequently reorganized in 1938—1939, and a research department was 
established.^ This committee was destined to issue fifty-one 
research bulletins during its existence from 1938 to 1959.
Reed K. Story, in his book The Search for Accounting 
Principles, sums up the approach followed hy the Institute during
2Alvin R. Jennings, "Present-Day Challenges in Financial 




. . . the Institute adopted what has been apropriately 
called the "piecemeal" approach to accounting principles. This 
approach was primarily practical; the objective was to give 
immediate help to the practicing accountant faced with a problem. 
Lengthy discussion of an over-all set of principles would merely 
delay the service the committee on accounting procedure could 
provide in reducing controversies, and there was considerable 
doubt that a comprehensive program could be carried to a 
successful conclusion. The committee therefore decided to 
consider specific topics as the need arose and, if possible, to 
recommend one or more alternative treatments as definitely 
superior to other recognized procedures.^
Research by the American Accounting Association (AAA)
The AAA followed a more conceptual approach in its research 
program. Emphasis was placed on strengthening the over-all framework 
upon which accounting practice rested, and formulating and gaining 
acceptance for a logical and consistent set of accounting principles. 
These principles could serve as standards toward which accounting 
practice could be raised.^
Despite the approach differences of the AICPA and the AAA, 
their ultimate conclusions were quite si m i l a r ,  ̂because the AAA 
and the AICPA's concept of accounting was similar. Storey discussed 
these similarities:
Three basic similarities in the programs of the two 
associations stand out: (1) the two societies had exactly the
same objective, i.e., the improvement of financial accounting 
and reporting practice by reducing the number of acceptable 
alternative procedures, (2) both saw financial accounting as
^Reed K. Storey, The Search for Accounting Principles (New 
York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1964),
p. 43.
^Ibid., pp. 41-42. ^Ibid., p. 43.
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essentially a process of cost and revenue allocation rather 
than as a process of asset and liability valuation, and
(3) both looked upon accounting principles as being derived 
from accounting practice.6
But accounting had changed considerably in twenty-five years. In
1957, Alvin R. Jennings, then president of the AICPA, felt that the
research approach of the Institute should also change.
The New Approach by the AICPA 
Jennings felt that the approach to research which had devel­
oped permitted little opportunity for testing and experimenting with 
new ideas. In fact, it actually might stifle creative thinking. 
Therefore, he proposed a new approach to research by the AICPA wherein 
accounting principles development would be regarded as pure research 
similar to that conducted in the field of medicine. He suggested a 
research organization be established distinct from the Institute 
itself. This organization's function would be to examine and 
re-examine the basic assumptions of accounting and to develop author­
itative statements to aid both industry and the accounting pro­
fession. ?
The Special Committee on Research Program was set up in 
December, 1957, to study and report to the Institute on the new 
approach to research suggested by Jennings. In their report a year 
later the committee stated: The broad problem of financial accounting
should be visualized as requiring attention at four levels: first,
postulates; second, principles; third, rules or other guides for the
f i  7°Ibid., p. 41. 'Jennings, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
application of principles in specific situations; and fourth, 
research.
In addition the committee recommended setting up the 
Accounting Principles Board (APB). The APB was to be the only group 
within the accounting profession to issue authoritative statements on 
what constituted generally accepted accounting principles. Statements 
or opinions of the APB were ordinarily to be based on accounting 
research studies conducted by an accounting research staff.9 In 
addition to other recommendations concerning the APB, the committee 
determined the immediate research priorities. The committee's 
report read:
Immediate projects of the accounting research staff 
should be a study of the basic postulates underlying accounting 
principles generally, and a study of the broad principles of 
accounting. The results of these, as adopted by the Board, 
should serve as a foundation for the entire body of future 
pronouncements on accounting matters, to which each new release 
should be related.-*-̂  [Italics not in the original. ]
The priorities established, first on postulates and then on 
principles, represented a new research approach by the AICPA. This 
approach was intended to result in a logical and consistent structure 
of accounting theory.
Early Research Under the New Approach
The first priority for accounting research was met in 
September, 1961, when Accounting Research Study No. 1, "The Basic
^"Report to Council of the Special Committee on Research 
Programs," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 106 (December, 1958), 
p. 63.
^Ibid., pp. 63-65. ^Ibid., p. 64.
Postulates of Accounting," was published. In April, 1962, the second 
priority was met with the completion of Accounting Research Study 
No. 3, "A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Principles for Business 
Enterprises." Both studies received mixed reactions. The authors' 
approach was normative rather than merely descriptive. However, they 
seem to have been significantly influenced by the profession's current 
thinking on accounting theory. Their research was perhaps not as much 
in the area of pure research and creative thinking as Jennings had 
visualized. Also these studies would have resulted in accounting prac­
tice experimentation to an extent unacceptable at that time. This 
point was firmly established by the Accounting Principles Baord when 
it stated: "The Board believes, however, that while these studies
are a valuable contribution to accounting thinking, they are too 
radically different from present generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples for acceptance at this time."-^ However, the Board did not 
reject future acceptance of some or all recommendations of the two 
research studies should they prove more acceptable at a later date.
The Board apparently felt it could not make pronouncements mandatory 
which were not generally accepted within the accounting profession.
Significance of the Rejection of ARS Nos. 1 and 3 
This rejection of the recommendations was significant. In 
doing so the Board was rejecting the studies intended to serve as the
1 1 Accounting Principles Board Comments on 'Broad Prin­
ciples,'" The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 113 (May, 1962), p. 10.
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foundation for all future APB pronouncements. Without an agreed-upon 
foundation of postulates and principles upon which to base their pro­
nouncements, the APB ran the risk of reverting back to its prede­
cessor's piecemeal approach. This was what happened. As Robert 
Trueblood stated, the Board went: " . . .  from one extreme to the
other— from an almost exclusive preoccupation with the theoretical to 
a fixation on details of practice. In so doing, the Board became more 
a continuation of its predecessor committee than the sharp new instru­
ment it had planned to be."-^ Arthur Andersen & Co. expressed a simi­
lar view: "Both groups [the APB and the Committee on Accounting
Procedures] have been involved primarily in what has been referred to 
as 'putting out fires,' rather than taking a coordinated and planned 
approach to the problem in total.
In evaluating the work of the APB, Mautz and Gray have 
observed that in only about half of the cases in which APB opinions 
have appeared did research studies precede APB opinions.^ In addi­
tion, Mautz and Gray state: "But our conclusion must be that the
Board has acted contrary to research recommendations as often as it
■^Robert M. Trueblood, "Ten Years of the APB: One
Practitioner's Appraisal," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 129 
(January, 1970), p. 62.
13Harvey E. Kapnick, Jr., Chairman, Arthur Andersen &
Co., Letter (November 16, 1970) to Marshall Armstrong, President, 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Before the 
Study Group on Establishment of Accounting Principles (Chicago:
Arthur Andersen & Co., October 15, 1971), p. 40.
l^Robert K. Mautz and J. Gray, "Some Thoughts on Research 
Needs in Accounting," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 130 
(September, 1970), p. 54.
has moved to implement research r e s u l t s . T h e s e  shortcomings can 
all be related, at least in part, to the lack of a generally accepted 
foundation of basic assumptions upon which the APB and its research 
staff could build.
The mere passage of time has not appreciably increased the 
acceptability of ARS No. 1 and No. 3’s recommendations as the Board 
may have hoped. As late as March, 1970, Gustafson could report 
acceptance in only a few areas, noteably installment sales, prior 
period earnings, the financing method of handling leases, and the 
interest method of bond premium and discount amortization.^
Although acceptance in those areas may indicate a trend eventually 
resulting in acceptance of all recommendations of the studies, such 
a statement is in question perhaps at this time.
The need for a foundation is still quite evident to the APB. 
This can be seen from their recent attempt at describing accounting 
assumptions and principles in Statement of the Accounting Principles 
Board No. 4, "Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying 
Financial Statements of Business Enterprises" issued in October,
1970. This report, like previous attempts at specifying the assump­
tions, has been criticized. Undoubtedly, one of the strongest crit­
icisms of APB Statement No. 4 came from Arthur Andersen & Co. that 
stated: "Statement No. 4 issued by the APB in 1970 provides no real
15Ibid., p. 55.
■^George A. Gustafson, "Status of Accounting Research Study 
Nos. 1 and 3," The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 129 (March, 1970),
p. 60.
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guidelines for progress . . . .
The era of research started with the creation of the APB is 
ending. This year, 1973, the APB will be replaced by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The FASB will be composed of 
seven full time members, only four of whom need be CPAs. It will be 
totally independent of the AICPA.
If the FASB should fail, the alternative may be governmental 
control of accounting. At this critical time in accounting history, 
an analysis is needed on why accounting assumption studies such as 
Moonitz's Accounting Research Study No. 1 and APB Statement No. 4,
have not given accounting its long sought after foundation. In
particular, research is needed on what is the nature and function of 
a discipline's basic assumptions and how are basic assumptions used 
in theory construction. This study hopes to contribute to this 
research.
Limitations of Previous Research Efforts
There are a number of reasons why these previous attempts
have not yielded a set of generally accepted accounting assumptions. 
These relate to a misconception of the nature and function of assump­
tions and a failure to provide a framework for accounting theory 
into which the assumptions would fit.
-^Arthur Andersen & Co., Before the Study Group on Establish­
ment of Accounting Principles (Chicago: Arthur Andersen & Co.,
October 15, 1971), p. 40.
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Concepts, Not Basic Assumptions
There seems to be common agreement that assumptions are the 
basic components of a theory. However, when a representative list 
is examined a mixture of stated assumptions, unstated assumptions, 
and theorems is frequently found. Such lists do touch on very impor­
tant accounting concepts, but they are not complete lists of the 
basic assumptions of accounting. This is a direct result of failing 
to recognize the nature of basic assumptions in theory construction.
Confusion Over the Function of Assumptions
Since the report of the Special Committee on Research Program 
there seems to be confusion over the function of basic assumptions. 
Its report described postulates (or assumptions) as follows: "Pos­
tulates are few in number and are the basic assumptions on which 
principles rest."^ Moonitz^^ and other researchers have accepted 
this description, apparently without questioning its reliability.
This seemingly minor criticism becomes major when one recognizes that 
the special committee did not intend to give any definition of pos­
tulates at all. Mautz, a member of the special committee, stated:
. . . The Committee’s assignment was of another sort—  
to devise a research program, not to define terms. It had no 
real intention of defining postulates and gave very little 
attention to these sentences. I can remember no specific
1 R Report to Council of the Special Committee on Research 
Program," op. cit., p. 63.
^Maurice Moonitz, "The Basic Postulates of Accounting," 
Accounting Research Study No. 1 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 1961), p. 2.
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discussion of this "definition" in any of the committee's 
meetings.^0
As a consequence of adopting such a definition, Moonitz and 
others have attempted to derive accounting assumptions without under­
standing their nature and function. This misunderstanding has led the 
APB to deny that accounting principles are derived from accounting 
assumptions. The APB stated: "They [the principles] have developed
on the basis of experience, reason, and custom; they become generally 
accepted by agreement (often tacit agreement) and are not formally 
derived from a set of postulates. Accounting principles undoubt­
edly do develop from accounting practice, and accounting principles 
must relate to accounting practice. However, underlying these prin­
ciples are some assumptions regarding the concepts with which the 
practitioner deals. These assumptions are the basic assumptions of 
accounting.
Earlier Attempts Too Broad
A third criticism of many basic assumption studies is that 
they represent overambitious attempts at theory construction. It is 
highly unlikely for any one research effort to be able to study and 
develop a complete list of basic assumptions for the whole of
^Robert K. Mautz, "Place of Postulates in Accounting," The 
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. 119 (January, 1965), p. 46.
O  1 Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying 
Financial Statements of Business Enterprises," Statement of the 
Accounting Principles Board Mo. 4 (New York: American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, 1970), p. 12.
13
accounting. The best that can be done in any single study is to 
take only a small segment of accounting and determine either prescrip- 
tively or descriptively the basic assumptions underlying that specific 
segment.
Need for a Theory Structure
Previous research attempts have not yielded a set of gen­
erally accepted basic accounting assumptions because a proper frame-
(3work for accounting theories has not been provided. The deductive 
approach described in this study provides such a framework.
In summary, several reasons are cited why accounting lacks 
a generally accepted foundation of basic assumptions. These include
a confusion over the nature and function of basic assumptions, over-
ambitious attempts at theory construction, and the lack of a theory 
structure. All three of these reasons reflect a lack of under­
standing or application of the techniques of theory construction. 
Accounting researchers must understand and apply the techniques of 
theory construction to develop well-constructed and testable 
accounting theories.
Objectives of the Study
The objectives of this study are as follows:
(1) To describe the nature and function of basic assump­
tions in a theory or discipline by a detailed analysis 
of the techniques of theory construction;
(2) To demonstrate that the above is applicable to 
accounting by constructing an outline of a theory of
14
financial accounting measurement; and
(3) To demonstrate the wide applicability of theory con­
struction techniques in accounting by applying these 
techniques to a diverse sample of accounting topics.
This study hopes to contribute to accounting an understanding 
of the nature of basic assumptions in deductive theories. This anal­
ysis, conducted in light of current thought in the philosophy of 
science and social sciences, has important implications for accounting 
theory construction. Recent studies of accounting's basic assumptions 
have only superficially analyzed this area. In addition, through 
the demonstration of the use of basic assumptions in theory con­
struction, their wide applicability to accounting theory construction 
is shown.
Research Methodology 
In this study library research, deductive logic, and 
reduction were relied upon exclusively. Extensive library research 
was employed in studying the techniques of theory construction. The 
research results are presented in Chapters 2 and 3 which discuss the 
nature of basic assumptions and theorems in a deductive theory.
Library research was employed in a detailed study of measurement 
theory. Chapters 4 and 5 contain the outline of a theory of finan­
cial accounting measurement to illustrate the techniques of theory 
construction. To construct a theory of measurement in financial 
accounting, one must be knowledgeable of both measurement theory and 
theory construction. Library research was again undertaken in 
searching out other financial accounting examples in which the
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techniques of theory construction were directly applicable. These 
areas are discussed in Chapter 6.
Research Sources 
In studying theory construction, measurement, and other 
areas in the theory structure of financial accounting, researchers 
draw upon literature from many sources. Accounting literature, 
itself, contains the work of noted authors as Moonitz, Chambers, 
Sterling, and Mattessich. These and other authors have attempted 
to analyze and synthesize knowledge from a variety of sources and 
apply it to accounting. The Opinions of the Accounting Principles 
Board can also be studied. These opinions represent continuing 
efforts at accounting theory construction.
Researchers can also examine literature in the field of the 
philosophy of science. Areas contained in the philosophy of science 
that are particularly relevant to this study include the general 
composition of the deductive approach, the nature of basic assump­
tions and other techniques of theory construction, and the rules of 
deductive logic.
Closely related to the above is the study of the deductive 
approach found in the sciences and social sciences. Because the 
deductive approach has been used with great success in these areas, 
this study selects the deductive approach as best suited for devel­
oping a general theory of financial accounting.
Measurement theory can also be studied, first as a separate 
discipline, and then as applied to other disciplines in the sciences
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and social sciences. Knowledge gained in this study can then be 
applied in constructing the outline of a theory of financial 
accounting measurement which applies the techniques of theory 
construction to accounting.
Deduction and Reduction
This study employs both deductive and reductive methodologies. 
Deductive inference proceeds as follows: "If A, then B. A, there­
fore, B." In logic such an argument is called "affirming the ante­
cedent" or "modus ponena," and is logically valid. Deductive 
inference, inherent in the deductive approach, is the means by 
which theorems are derived from basic assumptions. Reductive 
inference, on the other hand, proceeds as follows: "If A, then B.
B, therefore A." In logic such an inference is referred to as "the 
fallacy of affirming the consequence." Since logic, itself, is con­
cerned only with universally valid statements,22 such an inference is 
invalid. However, in science the reductive methodology is encountered 
quite frequently. Any time an empirical hypothesis is tested and con­
firmed, the argument presented is in the form of a reductive 
inference. Because of this it is often said that the confirmation 
of an empirical hypothesis proves nothing. It is possible that future 
testing may prove the hypothesis false. An argument proving a given 
hypothesis false would have the form: "If A, then B. Not B, there­
fore not A." In logic such an argument is referred to as "denying
22 j. m . Bochenski, The Methods of Contemporary Thought,
trans. Peter Caws (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1965), p. 68.
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the consequence" or "modus tollens," and is logically valid. Being 
a logically valid argument, one could say that it proves a hypothesis 
false.
However, saying that the confirmation of an empirical hypoth­
esis proves nothings does not imply that such a confirmation is 
useless. Quite the contrary, each affirmative test of a hypothesis 
serves as further evidence of its truth, and is very useful.
Some tests of a hypothesis, because of the manner in which they are 
structured, provide more evidence than other tests. Each affirmative 
confirmation, although proving nothing, increases one's confidence 
that a given hypothesis is true.
At first glance the deductive approach and the reductive 
methodology may not seem compatible. But this is not the case. 
Reduction is frequently subdivided into what is called "inductive" 
and "non-inductive" reduction. This classification represents 
only one possible subdivision of reduction. Reduction can also be 
subdivided into regressive and progressive reduction. Recall that 
reduction proceeds as follows: "If A, then B. B, therefore A." In
regressive and progressive reduction the consequence, B, is known to 
be true. In regressive reduction an attempt is made to explain the 
consequence in terms of an antecedent, A, whose truth value is 
unknown. Regressive reduction or explanation is accomplished by 
constructing a deductive system in which the statements to be 
explained, the consequences, are derived as theorems. Causal and 
teleological explanation are permitted. Regressive reduction must 
always precede progressive reduction. In progressive reduction
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verification is added. From statements obtained initially through 
regressive reduction, an attempt is made within a deductive system 
to derive new statements which may be empirically verified. Thus, 
reduction is consistent with a deductive s y s t e m . 23
Definition of Key Terms
The purpose of this section is to give a brief definition of 
some key terms used in this study. Their meanings are made clearer 
as the study proceeds.
Deductive Approach
The essence of a deductive or axiomatic approach is that 
one group of statements, called theorems, is derived through the 
use of deductive logic applied to another more fundamental set of 
statements serving as basic assumptions. As used in this study the 
axiomatic approach is synonymous with the deductive approach. The 
term "axiomatic approach" places emphasis on axioms or basic 
assumptions. The term "deductive approach" emphasizes deductive 
logic. Examples in accounting where the deductive approach has 
been utilized include Ijiri's The Foundations of Accounting 
Measurement,̂  Mattessich's Accounting and Analytical Methods,̂ 5 
and Moonitz's Accounting Research Study No. 1, "The Basic Postulates
^^Ibid., pp. 92-95.
2^Yuji Ijiri, The Foundation of Accounting Measurement 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967).
25Richard Mattessich, Accounting and Analytical Methods 




The term "basic assumption" is used in this study in the same 
way as the term "postulate" has been used in accounting literature 
over the past fifty years. In this sense, basic assumptions represent 
the foundation statements in a deductive system. Postulates actually 
represent only one group of basic assumptions underlying accounting. 
Axioms and objectives, defined in Chapter 2, are two other types of 
basic assumptions underlying accounting. The term "basic assump­
tions," or simply "assumptions," normally is used to refer collec­
tively to the objectives, axioms, and postulates of accounting.
Concept
Concepts represent views or descriptions of some aspect of 
the real world. A concept of something is not the same as the thing 
itself. Concepts are by nature abstractions or surrogates. As 
abstractions they have no real existence. The things described by 
concepts may have a real or an assumed existence. If the thing 
described has an assumed existence, it cannot be directly perceived 
by the senses, but must be indirectly perceived, for example, 
accounting, revenue, or fairness.
^Maurice Moonitz, "The Basic Postulates of Accounting," 
Accounting Research Study No. 1 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 1961).
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Theory
A theory, defined as a set of logically related statements 
including some law-like basic assumptions having testable implications, 
is an explanation and description of some concept. All theories are 
deductive systems.
A deductive system is characterized by two outstanding fea­
tures: a set of basic assumptions and deductive logic. In general,
every theory can be reformulated in a deductive framework where every 
new statement in the theory is deductively derived from a set of basic 
assumptions.
A theory may be constructed about some aspect of a discipline 
such as revenue recognition, measurement, communication, ethics, or 
the treatment of leases in financial statements. Such theories may 
be broad or narrow depending on the concept the theory purports to 
describe, explain, and/or predict.
Furthermore, the boundaries of an entire discipline, such as 
accounting, are delimited and the discipline is implicitly defined 
by the assumptions of the theories that make up the discipline. In 
other words, the accounting discipline is made up of all the account­
ing theories that are generally accepted within accounting. Since 
every theory can be formulated in a deductive framework, so too can 
one conceptualize a general theory of the discipline. A general 
theory then consists of the basic assumptions of all the discipline’s 
theories and the statements deductively derived from these basic 
assumptions.
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Scope and Limitations of This Study 
The techniques of theory construction presented in this 
study are applicable to many areas of accounting theory construction. 
The assumptions stated in the theory of financial accounting measure­
ment represent only an outline of such a measurement theory. Emphasis 
is placed on demonstrating the use of the techniques of theory con­
struction, specifically the use of idealizations and the different 
types of basic assumptions. Theorems (also called principles) are 
not extensively developed. Assumptions in many areas related to this 
measurement theory, such as in mathematics, logic, communications, 
and psychology, are omitted. The measurement theory itself is limited 
to pure competition. Other conditions under which the theory applies 
are pointed out as the theory is developed.
In the applications to selected accounting topics in Chapter 6 
only specific aspects of each topic are discussed. Where necessary, 
an effort is made to supply unstated assumptions and to develop appro­
priate theorems. Also the use of idealizations and the different 
types of basic assumptions is evaluated.
Preview to This Study 
This study begins in Chapter 2 with an investigation of the 
nature of basic assumptions in deductive theories. Euclidean geom­
etry, the classic presentation of a deductive system, is studied.
Also, contemporary views on theory construction in the sciences and 
the social sciences are drawn on heavily. Chapter 3 contains an 
analysis of the entire structure of deductive theories drawing upon
these and other sources.
Chapter 4 begins a two-chapter sequence designed to illus­
trate the use of theory construction techniques in one extended 
example. Measurement theory is studied. This must precede any 
actual attempt to construct a theory of financial accounting measure­
ment.
In Chapter 5 a concept of financial accounting measurement 
is described. Then, regressive and progressive reduction are used 
to derive some of the key basic assumptions in the theory of finan­
cial accounting measurement previously described. Only a broad 
outline of the theory of financial accounting measurement is given. 
Emphasis is placed on demonstrating the theory construction tech­
niques in Chapters 2 and 3.
Chapter 6 applies the theory construction techniques pre­
sented in this study to selected but diverse areas of accounting 
research. Applications in these areas, along with application in 
the theory of financial accounting measurement presented in Chap­
ters 4 and 5, demonstrate that the techniques of theory construction 
used so successfully in the sciences and other social sciences are 
directly applicable to acccounting.
The final chapter includes summary and concluding remarks. 
Implications for future theory construction in accounting are given.
Chapter 2
THE NATURE OF BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
This chapter begins a two-chapter analysis of the techniques 
of theory construction. The objective of these two chapters is to 
describe the nature and function of basic assumptions in a theory or 
discipline. This is accomplished by a detailed analysis of the tech­
niques of theory construction conducted in light of current thought 
in the philosophy of science.
Chapter 2 concentrates on the nature of basic assumptions. 
First, the concept of basic assumptions as found in a deductive theory 
is examined. Then further insight on the nature of basic assumptions 
is gained when the Aristotelian and Euclidean concept of basic 
assumptions are investigated. Finally the problem of obtaining gen­
eral acceptance for a set of basic assumptions is discussed.
The nature of basic assumptions cannot be fully explored 
unless their relationship with the entire structure of a deductive 
theory is explored. Accordingly, Chapter 3 looks briefly at the 
entire structure of a deductive theory.
Basic Assumptions
What is meant by basic assumptions? Dictionary definitions 
connote that basic assumptions are some fundamental, self-evident,
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basic, underlying propositions about a concept.^ Rather than simply 
offering such a dictionary definition of the term "basic assump­
tions," it might be more helpful to investigate the term from several 
perspectives. The result is a rather lengthy description of the term 
"basic assumptions," but one essential to the purpose of this study. 
Understanding the nature of basic assumptions is essential if one is 
to employ basic assumptions in constructing accounting theories.
•̂Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English 
Language Unabridged, (2nd ed.; New York: The World Publishing Company,
1962) offers the following definitions of "assumption" and the 
synonyms "axiom" and "postulate" on pages 114, 132, and 1408, respec­
tively:
assumption— "1. an assuming or being assumed
2. anything taken for granted; supposition
3. presumption
4. a postulate or proposition assumed. In logic, the 
minor or second proposition in a categorical 
syllogism."
(Definitions 5 and 6 are not relevant for this study 
since they deal with assumption in the religious 
sense.)
axiom— "1. a self-evident truth or a proposition whose truth is so 
evident at first sight that no process of reasoning or 
demonstration can make it plainer; as, the whole is greater 
than a part.
2. an established principle in some art or science; a prin­
ciple received without new proof.
3. a statement universally accepted as true; a maxim."
postulate (noun)— "1. a proposition or supposition assumed without
proof, or one that is considered as self- 
evident, or too plain to require illustration; 
a proposition of which the truth is demanded 
or assumed for the purpose of future rea­
soning; a necessary assumption.
2. in mathematics, a self-evident problem, 
answering to axiom, which is a self-evident 
theorem.
3. a prerequisite.
4. a basic principle."
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In developing this description the relation of basic assump­
tions to a discipline's underlying concept is explored first. Second, 
insight is gained on the nature and appearance of basic assumptions. 
Third, several generally recognized characteristics or requirements 
of basic assumptions are examined.
Referant of Basic Assumptions 
It is impossible to discuss a discipline's basic assumptions 
without also discussing the discipline's particular concept.
What Is a Concept of a Discipline?
A concept of a discipline is a description of that discipline, 
including the conditions under which the description holds. This 
description may be presented narratively or in a set of basic assump­
tions. Normally, one begins with a narrative description of a dis­
cipline or a specific portion of a discipline and then proceeds 
reductively to determine the basic assumptions, including objectives, 
that underlie that concept of the discipline. The goal of this 
reduction is to identify only the essential basic assumptions that 
deductively yield the previously specified concept of the discipline. 
Hendriksen describes the deductive process:
The starting point for any field of study is to set 
forth its boundaries and determine its objectives. In the 
field of accounting, the objectives can be considered part of 
the postulates in the formal structure or they can be viewed 
as a set of propositions above or at the same level as the 
postulates. But it cannot be denied that some agreement on 
objectives is necessary to determine what postulates are 
relevant to accounting and to evaluate the principles and 
rules based on the postulates in order to determine whether 
or not they fulfill the requirements of the system. That is,
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the principles and rules should be logically derived from the 
postulates and meet the test of squaring with the basic 
objectives of accounting.2
Hendriksen uses the term "postulates" in this quote as this author
uses the term "basic assumptions."
The important point to note from Hendriksen1s statement is 
not the location of the objectives, which is simply a matter of 
choice, but that a determination of the objectives for accounting 
precedes a determination of the other basic assumptions. Further­
more, the objectives are functionally different from the other basic 
assumptions and represent a separate set of statements at or near 
their level.
Does the Concept of a Discipline Change?
The concept of a discipline first must be determined before 
the basic assumptions of that discipline can be determined. However, 
every discipline is constantly being exposed to new discoveries 
within itself and from other disciplines. Therefore, the concept of 
a discipline is constantly changing, making a complete determination 
of its basic assumptions an unattainable or a momentarily attainable 
goal.
Only a slight change in the concept of a discipline may 
necessitate changes in its basic assumptions. This fact partially 
explains why no two sets of basic assumptions identified in any two 
accounting studies have been exactly the same. Each of these studies,
^Eldon S. Hendriksen, Accounting Theory (Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1965), p. 81.
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from Paton through APB Statement No. 4, was undertaken at a different 
point in time. Accounting as practiced today is different from 
accounting as practiced in 1922, when Paton*s Accounting Theory-* was 
published. This change in the concept of accounting was not sudden. 
Rather, it was a gradual, evolutionary change. The author of each 
study probably had a different concept of accounting in mind. Therefore, 
slightly different basic assumptions were obtained. Unfortunately, 
not all of these authors specified the concept of accounting they 
studied. Each of these authors may also have had a different concept 
regarding the nature and function of basic assumptions. These dif­
ferences resulted in the specification of different basic assumptions.
Euclidean geometry sheds light on another possible reason why 
no two accounting assumption studies have been alike. The theorems 
of Euclidean geometry have been derived from different basic assump­
tions using different primitive terms by different mathematicians. In 
addition to Euclid, for example, Hilbert utilized twenty-one assump­
tions and five primitive terms, andVeblen utilized twelve assumptions 
and only two primitive terms.^ All efforts yielded Euclidean 
geometry. Likewise, it is possible that two accounting researchers, 
starting with an identical concept of accounting and working 
independently, could reductively derive different basic
William Andrew Paton, Accounting Theory (New York: The
Ronald Press Company, 1922).
^Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, "The Nature of a Logical 
or Mathematical System," Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 
eds. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, Inc., 1953), p. 140.
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assumptions underlying their concept of accounting. The basic 
assumptions may differ because the authors employed different 
primitive terms, different levels of language^ and/or different 
phraseology. But the end product of these basic assumptions, a 
given concept of accounting, would be the same. Thus, one set of 
assumptions should be logically derivable from the other set.
Appearance of Basic Assumptions
Both the accounting theorist Hendriksen and the economic 
theorist Schumpeter have pointed out that basic assumptions may seem 
trivial. Hendriksen stated: "The postulates are not necessarily
numerous or complicated, they may even seem trivial or obvious. 
Schumpeter wrote:
. . . But we must not forget that the proudest 
intellectual structures rest on trivalities that are entirely 
uninteresting in themselves. What could be more trivial than 
that a body at rest will remain at rest unless something (a 
"force") acts to set it in motion (Newton’s First Law)? Let 
us, then, look at the structure that was erected on those 
trivialities.̂
Einstein once said it is not the function of science to give 
the taste of the soup; a description of the soup is enough. A basic 
assumption may contain concepts that are not exact descriptions of the 
real world. Science often employs such concepts. Scientists find
5John W. Buckley, Paul Kircher, and Russell L. Mathews, 
"Methodology in Accounting Theory," The Accounting Review, Vol. 43 
(April, 1968), p. 279.
^Hendriksen, op. cit., p. 4.
^Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, edited 
from a manuscript by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1954), p. 911.
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such "idealized" concepts, although not strictly descriptive of 
realtity, useful generalizations. Examples of "idealized" concepts 
include assumptions of "a rational man," "frictionless forces," 
"ideal gas," and "perfect competition." Also, Einstein's use of 
Riemannian non-Euclidean geometry in his theory of relativity assumes 
that the universe has a constant curvature. Today it is known that 
the curvature is not constant.
Idealized concepts are not to be used loosely. Such terms 
have very explicit definitions or descriptions. Their use often 
allows scientists to simplify complicated phenomena. Idealized 
concepts aid theory construction by preventing theories from getting 
bogged down in detailed attempts at describing reality. Idealized 
concepts are "true" descriptions of reality but under conditions in 
which many possible unimportant distorting influences are ignored.
The essential points of the theories are emphasized, not the details 
of unimportant aspects of the phenomena. Total descriptions of 
reality are doubtlessly impossible.
Concerning these "ideal" concepts, Nagel has- said:
In many sciences, relations of dependence between 
phenomena are often stated with reference to so-called 
"pure cases" or "ideal types" of the phenomena being 
investigated. That is, such theoretical statements (or 
"laws") formulate relations specified to hold under highly 
"purified" conditions between highly "idealized" objects or 
processes, none of which is actually encountered in experience.
In short, unrealistic theoretical statements serve 
as a powerful means for analyzing, representing, and codifying 
relations of dependence between actual phenomena.®
®Ernest Nagel, "Assumptions in Economic Theory," American 
Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, May, 1963, pp. 215-216.
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In critically analyzing a theory, the view is often taken 
that when all else fails, one can always criticize its basic assump­
tions. It is apparently felt that if these basic assumptions are at 
variance with the real world then the basic assumptions are incorrect 
and the theory is weak. However, in many cases these basic assump­
tions simply contain "idealized concepts" which, as shown above, are 
quite common and indispensable in science. In view of this situation, 
a criticism of the basic assumptions of a theory is severely limited. 
If the theory fails to adequately describe and explain or leads to 
false predictions, then the basic assumptions may be legitimately 
criticized. If a theory utilizing "idealized concepts" accomplishes 
what it sets out to do, then any criticism of the theory's "idealized 
concepts" is a weak one.
Characteristics of Basic Assumptions 
Several characteristics^ are generally required of statements 
before they are accepted as basic assumptions. A set of basic assump­
tions should have a certain aesthetic quality, and should be consist­
ent, independent, reproductive, and complete. This refers to both a 
single basic assumption and a set of basic assumptions. Requirements 
of a deductive system are discussed in the next chapter.
An Aesthetic Quality
A certain aesthetic quality is usually required of a single 
basic assumption or a single set of basic assumptions. Normally it
^Some or all of these requirements have been discussed by 
several authors including Barker, Wilder, Eves and Newsom, and others.
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is desirable to state a basic assumption as simply as possible. 
Euclid’s basic assumptions provide an example. Euclid's fifth pos­
tulate is longer and more involved than any of his other four pos­
tulates. Many attempts were made to show either that this fifth 
postulate was derivable from his other four postulates or was 
replaceable with a simpler postulate. However, all attempts failed. 
It is interesting to note, however, that this effort led to the dis­
covery of non-Euclidean geometry.
It is also desired that a set of basic assumptions contain 
the minimum number of basic assumptions necessary. Both these 
aesthetic requirements must be taken together. A set of basic 
assumptions could conceivably be stated in one rather long and 
cumbersome statement. But cumbersome statements are ruled out by 
the requirement that individual basic assumptions be as simple as 
possible. Bochenski has pointed out that this aesthetic tendency is 
sometimes taken to the point where a single, unclear statement is 
employed rather than several perfectly clear statements. Opera­
tionally, determining the simpler of competing statements can be 
difficult. Application of a criterion would be helpful in selecting 
the simpler statement. But Hempel points out that although some 
recent efforts have yielded interesting results, no satisfactory 
criterion for judging simplicity is available.H
10J. M. Bochenski, The Methods of Contemporary Thought, 
trans. Peter Caws (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1965), p. 72.
11Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, InCi, 1966), p. 42.
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Consistency
A set of basic assumptions also must be consistent. They
are said to be consistent if they do not contradict each other.
Consistency is a very important requirement. Mathematical logic
has shown that every statement in a system is derivable from a
1 0single contradiction.  ̂ Thus, if contradictory statements were 
allowed in the assumptions of a theory, that theory could be used 
to prove both a statement and a contradiction. But, a statement and 
its contradiction cannot both be true in any particular place at any 
particular time. Such a theory is useless.
Independence
A third requirement is that the basic assumptions be inde­
pendent. A basic assumption is independent if it cannot be derived 
from the other basic assumptions of the system. This requirement is 
similar to the aesthetic requirements. The absence of independence 
of the basic assumptions will not destroy the system. However, know­
ing that the basic assumptions are independent allows one to differ­
entiate between the basic assumptions of a discipline and the theorems 
derived from those basic assumptions.
Reproductivity
Basic assumptions should be reproductive; they should logically 
imply many theorems. If a set of basic assumptions do not imply any 
theorems, they are useless. In such a case the assumptions convey
•^Bochenski, loc. cit.
very little information about a concept.
Completeness
Finally, it is desirable that no unstated basic assumptions 
be used in deriving the theorems about a concept. Euclid uninten­
tionally employed assumptions not included among his axioms and 
postulates. Such a violation does not destroy a system, but does 
make the system less than ideal.
Aristotelian and Euclidean Conception of Basic Assumptions 
Earlier it was seen that objectives, though part of the set 
of statements referred to as basic assumptions, represent a distinct 
subset of statements. In this section an attempt is made to further 
subdivide the remaining statements in a set of basic assumptions.
Postulates and Axioms: The Distinction
The term "postulate" is not new. It has been used since the 
time of Aristotle, 384-321 B.C. Aristotle made an important dis­
tinction between a postulate and an axiom. Eves and Newson have 
stated:
. . .  We thus seem to have, according to Aristotle, the 
following four distinctions between an axiom and a postulate.
An axiom is common to all sciences, whereas a postulate is 
related to a particular science; an axiom is self-evident, whereas 
a postulate is not; an axiom cannot be regarded as a subject for 
demonstration, whereas a postulate is properly such a subject; 
an axiom is assumed with the ready assent of the learner, whereas 
a postulate is assumed without, perhaps, the assent of the 
learner.
13Howard Eves and Carroll V. Newsom, An Introduction to the 
Foundations and Fundamental Concepts of Mathematics (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1958), pp. 30-31.
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This distinction was not universal. Since Aristotle,the terms 
"postulate" and "axiom" have frequently been used interchangeably.
Copi has stated: "The contemporary practice is to draw no such
distinction, but to regard all the unproved, initial propositions of 
a deductive system as having the same standing, and to refer to them- 
all, indifferently, as 'axioms’ or as 'postulates,' without attaching 
any difference in meaning to these two terms.Disregarding contem­
porary usage, an examination of the Aristotelian distinction between 
postulates and axioms may yield an important insight concerning such 
statements.
Euclid's Use of Postulates and Axioms
Euclid, whose use of postulates and axioms has been considered 
the classic example, made use of the Aristotelian distinction.^
Euclid employed two groups of statements, one called "postulates" and 
the other called "axioms" or "common notions." These two groups of 
statements are shown in Table 1 on the next page. Euclid's postulates 
primarily were statements about geometry. His axioms or common 
notions, concerned with magnitudes, were meant to apply to many 
fields.
Barker further clarifies the distinction between postulates 
and axioms which Euclid and others apparently had in mind. Barker
14Ibid., p. 31.
l-*Irving M. Copi, Symbolic Logic (3rd ed.; New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 181.
■^Eves and Newsom, op. cit., p. 34.
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Table 1
Euclid's Postulates and Common Notions
Postulates
Let the following be postulated:
1. To draw a straight line from any point to any point.
2. To produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight 
line.
3. To describe a circle with any centre and distance.
4. That all right angles are equal to one another.
5. That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines make
the interior angles on the same side less than two right 
angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet 
on that side on which are the angles less than the two right 
angles.
Common Notions
1. Things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to 
one another.
2. If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal.
3. If equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders are 
equal.
4. Things which coincide with one another are equal to one 
another.
5. The whole is greater than the part.
Source:
Sir Thomas L. Heath, trans., "The Thirteen Books of Euclid's 
Elements," Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 2 (Chicago:




. . . The Greeks probably would have thought that there 
was this difference between the axioms and the postulates as 
regards their believability: that if a person were to doubt or
deny the postulates of geometry, he would of course be making a 
mistake and he would thereby disqualify himself for thinking 
about geometry; but he might nevertheless be able to think 
soundly about other subjects (such as arithmetic, biology, or 
music). Whereas, if a person were to doubt or deny the axioms 
about magnitude [common notions], he would thereby show himself 
unfit for thinking about practically every serious intellectual 
subject; for all, or nearly all, subjects in one way or another 
employ the notion of magnitude. '
Postulates and Axioms: Observations
on the Distinction
Reflecting on both the Aristotelian distinction between
axioms and postulates and Euclid's use of these two separate groups
of statements, several important observations can be made.
Knowledge Borrowed From Other Disciplines
Euclid could not have derived his propositions of geometry 
without the aid of both his axioms and his postulates. Any body of 
knowledge concerned with magnitudes must employ Euclid's or some 
other list of axioms of magnitude among its fundamental assumptions. 
Accounting, for example, employs the concept of magnitude. There­
fore, it must include in its fundamental assumptions a list of axioms 
of magnitude. In addition, accounting is concerned with other areas: 
for example, measurement, communications, economics, behavior, logic, 
and ethics. Accordingly, accounting must include axioms concerning 
each of these areas among its fundamental assumptions. These axioms,
■^Stephen F. Barker, Philosophy of Mathematics (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 20.
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like the axioms of magnitude, are shared with a great many other 
disciplines.
That these groups of axioms, shared among other disciplines, 
also form part of any complete list of the basic assumptions of 
accounting is an important point. Just as geometry could not be 
fully developed without the axioms of magnitude, accounting cannot 
be fully developed without axioms of magnitude, measurement, com­
munications, economics, behavior, logic, ethics, and others.
Rudner has discussed a clue which helps in recognizing 
when one discipline is assuming knowledge from another discipline. 
This clue is the presence of nonindigenous terms in a theory.
Rudner states:
The importance of focusing attention on nonindigenous 
terms in partially formalized theories rests in the fact that 
their occurrence will usually indicate that some portion 
(large or small) of the results of some other discipline 
or area of knowledge is being presupposed in the theory. Thus, 
for example, the occurrence of "temperature" in a presently 
physiological theory would indicate that a portion of physics 
was being systematically presupposed in the physiological 
theory.16
To the extent that knowledge assumed from other disciplines escapes 
explicit recognition in a listing of basic assumptions, that listing 
is incomplete.
Knowledge Indigenous to a Discipline
In addition to the axioms of magnitude, to develop geometry 
Euclid also needed postulates. These postulates were thought to
■^Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 48-49.
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relate only to geometry. Euclid’s postulates made geometry a 
distinct body of knowledge, for example, distinct from physics. With­
out such a unique set of postulates nothing would distinguish one 
body of knowledge from another. Accounting, likewise, must employ 
a group of fundamental statements unique to itself. These fundamental 
statements are essential if accounting or any other discipline is to
exist as a separate body of knowledge.
In reality, however, it is easy to imagine Euclid's unique 
postulates of geometry or accounting1 s postulates employed in other 
disciplines. This situation occurs whenever one discipline utilizes 
knowledge from another discipline. However, this utilization does 
not deny the separate existence of the other discipline. The 
uniqueness of that other discipline does not lie in the uses made of 
its knowledge, but rather in the existence of the knowledge itself.
It is the unique postulates of a discipline that set it apart from 
other disciplines as a separate and distinct body of knowledge.
In summary, when discussing the basic assumptions that under­
lie a body of knowledge, both axioms held in common with other dis­
ciplines and a discipline's own unique set of postulates must be 
discussed. Whether the terms "axioms" and "postulates" are used 
interchangeably or not, two distinct sets of statements are inev­
itably involved. These two sets of statements are derived only after 
another set of statements embodying the objectives of a discipline 
have been specified.
Circular Reasoning
Another important observation on the Aristotelian and
Euclidean distinction between axioms and postulates can be made by 
reflecting on their self-evidence, demonstrability, assentation, and 
applicability. Axioms were considered applicable to many fields. 
Perhaps because of this widespread applicability they were regarded 
as self-evident. Hence axioms were readily assented to and needed 
no demonstration. On the other hand, postulates were considered 
applicable to only one field. Perhaps, because of this they were not 
regarded as self-evident. Therefore, postulates were not readily 
assented to and were considered in need of demonstration. The key 
seems to be whether the particular statement was self-evident. 
However, self-evidence apparently depends on universal acceptability, 
which in turn depends on self-evidence.
This distinction between axioms and postulates appears to be 
based either on circular reasoning or some other unspecified assump­
tion. There is no apparent reason why axioms and postulates cannot 
both be considered self-evident. Self-evidence of such statements 
certainly appears, at first glance, to be desirable. Therefore, the 
following discussion ignores this distinction and treats both axioms 
and postulates as candidates for self-evidence. Reliability of this 
self-evidence criterion for both axioms and postulates is examined.
In addition the susceptability of axioms and postulates to demon­
stration is also considered.
Obtaining General Acceptance for 
Axioms and Postulates
Before proceding to a discussion of how axioms and postulates 
can obtain general acceptance, the need for such statements might be
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explained. This is done by an analogy with language.
The Need for Axioms and Postulates 
Axioms and postulates are needed because all knowledge must 
be based ultimately on certain assumptions. Without this, all know­
ledge would involve either circular reasoning or an infinite series 
of assumptions, each based on the assumption preceding it. An 
analogous situation also exists in language. Certain terms in 
language, whether natural language or artificial language, must remain 
undefined. To attempt to define these primitive terms would result in 
the language either introducting an infinite series of terms or would 
involve circular reasoning.
For example, assume that in studying a new language a reader 
encountered the word "inscrutable" and was not sure of its meaning.
On looking this word up in the dictionary, he found only the word 
"enigmatic," and was also uncertain of its meaning. He then looked 
that word up in the dictionary, found it defined as "puzzling," and 
was uncertain of its meaning. So he looked up "puzzling" and found 
it defined as "mysterious." With a new word introduced in each 
definition this process could continue ad infinitum.
On the other hand, suppose on looking up the original word, 
"inscrutable," he again found it defined by the word "enigmatic." On 
looking up the word "enigmatic," he discovered it defined by the word 
"inscrutable." If he does not know the meaning of either term, he is 
caught in a hopeless dilemma. This procedure is an example of 
circular reasoning. As long as the sequence of definitions leads
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back to the original word, circular reasoning occurs. The only 
solution is a listing of primitive or undefined terms.
The primitive terms of a language must be listed in advance
with no meaning assigned to them. They are then used to define other
terms. These other terms, along with the primitives, are used to 
define all the words of a language.
Just as the primitives must be used in a language, objectives,
axioms, and postulates must be used as the basic assumptions that
underlie a discipline of knowledge. Without the use of basic assump­
tions, each statement about a discipline would have to be justified 
either by an infinite series of other statements, or by circular 
reasoning in appealing to one or more other statements already in the 
set. The only solution is to reductively identify a set of basic 
assumptions concerning a concept of a discipline that will be treated 
analogous to primitive terms in a language.
Basic Assumptions and Self-Evidence 
The basic assumptions of a discipline need to be generally 
accepted by both researchers in that discipline and researchers in 
other related disciplines. Relying on self-evident statements would 
be one way to attain this general acceptance. Axioms and postulates 
must be self-evident to appeal to all reasonable men. They also must 
have sufficient content to be capable of being used to derive other 
less obvious statements called theorems. One could also use the self­
evidence of these theorems as further evidence for accepting the 
underlying basic assumptions.
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Stating all basic assumptions in a way making them self- 
evident certainly would be advantageous. But Cohen and Nagel have 
pointed out that what is self-evident to one person may not be self- 
evident to all persons. Cultural conditions and individual training
are determining factors. Furthermore, Cohen and Nagel point out that 
at various times contradictory propositions concerning many topics 
have been held to be self-evident.^ Geometry provides an excellent 
example of this point. Euclid's postulates appear to be self-evident. 
Yet each of Euclid's postulates has at least one contradiction. The 
eventual denial of Euclid's fifth postulate led to Riemannian and 
Lobachevskian non-Euclidean geometries.
Consequences of the three types of geometries question heavy 
reliance on so-called "self-evident" basic assumptions. Poincare has 
pointed out:
There is a sort of opposition between Riemann's 
geometry and that of Lobachevski.
Thus the sum of the angles of a triangle is: Equal to
two right angles in Euclid's geometry; Less than two 
right angles in that of Lobachevski; Greater than two 
right angles in that of Riemann.
The number of straights through a given point that 
can be drawn coplanar to a given straight, but nowhere meeting 
it, is equal:
To one in Euclid's geometry 
To zero in that of Riemann;
To infinity in that of Lobachevski.^®
Despite the fact that the above statements of Riemannian and
l^Cohen and Nagel, op. cit., p. 131.
2®Henri Poincare, "Non-Euclidean Geometries and the Non- 
Euclidean World," Readings in the Philosophy,of Science, eds. 
Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., 1953), p. 173.
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Lobachevskian non-Euclidean geometries do not appear self-evident, 
these geometries do seem to be valid. That they are not merely 
logical exercises is evident when one realizes it was Riemannian 
non-Euclidean geometry that Einstein used in his theory of rel­
ativity. 21 Reliance on the self-evidence of a statement, though 
desirable, is risky.
Analytic and Synthetic Statements— A Solution?
Applying one of Kant's ideas offers a possible solution to 
this delimna concerning self-evident statements. Kant originated 
the concepts of analytic and synthetic judgments. Modern philosophers 
prefer to talk about analytic and synthetic statements. A statement 
is analytic if and only if understanding the statement is sufficient 
to know its truth value. An example of an analytic statement is:
"All bachelors are unmarried." Another example in accounting is: 
"Assets equals equities." If one simply understands the statement's 
concepts, then one knows the statement is true. On the other hand, 
in a synthetic statement, the mere understanding of the concepts in 
the statement is never sufficient to enable one to know whether the 
statement is true. In a synthetic statement some outside element 
must be added to determine the statement's truth value. An example 
of a synthetic statement is: "No pigs fly." Knowledge about pigs
and flying must be added from outside the statement to determine its 
truth value.
Kant explained analytic and synthetic statements in a second
^Barker, op. cit., p. 50.
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way which he and many modern philosophers consider equivalent to 
Kant’s first explanation. According to this explanation, a statement 
is analytic if it is true solely by virtue of its logical form: for
example, "All dogs are dogs." A statement is also analytic if it can 
be transformed by definitions into another statement that is true 
because of its logical f o r m . 22
It would be very helpful if basic assumptions could be stated 
as analytic statements. Their truth value could then be known through 
understanding the concepts involved. No empirical evidence would be 
necessary to verify analytical statements. However, analytic state­
ments may be self-evident but they do not contain sufficient content 
to convey anything meaningful. If analytical statements used for 
axioms and postulates do not have any meaningful content, then no 
meaningful theorems can be derived from them. Synthetic statements, 
on the other hand, can contain sufficient content to be meaningful, 
but appeal must be made to empirical evidence to determine their truth 
value.
Demonstration of Basic Assumptions:
As a Logical Proof
In a deductive system, axioms and postulates are basic 
assumptions. If the axioms or postulates could be derived from some 
other statements in the system, they would be theorems rather than 
basic assumptions. Any logical proof then must appeal to statements
22wesley C. Salmon, Logic (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 97-101; and Barker, pp. cit., 
pp. 7-10; and others.
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outside the particular system under study if axioms or postulates 
are to remain basic assumptions.
Axiom or postulate statements are basic assumptions only in 
relation to a particular deductive system. It is possible to derive 
an assumption in one system from a given set of assumptions in a 
second system. This second system could then be used as a logical 
proof or demonstration of a particular axiom or postulate. However, 
a logical proof is valid only if the basic assumptions are valid, 
assuming the logic is correct. Therefore, a logical proof only shows 
that the given assumption in one system is valid if the basic assump­
tions of the other system are valid. One could then conceivably 
derive a basic assumption of the second system from basic assumptions 
of a third system. But the validity of this proof depends on the 
validity of the basic assumptions of the third system. This process 
then proves nothing. The earlier analogy with language showed this 
process could be carried on ad infinitum, or circular reasoning could 
be employed to end the process. Both of these alternatives are 
generally considered undesirable. The only remaining solution is to 
accept one set of axioms and postulates as basic assumptions. This 
set might as well be the assumptions contained in the first system.
An appeal to a second system might be worthwhile, if evidence 
has been gathered which supports the assumptions and theorems of that 
second system. Subsequent assumption and theorem verification in the 
second system would yield evidence that the first system's assumptions 
and theorems were valid. Although such a procedure proves nothing, it 
does furnish evidence of the validity of the first system. This
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evidence is, however, based on an empirical demonstration of the 
second system.
Demonstration of Basic Assumptions:
As an Empirical Proof
The word "demonstrate" can also be used to connote empirical 
proof. It should be noted that the word "proof" is used here very 
loosely. Empirical evidence can never prove anything, it can only 
disprove something. This point is discussed in Chapter 1. No matter 
how many times a given statement has been empirically tested and 
validated, it is always possible that the next test may disprove the 
statement. Each empirical test only gathers further evidence that a 
given statement is true. With each successful test of a statement 
one’s confidence of its validity increases.
Once it has been decided to test a set of basic assumptions, 
two alternatives are open. First, the basic assumptions themselves 
can be tested directly. Secondly, the basic assumptions can be 
tested indirectly by testing their derived theorems.
Direct Testing of the Basic Assumptions
From logic one knows that if the basic assumptions are valid, 
then the theorems deductively derived from the basic assumptions must 
also be valid. Since there are fewer basic assumptions to test, val­
idation of a theory would be easier if only the basic assumptions had 
to be tested. But there is a danger in relying solely on a test of 
the basic assumptions. An example from geometry points to this danger.
If the assumptions of Euclidean geometry had been tested,
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they would probably have been accepted, since they agree with one's 
view of the physical world. However, if the assumptions of non- 
Euclidean geometry were tested, they might have been rejected, since 
a contradiction or denial of Euclid's fifth postulate contradicts 
one's view of the physical world. Because of the subsequent val­
idation of Einstein's theory of relativity, which utilized Riemannian 
non-Euclidean geometry, one has evidence of the validity of one form 
of non-Euclidean geometry.
Both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries appear to be 
logically correct. Since different empirical evidence seems to con­
firm both, which evidence is to be believed? In reality both must 
be believed. Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries are both valid, 
as they are simply descriptions of. different concepts of geometry. 
Since they describe different concepts of geometry, the assumptions 
are also different. Each concept of geometry is a description of 
different parts of the real world; each concept is valid within its 
limits.
Concerning empirical testing of the basic assumptions, Cohen 
and Nagel have pointed out that attempting to establish the truth 
value of the basic assumptions empirically is seldom used in science:
. . .  It follows that axioms need not be known to be 
true before the theorems are known, and in general the axioms 
of a science are much less evident psychologically than the 
theorems. In most sciences, as we shall see, the material 
truth of the theorems is not established by means of first 
showing the material truth of the axioms. On the contrary, the 
material truth of axioms is made probable by establishing 
empirically the truth or the probability of the theorems.^3
^Cohen and Nagel, op. cit., p. 132.
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A simple test of only the basic assumptions must then be 
rejected. Such a test is too closely tied to the concept of self­
evidence, which an earlier discussion showed to be an unreliable 
criterion for accepting or rejecting basic assumptions. Subsequent 
discussion in this chapter concerning theoretical concepts also 
provides further evidence that a test of only the basic assumptions 
is unreliable.
Indirect Testing of the Basic Assumptions
The second alternative to be considered involves testing the 
basic assumptions indirectly. This alternative is accomplished by 
testing the statements (theorems) logically implied by the basic 
assumptions. If the rules of logic are properly followed in deduc­
tively deriving the theorems from the basic assumptions, then the 
truth of the theorems depends solely on the truth of the basic 
assumptions. If sufficient evidence can be gathered showing that 
the theorems are valid, it also helps to establish the validity of 
the basic assumptions. Again it should be noted that such evidence 
never proves a basic assumption or a theorem valid. It only increases 
one’s confidence that a given basic assumption or a theorem is valid. 
The following discussion will examine some other problems in valida­
ting a set of basic assumptions.
Lessor-Order Problems
Hempel has stated the case requiring empirical testability 
as follows:
. . .  no statement or set of statements T can be 
significantly proposed as a scientific hypothesis or theory
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unless it is amenable to objective empirical test, at least 
"in principle." This is to say that it must be possible to 
derive from T, in the broad sense we have considered, certain 
test implications of the form "if test conditions C are real­
ized, then outcome E will occur;" but the test conditions need 
not be realized or technologically realizable at the time when 
T is propounded or contemplated.24
From a set of assumptions, T, it is possible to derive a 
great many theorems. For example, Euclid derived 465 theorems from 
his initial assumptions, his ten axioms and postulates, plus a few 
other unstated assumptions. This is not to say that every theorem 
has to be tested separately, for many theorems may be testable 
together. It is clear that such testing is not simple. Furthermore, 
most tests must be performed several times under similar and varying 
conditions. The extent of such testing, of course, depends on the 
complexity of the theory involved. If it is as complex as a theory 
of financial accounting, the complexity of the testing is consid­
erable.
Hempel also pointed out that a theory may not be testable at 
a given time because of technological limits. A theory needs to be 
testable only "in principle." The inability to test a theory with 
current knowledge or under current conditions does not invalidate a 
theory, nor does it make the theory an improper subject for study.
All of Einstein's theory could not be tested when he first developed 
it. Parts of it are, in fact, still being tested today.
If the theroy is new, the inability to test it currently must 
be expected. Its testing may require unavailable data, or physical
^Hempel, op. cit. , p. 30.
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conditions that occur infrequently. Testing may require equipment 
which has not yet been built. In all these cases, it should be 
sufficient to point out how the theory can be tested.
The preceding problems, though troublesome, can be overcome. 
The following discussion looks at some contemporary philosophical 
problems that at present have no acceptable solution.
Higher-Order Problem
Every scientific concept is not empirically testable. This 
fact seriously complicates the verification of scientific theories.
Dispositional and Theoretical Concepts.— The natural sciences 
and the social sciences have been unable to get along without dispo­
sitional and theoretical concepts which are not empirically testable. 
Rudner discusses these two concepts. In general, dispositional con­
cepts refer to unobservable characteristics of observable things. It 
is a claim that something has a disposition or potential for showing 
a particular characteristic, rather than actually showing that char­
acteristic. For example, combustible is a dispositional concept; 
burning is not. Other examples of dispositional concepts include 
many "ible," "uble," and "able" words. In particular, words such as 
"soluble," "observable," "magnetic," "elastic," "attitude," "reflex," 
"habit," "response," "repetoire," "personality," "hardness," "con­
ductor" are all dispositional concepts. Theoretical concepts, refer 
to unobservable characteristics of unobservable things. Examples of 
such concepts include electron, superego, institutional inertia, 
cultural lag, length, volume, mass, charge, habit strength, demand,
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age, preference, and variables.25 The essence of these two types of 
concepts is that both involve nonobservables.
Scientist Versus Philosopher View on Observables.— The dis­
tinction between an observable and a nonobservable is not sharp.
Carnap issues a warning that should be heeded when one encounters 
a discussion of observables and nonobservables. Carnap states:
. . . Philosophers and scientists have quite different 
ways of using the terms "observables" and "nonobservables." To 
a philosopher, "observables" has a very narrow meaning. It 
applies to such properties as "blue", "hard", "hot". These are 
properties directly perceived by the senses. To the physicist, 
the word has a much broader meaning. It includes any quantita­
tive magnitude that can be measured in a relatively simple, 
direct way. A philosopher would not consider a temperature of, 
perhaps, 80 degrees centigrade, or a weight of 93-1/2 pounds, 
an observable because there is no direct sensory perception of 
such magnitudes. To a physicist, both are observables because 
they can be measured in an extremely simple way.^6
Carnap also points out that measurements that are complicated and
indirect, such as determining the mass of a molecule or an electron,
are considered nonobservable to the p h y s i c i s t . 27 Carnap's distinction
between observables and nonobservables is adopted here. That is,
things are considered observable if they can be directly perceived by
the senses or measured by relatively simple techniques.
It is obvious that dispositional concepts and theoretical 
concepts play a very important and currently indispensable role in 
scientific theories. However, since they are not observable or
25Rudner, op. cit., pp. 21-23.
26Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics (New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966), p. 225.
27Ibid., p. 226.
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empirically verifiable characteristics of things, they are not 
empirically testable. Because of this fact they should not be used 
as primitive terms in scientific theories. While they still could 
be introduced into theories as defined terms, they provide excep­
tional definitional problems. It appears, at least at the present 
time, that science cannot get along without the use of dispositional 
and theoretical concepts in scientific theories. Therefore, some­
thing less than complete testability of theories and likewise assump­
tions must be a c c e p t e d . ^8
Accounting Concepts.— The problems posed for accounting are 
obvious. Many accounting concepts are either dispositionals or theoret- 
icals, depending on the particular things to which they refer. For 
example, when concepts such as revenue or value are used in connection with 
specific observable assets, dispositional concepts are being employed. 
When these same concepts are used in connection with an unobservable 
business entity, theoretical concepts are being employed. Further­
more, when assets are defined as "service potentials," the concepts 
become theoreticals rather than dispositionals. Other examples of 
such unobservable concepts in accounting include income, earnings, 
depreciation, expense, gopdwill, opportunity cost, amortization.
Also included are all conepts with ethical connotations, such as 
fairness, usefulness, truth, objectivity, and understandability.
Such ethical considerations, while necessary in nearly every body of
28Rudner, pp. cit,, pp. 21-23.
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knowledge, are indispensable in a service activity such as accounting.
To the extent that these concepts enter into theories of 
accounting through the basic assumptions, these concepts make theories 
less than completely testable. While it would be preferable to avoid 
such concepts in accounting, the very nature of the discipline deems 
such avoidance almost impossible.
In summary, while synthetic statements offer meaningful con­
tent, the presence of dispositional and theoretical concepts in those 
statements inhibit their empirical testability. When such concepts 
appear in objectives, axioms, and postulates, these concepts are 
carried over into the theorems derived from these basic assumptions, 
and the empirical testability of the theorems is inhibited.
A Partial Solution
Hempel has discussed a partial solution to this problem. In 
addition to basic assumptions of a theory which contain the dispo­
sitional and theoretical concepts (he calls them internal principles), 
Hempel identifies another type of basic as s u mptions called bridge 
principles. He explains these two as follows:
. . . For the internal principles of a theory are 
concerned with the peculiar entities and processes assumed by 
the theory . . . and they will therefore be expressed largely 
in terms of characteristic "theoretical concepts," which refer 
to those entities and processes. But the implications that 
permit a test of those theoretical principles will have to be 
expressed in terms of things and occurrences with which we are 
antecedently acquainted, which we already know how to observe, 
to measure, and to describe. In other words, while the internal 
principles of a theory are couched in its characteristic 
theoretical terms . . . the test implications must be formulated 
in terms which are "antecedently understood," as we might say, 
terms that have been introduced prior to the theory and can be 
used independently of it. Let us refer to them as antecedently
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available or pretheoretical terms. The derivation of such test 
implications from the internal principles of the theory evidently 
requires further premises that establish connections between the 
two sets of concepts; and this . . .is accomplished by appro­
priate bridge principles. . . . Without bridge principles, the 
internal principles of a theory would yield no test implications, 
and the requirement of testability would be violated.^9
Bridge principles connect nonobservable concepts with concepts that 
are observable and measurable or with previously established theories 
and their observable and measurable a s p e c t s .
The adjective term "bridge" used by Hempel is only one term 
among many describing this type of connecting statement. Scientists 
uniformly attest to the need for such connecting statements in theory 
construction, but there is a lack of uniformity as to what to call 
them. For instance, Carnap and Nagel call such statements "corre­
spondence rules," Bridgman calls them "operational rules," and 
Campbell calls them the "Dictionary."31
Summary Remarks 
It is shown in this chapter that all theories must be based 
on certain basic assumptions. This basis is necessary to avoid either 
an infinite series of statements or circular reasoning.
"Proving" a Theory 
In order to establish the truth of a theory, several alter­
natives are proposed. Reliance on self-evidence of either a theory's 
basic assumptions or its theorems is rejected because self-evidence
29nempel, op. cit., pp. 74-75. 30Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
3 1 Carnap, op. cit., p. 233.
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is not a reliable test. The use of analytic statements is also 
proposed, but rejected, because of a lack of sufficient meaningful 
content. Reliance must then be placed on synthetic statements.
Synthetic statements could be tested or demonstrated by 
appealing to a second deductive system. However, testing in this 
manner must utilize one deductive system as given to avoid circu­
larity or an infinite series of appeals to different deductive sys­
tems. Because of this reference, the second method of demonstration, 
an empirical test of the theorems of the theory, is preferred. Such 
an indirect test is not without problems. The presence of dispo­
sitional and theoretical concepts in these statements is found to 
complicate the testing. Dispositional and theoretical concepts are 
not directly testable. Therefore, neither are the internal state­
ments that contain them. To test a theory other statements must be 
added at the level of basic assumptions that tie the internal state­
ments to testable phenomena. This second kind of statement is 
called a bridge statement.
In all, five different varieties of basic assumptions have 




(4) internal postulates,, and
(5) bridge postulates.




A thorough description of a particular concept of accounting 
must proceed the derivation of the basic assumptions. After the 
concept has been described, the basic assumptions underlying the con­
cept are derived reductively. The basic assumptions are required to 
have certain aesthetic qualities. They must also be consistent, 
independent, reproductive, and complete. In addition, the basic 
assumptions may have the appearance of trivial statements or may 
employ idealizations and thus in appearance may not be exact decrip- 
tions of the real world.
The first statements derived about a concept are the objec­
tives or goals of the particular concept. The objectives may be 
either attainable or unattainable. Their purpose is to guide or 
give direction to the axiom and postulate statements.
After the objectives are defined, the axioms and postulates 
of the concept are reductively derived. Axioms employed are basic 
assumptions underlying other related disciplines from which knowl­
edge is utilized. Accounting, for example, assumes knowledge con­
cerning measurement, magnitudes, communications, behavior, ethics, 
logic, and others. Since knowledge in these areas is employed in 
accounting, the basic assumptions or postulates of these areas 
become basic assumptions or axioms of accounting. As already stated, 
these axioms are broken down into two classes regarding their test­
ability. Internal axioms employ theoretical concepts and hence are 
not directly testable. Bridge axioms are employed to connect 
internal axioms to measurable and observable phenomena.
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Finally, postulates are employed. Postulates are the basic 
assumptions underlying a discipline. Whereas axioms represent basic 
assumptions borrowed from other disciplines, postulates represent the 
basic assumptions of a unique discipline. The postulates of account­
ing serve as axioms in theories constructed in other disciplines that 
assume accounting knowledge. The postulates of accounting make it a 
unique discipline. Here again, both internal postulates and bridge 
postulates are found.
Completing the Picture 
This chapter began explaining the structure of a deductive 
theory. The nature of basic assumptions in such a theory is thor­
oughly discussed here. The following chapter examines the remaining 
structure of a deductive theory. The nature of the complete system 
of basic assumptions and theorems is discussed.
Chapter 3 
THE AXIOMATIC OR DEDUCTIVE APPROACH
This chapter continues to apply the techniques of theory
construction to the study of the nature and function of basic
assumptions in a theory or discipline. The subject of Chapter 2 was
the basic assumptions themselves. This chapter is concerned with the 
entire structure of a deductive theory: both assumptions and
theorems. A few comments providing a historical perspective of the 
deductive approach are presented first. Following this perspective, 
successive sections of this chapter deal with the nature, charac­
teristics, and advantages of the deductive approach to theory con­
struction.
Origin and Significance of the 
Deductive Approach
The history of the deductive approach begins with Aristotle, 
384-321 B.C. Although earlier philosophers were concerned with the 
indirect acquisition of knowledge, Aristotle first developed logic.
He also developed the idea of a deductive system.! The Greek math­
ematician Euclid put the deductive approach to its first great use in 
systematizing geometry.
!j. M. Bochenski, The Methods of Contemporary Thought, 
trans. Peter Caws (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1965), p. 69.
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The Deductive Approach and Geometry 
The Egyptians first developed geometry. They found many 
practical uses for the principles they had discovered inductively; 
namely, land surveying, architecture, and engineering. The Greeks, 
aware of what the Egyptians were doing with their geometrical prin­
ciples, became interested. Unlike the Egyptians, however, the Greeks 
were not interested in the practical applications of geometry. The 
Greeks were more philosophical. Philosophy had begun with the 
ancient Greeks. Their interest was theoretical; the Greeks wished to 
prove deductively the geometrical principles the Egyptians employed.^ 
Prior to Euclid, several Greeks had successfully proven many 
of the Egyptian geometrical principles. A large part of Euclid's work 
probably consisted of refining and arranging these earlier proofs.
His main contribution was his use of the deductive approach. Euclid 
successfully gave deductive proofs for 465 theorems of geometry, 
ostensibly utilizing only ten initial assumptions. In reality a few 
additional assumptions appeared in Euclid's proofs, but went unde­
tected until the nineteenth century. These added assumptions probably 
arose and went unnoticed due to his familarity with geometry. These 
added assumptions were inadvertent and reference to them is not meant 
to detract in any way from Euclid's accomplishment. Had he been aware 
of them, he could have corrected the problem.
^Stephen F. Barker, Philosophy of Mathematics (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 15-16.
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Impact of the Deductive Approach 
The impact of Euclid's accomplishment has been phenomenal. 
Barker summed up Euclid's work when he wrote:
. . . Then about 300 B.C. Euclid wrote his classic 
book, The Elements, in which he drew together and presented 
in systematic form all the main geometrical discoveries of 
his predecessors. This great book is one of the most influ­
ential classics in the literature of Western thought. Through 
ancient times, through the medieval era, and in the modern 
period right up into the nineteenth century, Euclid's Elements 
served not only as the textbook of geometry but also as a 
model of what scientific thinking should be.3
Wilder's appraisal is similar: "The influence of Euclid's work has
been tremendous; probably no other document has had a greater influ­
ence on scientific thought."^
Euclid's work is considered the classic example of the 
deductive approach. In mathematics the use of the deductive approach 
is increasing. Barker has stated: " . . .  one of the striking fea­
tures of twentieth century mathematics is its greatly increased use 
of the axiomatic approach in mathematical studies besides geometry."5 
In areas other than mathematics use of the deductive approach^ has 
met with less success. Spinoza attempted in his Ethics to use the
3lbid., p. 16.
^Raymond L. Wilder, Introduction to the Foundations of 
Mathematics (2nd ed.; New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 4.
^Barker, op. cit., p. 57.
^By the deductive approach this author means that basic 
assumptions are explicitly stated either in words or symbolic logic. 
The assumptions are then combined to yield theorems. The deductive 
approach does not refer simply to deductive narrative discussions.
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deductive approach, but "his attempt was a lamentable failure.
Isaac Newton in his Philosophise Naturaljs Principia Mathematics 
(1687) deduced theorems and corollaries using the deductive approach. 
He began with eight definitions and three axioms of motion. His 
logic was not nearly as rigorous as Euclid's.8 Many other areas in 
physics have been formulated as deductive systems. Similar attempts 
have also been made in biology and psychology.9
These are but a few instances in which the deductive approach 
has been used. However, the further one moves away from mathematics, 
the less successful its utilization has been. This situation is only 
natural. Compared to mathematics, many other sciences and social 
sciences are still in their infancy. Deductive logic is a tool of 
the mathematician; one he uses every day. Deductive logic has not 
become so engrained in the thought of researchers in other disciplines.
The deductive approach used today in mathematics is vastly 
different from what it was in Euclid's day. Today when mathematicians 
utilize the deductive approach, they are dealing with a very formal 
system. Symbols are employed instead of words. Initially these 
symbols have no assigned meaning. This reduces the possibility of 
unstated assumptions being introduced in the system. Only after the
^Bochenski, loc. cit.
^Dudley Shapere, "Newtonian Mechanics and Mechanical Expla­
nation," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: 
The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1967), Vol. 5, p. 491.
^Irving M. Copi, Symbolic Logic (3rd ed.; New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 180.
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system has been axiomatized, with many theorems derived, is meaning 
assigned. Once a meaning has been assigned to the symbols, the system 
is called an interpreted system or a model. The symbols can be inter­
preted in alternative ways providing the basic assumptions are truth­
ful in each interpretation. Each interpretation yields a model.
Accounting and the Deductive Approach 
Researchers in accounting and other sciences and social 
sciences have not shown a great deal of interest in employing the
highly formal deductive systems used by some mathematicians and
logicians. Some mathematicians have even objected to such highly 
formalized systems.However, the deductive approach can and has 
been utilized in accounting without the use of symbolic logic.
Ijiri and Mattessich and in a less rigorous fashion, Moonitz, have 
all employed the deductive approach in accounting.
Accounting theory has reached the point where its logic 
needs systemization. If this systemization can be accomplished, and 
if accounting principles can be derived from a set of accounting
assumptions, accounting will be well on its way to developing a
stronger theory structure. The following sections examine the 
deductive approach more closely.
The Deductive Approach 
The deductive or axiomatic approach represents a rigorous 
utilization of deductive logic. It requires an explicit statement of
lOWilder, op. cit., p. 45
all initial assumptions utilized in the deductive system.
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Description of the Deductive Approach 
The deductive approach may be described briefly as follows: 
starting from a set of statements serving as initial assumptions 
about some concept, an attempt is made to derive logically all other 
possible statements about the concept. Wilder has used an analogy 
in describing the axiomatization of a concept:
The process may be compared with that of making colors. 
Suppose T is a collection of colors, and that we are given 
certain rules for mixing colors to produce new colors; select 
a collection A of colors from T which will be sufficient, by 
using the given rules for mixing, to produce all colors of T.
In this analogy we have substituted colors for statements and 
mixing of colors for implication.H
In this analogy, T is the set of all possible statements about a 
concept. Rarely are all the statements about a given concept known. 
But a sufficient number of statements are usually known to describe 
a concept adequately. The rules for mixing colors in the analogy 
are simply the rules of logic. Collection A of colors (or state­
ments) is a subset of T such that when combined with the rules of 
mixing (or of logic) it is possible to produce all the possible 
colors (statements) in T. The process of identifying the set A of 
initial colors (statements) is the process of reduction. From a 
given set of statements describing a concept, the process proceeds 
reductively to identify a subset of statements about the concept. 
When this subset of statements is combined with the rules of logic, 
that subset deductively yields all the statements about the concept.
•^Ibid., p. 30.
64
From this analogy it is possible to identify several components of a 
deductive system. These components are discussed next.
Components of the Deductive Approach 
In discussing basic assumptions, the preceding chapter has 
already mentioned some components of a deductive system. Statements 
at the basic assumption level and the rules of logic have been dis­
cussed. Also mentioned briefly are two types of terms making up those 
statements: primitive terms and defined terms. It is now possible to
give a more complete description of the components of a deductive 
system. These components are listed below:
(1) a set of initial statements about a concept
(2) a set of derived statements about a concept
(3) rules of logic,
(4) a set of primitive terms,
(5) a set of defined terms,
(6) a set of universal terms,
(7) rules of definition, and
(8) rules of grammar.
Each of these components is needed and thus becomes a part of a deduc­
tive system. These components can roughly be divided into two groups: 
one concerning statements and the other concerning terms.
Statements in a Deductive System
The set of initial statements about a concept are the basic 
assumptions. These statements represent the subset of all possible 
statements about a concept from which all other possible statements
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about the concept are derived. As pointed out in the previous 
chapter, at least five different types of basic assumptions exist. 
These are the objectives, the unique internal and bridge postulates 
of a discipline, and the internal and bridge axioms borrowed from 
other disciplines. These statements are referred to collectively 
as basic assumptions or statements of the basic assumptions.
The basic assumptions, when combined with the rules of logic, 
yield the set of derived statements about a concept. This derived 
set of statements is alternatively called the theorems or principles 
of a discipline or theory. Assuming the rules of logic are correctly 
followed, the sole determinant of the truth value of the theorems is 
the truth value of the basic assumptions. These two types of state­
ments, the basic assumptions and the theorems, are the only two types 
of statements permitted in a deductive system. Together they describe 
fully the particular concept involved.
The rules of logic function to specify all possible ways the 
basic assumptions and previously derived theorems can be combined to 
form new theorems. These combinations of basic assumptions and 
theorems are deductively valid. Thus, the rules of logic divide a 
system's derived statements into two subsets: those statements that
are deductively valid and those statements that are deductively 
invalid. In actual practice only the deductively valid statements 
are referred to as derived statements or alternatively theorems or 
principles.
Logic is concerned only with the form of an argument. If an 
argument has the appropriate form, it is considered deductively valid.
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Logic, therefore, says nothing about the truth of the assumption- 
level statements. An argument in the above sense is a group of 
statements in which a conclusion is deductively implied by certain 
basic assumptions.
Terms in a Deductive System
In general all the terms appearing in the statements of a 
deductive system are of three types. They are either primitive 
terms, defined terms, or universal terms.
Primitive Terms in a Deductive Theory
The previous chapter has already shown the need for primitive 
terms in a system. Primitive terms are those which remain undefined 
to avoid either an infinite or circular series of definitions. In 
one sense selection of the terms to remain undefined in a theory is 
arbitrary. That is, terms undefined in one deductive system may be 
defined terms in another deductive system describing the same concept. 
Therefore, no term is undefinable; rather, certain terms are chosen 
to remain undefined in a given system. Of course, the terms selected 
must be ones capable of defining all other technical terms in a system.
The selection of certain terms to serve as primitive terms 
does not imply that their meaning is not known. Quite the contrary, 
if no one knew what the primitive terms meant, then no one could make 
sense out of the system's statements. What is meant is that no 
explicit definitions of the terms are given in the system. Some 
meaning will be implicitly derived from the way the terms are used in 
the system. Also, if necessary, the primitive terms can be defined
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in a separate deductive system or systems according to the primitive 
terms of those other systems. However, as with basic assumptions, 
ultimately some set of terms must be accepted as primitives if an 
infinite series of definitions or circularity in definitions is to 
be avoided.
Defined Terms in a Deductive Theory
To define terms in a given deductive system it is necessary 
to utilize the system’s primitive terms, other previously defined 
terms, and universal terms. The only ones usually defined in a 
theory are technical terms, or terms that are used in a particular 
way in a theory.
Universal Terms in a Deductive Theory
The statements of a deductive system, in addition to con­
taining primitive and defined terms, also contain universal terms. 
Universal terms are non-technical terms and include those commonly 
found in everyday language. Many common nouns, verbs, adjectives, 
adverbs, articles, conjunctions, and prepositions are considered 
universal terms. Because of their familarity, these terms are pur­
ported to be universally understood. In contrast many terms appearing 
in theories as primitives or defined terms are often technical in 
nature. Compare, for example, some universal terms (the, is, all, 
there, if, then) with some terms that could appear as primitive or 
defined terms in a theory of accounting (entity, revenue, asset, 
equity, cost). It is not always easy to decide which terms in a 
theory should be considered universal terms and which should be
defined. Even relatively simple terms can be interpreted quite
differently. Care must be taken by a researcher to define any terms 
which may be interpreted incorrectly.
In one sense universal terms are treated much like primitive 
terms because they remain undefined in a deductive system, and there­
fore may not represent a separate category of terms. On the other 
hand, when the primitive terms of a theory are listed, universal 
terms do not appear on the list. For this reason they may be con­
sidered a separate class of terms.
Rules of Definition
Definitional rules determine when one term or expression may 
properly be substituted for another term or expression. Generally, 
the term or expression on the left is referred to as the definiendum. 
The meaning of the definiendum is unknown. It is defined or given a
meaning by the term or expression appearing on the right, called the
definien. The definiendum may be separated from the definien by the
symbol "=df"* This symbol indicates that the two expressions can 
readily be substituted for each other while maintaining the truth 
value of the statement in which they are contained. The symbol "=df" 
also may be assumed. For example, the term "bachelor" can be defined 
as an "unmarried male." If "bachelor" were introduced into a deduc­
tive theory, the following definition would appear:
Definition: bachelor unmarried male.
This definition indicates that anytime the expression "unmarried male 
appears in a statement, the term "bachelor" may be substituted for it 
maintaining the statement's truth value. Such a definition is an
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explicit definition. In a deductive system, whenever a defined term 
is first introduced, it must be presented in an explicit definition.
Rules of Grammar
It is possible in forming statements to combine a system’s 
primitive terms, defined terms, and universal terms in many possible 
ways. Some of these statements are permitted in a given system; 
other statements are not. The rules of grammar play a very important 
role. Their function is to divide into two groups all of the possible 
ways the terms of a 'system can be combined. One group represents 
combinations of terms that are permitted in a system. Statements in 
this group are said to be well formed. An example might be the 
statement: "Assets equal equities." The other group represents
combinations of terms that are not permitted in a system. An example 
might be: "A the asset." Such statements are nonsensical and convey
no meaning.
It might be logically argued that a discussion of the com­
ponents of a deductive system should also include a discussion of 
the letters that make up the terms and the rules specifying acceptable 
combinations of those letters to form terms. This discussion could 
also include the symbols used to make letters and the rules specifying 
the permitted combinations of those symbols. Ultimately, however, 
such a discussion has to stop somewhere. Something always has to be 
taken as given.
From another point of view the detail in which the preceding 
components of a deductive system are discussed may seem excessive. 
Everyone knows about terms, definitions, logic, and grammar. However,
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in a deductive system constructed entirely with symbolic logic, such 
components are vital. In such a system, symbols are initially 
assigned no meaning. Grammar rules, definitional rules, and logical 
rules must be stated if one is to know how to combine symbols to form 
new statements. With symbolic logic the rules of logic, definitions, 
and grammar take on new meaning. For example, in symbolic logic a 
sentence may be defined as any series of symbols preceded by the 
letter "W."
Even for deductive systems not using symbolic logic, the 
recognition of such rules is valuable. Definitional rules state how 
new terms are to be introduced into the system. Following these 
rules helps avoid unclear definitions. The rules of logic specify 
how an argument may proceed without exceeding its assumptions.
Characteristics of a Deductive System
In the last chapter the characteristics of basic assumptions 
were discussed. These characteristics included a desired aesthetic 
quality, consistency, independence, reproductivity, and completeness. 
Since basic assumptions are part of a deductive system, the char­
acteristics of basic assumptions are also characteristics of the 
deductive system. There is no need to repeat the discussion of these 
characteristics. However, the deductive system, when viewed in its 
entirety, has additional characteristics. The discussion of these 
characteristics is necessary to complete the analysis of theory con­
struction begun in Chapter 2. First, a desirable characteristic, 
full formalization, is discussed, as are some of its implications. 
Secondly, two other previously discussed characteristics, consistency
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and completeness, are expanded and a possible conflict between the two 
is examined.
Full Formalization: The Ideal
To assert that a discipline or a particular theory in a dis­
cipline is fully formalized is a strong assertion. As used here full 
formalization means that every statement in a particular deductive 
system is either a basic assumption (an objective, axiom, or pos­
tulate) , or that the statement is explicitly and deductively derived 
from the basic assumptions. Furthermore, every technical term 
appearing in the statements must be either a primitive term or a 
defined term. Described thus far is the completeness criterion of a 
set of assumptions discussed earlier. In addition, full formalization 
requires that the given deductive system be fully articulated. As 
interpreted in this study, fully articulated means that all the 
theorems have been derived that can technically be derived in a given 
deductive system. To the extent that a deductive system is not fully 
formalized, knowledge technically contained within the system remains 
undiscovered.
Full formalization acts as a constraint on the discipline's 
development. If it is desired to introduce a new set of fundamental 
statements into a deductive system, these statements must be intro­
duced at the basic assumption level. This new set of statements may 
be introduced to replace an older set of statements which has been 
cast aside in the light of new knowledge. The new set of statements 
also may be introduced to achieve full formalization for a part of a 
theory structure or discipline that had previously been only partially
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formalized. Or the area may have previously been omitted from the 
theory or discipline entirely.
An area may have been omitted entirely for a number of rea­
sons. Some new scientific breakthrough previously unrecognized may 
have led to a new set of statements. Perhaps previous knowledge of 
the area may have been so uncertain that any statements concerning 
the area would have been mere speculation. Contradictory sets of 
statements may have had equal support. Therefore, the area was 
previously omitted from the system until the area had been advanced 
further. Another reason could be that a previously developed set of 
statements may have been thought inapplicable to a system of know­
ledge .
Full formalization is seldom achieved in theories, much less 
in an entire discipline. Rudner has pointed out three reasons why a 
theory may not achieve full formalization. First, full formalization 
may conflict with other goals in theory construction such as pre­
diction, control, and testing of a theory. Second, in the early 
stages of theory construction, insistence on full formalization may 
be too rigid a requirement. Finally, there is the danger of over­
allocation of efforts to attain full formalization to the detriment 
of other equally important areas. Rudner points out that these 
limitations are meant to apply only to the initial formulator of a 
theory and not to the philosopher who later attempts rigorously to 
reformulate the theory.12
l^Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 52.
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Deciding to what degree a theory is to be formalized 
basically involves a cost-benefit analysis. The cost of attempting 
various degrees of formalization must be weighed against the expected 
benefits to be derived.
Consistency and Completeness
Consistency and completeness of a set of basic assumptions 
has already been discussed in Chapter 2. Consistency and completeness 
of the entire structure of a deductive theory is discussed here.
Consistency
A set of assumptions is consistent if no assumption in the 
set contradicts another assumption. Consistency assumes a broader 
meaning when applied to an entire deductive system including both 
assumptions and theorems. A deductive system is consistent if 
neither the assumptions nor the theorems derived from the assumptions 
contradict any other assumption or theorems of the deductive system. 
Consistency is very important. Copi has pointed out that if a system 
contains contradictory statements and thus is inconsistent, the sys­
tem cannot possibly serve to systematize knowledge.13 An inconsistent 
deductive system is useless for theory construction.
One further point should be noted. Although some theorems 
often are not obvious implications of a set of basic assumptions, it 
is true that the theorems of a deductive system do not contain any 
knowledge that is not already found in the basic assumptions.
l^Copi, op. cit., p. 187.
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Therefore, it can be argued that only the basic assumptions need to 
be checked for inconsistencies. Though true, such a check relies 
heavily on identifying self-evident inconsistencies. And self­
evidence was found earlier to be an unacceptable criterion for eval­
uating the truth value of basic assumptions. Both assumptions and 
theorems should be checked for inconsistencies.
Completeness
A set of basic assumptions is complete if it contains all 
the assumptions needed to derive the theorems of the system. A 
deductive system is complete if every true statement about a concept 
that can be expressed in the system's primitive terms is either an 
assumption or a theorem.^ A deductive system is incomplete if there 
exists one or more true statements about a concept expressible in the 
primitive terms of that system that cannot be derived as a theorem of 
the system. Completeness of a deductive system is very desirable.
If a system is incomplete, then knowledge technically available 
about a concept cannot be derived from the system. This knowledge, 
therefore, may remain undiscovered. Completeness, in this sense, 
goes beyond mere full formalization. A deductive system is fully 
formalized if all theorems that may be derived from the assumptions 
are derived. Completeness requires that all true statements about a 
concept expressible in the primitive terms of a deductive system be 
derivable from the basic assumptions of that system.
Whereas inconsistency in a deductive system destroys the
■^Barker, op. cit., p. 94.
75
usefulness of the system, incompleteness is not as damaging. An 
incomplete deductive system may be very useful; although, not as 
useful as it could be if it were complete.
Godel's Proof15
It thus seems highly desirable for a given deductive system to 
be both consistent and complete. However, this situation is not always 
possible. In 1931 Godel was able to demonstrate that for one kind of 
deductive system, consistency and completeness are incompatible. He 
was concerned with those systems such as Principia Mathematic, which 
attempted to develop all the formulas for the natural numbers. Godel's 
conclusions show that in such systems there are always true statements 
about the concept which cannot be derived from a given set of assump­
tions. The deductive system, then, is incomplete. One such system 
may be more complete than another such system; however, no system is 
both complete and consistent. Godel's proof shows there are limita­
tions in the deductive approach. In particular, it apparently is impos­
sible to develop a consistent and complete axiomatization of the 
entire field of mathematics or even of each subfield of mathematics. 
However, Wilder has pointed out that it is still possible and, in fact, 
has been done quite successfully, to axiomatize special parts of 
mathematics and logic.^
^Ibid., pp. 94-97; and Wilder, op. cit., pp. 270-275; and 
Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, Godel's Proof (New York: New
York University Press, 1958), pp. 3, 58, 59, and 98.
^ W i l d e r ,  op. cit., pp. 274-275.
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Advantages of the Deductive Approach 
Utilization of the deductive approach, whether the system is 
highly formalized or not, offers several advantages. The discussion 
of these advantages assumes that the deductive system is fully for­
malized and internally consistent. In deductive systems less than 
fully formalized, these advantages apply in lesser degrees, depending 
on the degree of the system's formalization.
Major Advantages 
One major advantage of the deductive approach is that it 
forces a researcher to recognize all of the basic assumptions utilized 
in the construction of a particular theory. Then the deductive 
approach restricts the researcher to those basic assumptions. If the 
researcher wants to add something else to a theory, something that is 
not technically contained in the theory's current basic assumptions, 
then that something must be added at the level of the basic assump­
tions.
Also, except for the primitive terms, each new technical 
term introduced into the deductive system must be defined explicitly 
upon introduction. Once a technical term had been so defined, it 
retains its meaning throughout the entire system. Misunderstandings 
concerning the intended meanings of such key terms are thus reduced.
Once the basic assumptions underlying a theory structure or 
a discipline are recognized, a deductive approach pursues these 
assumptions to their logical ends. An attempt is made to derive all 
theorems of a given set of basic assumptions. The formalized system
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represents an internally consistent standard of comparison for actual 
practice. Inconsistencies in actual practice can be pointed out by 
using this comparison. For example, if.all other things are equal, 
revenues and expenses from the same event cannot logically be recog­
nized in different ways unless their recognition is based on dif­
ferent basic assumptions.
Finally, a deductive approach encourages an efficient break­
down of a discipline into homogeneous subtheories. These subtheories 
may be narrow or broad. The individual subtheories can then be 
integrated with other subtheories in a building block approach to 
yield broader, more encompassing theories. However, such a building 
block approach does not mean that each block or subtheory is unre­
lated. Most subtheories share some basic assumptions with other 
subtheories. For example, some ethical basic assumptions are shared 
in almost every accounting subtheory.
Lesser Advantages 
A deductive theory represents a systemization of knowledge 
about a particular concept. The theory thus represents a useful 
teaching device. However, the student must be aware that despite 
the theory's apparent logic, it represents only one theory about a 
concept. Other theories may be less aesthetically appealing and yet 
more descriptive, explanative, and predictive.
In a deductive system one statement proceeds to the next 
statement in a logical manner. While the logic of any deductive 
system is a distinct strong point, logic also is a potential weak­
ness of all deductive systems. That is, the validity of a deductive
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system is totally dependent on the validity of the system's logic. 
According to Wilder: "If it should turn out that the logical
machinery itself reveals flaws, then what faith can be placed in 
the reliability of the theorems deduced?"-^
Summary Remarks 
Chapter 2 discusses the nature of basic assumptions in a 
deductive theory. This chapter concentrates on the theorems and 
the entire structure of such a theory. Taken together, these two 
chapters achieve their objective of describing the nature and function 
of basic assumptions in a theory or discipline.
Summary and Conclusions 
Specifically the origin and significance of the deductive 
approach is briefly sketched. Begun by Aristotle and classically 
employed by Euclid, the deductive approach is today employed in both 
the sciences and social sciences. Generally, non-mathematicians 
avoid the complexities of symbolic logic.
The deductive approach is described by way of a borrowed 
analogy with the mixing of colors. This description clearly points 
out the components of a deductive system which are: (1) initial
statements or basic assumptions of which five types were identified 
in Chapter 2, (2) derived statements or theorems, (3) logical rules, 
(4) primitive terms, (5) defined terms, (6) universal terms, (7) def­
initional rules, and (8) grammar rules. Each of these components is
l^Wilder, op. cit., p. 45.
briefly discussed.
Characteristics of a deductive system are then discussed.
In addition to the characteristics of a set of basic assumptions 
presented in Chapter 2, full formalization is added and consistency 
and completeness are expanded. Godel's proof shows that a deductive 
system cannot be both consistent and complete.
Several advantages of the deductive approach are mentioned. 
Forcing a researcher first to recognize all his assumptions and then 
to pursue those assumptions to their logical ends are the chief 
advantages of the approach. Other advantages are the efficient break­
down of a discipline and the pedagogical benefit of systemization of 
a discipline or concept.
The deductive approach to theory construction so successfully 
employed in mathematics offers definite advantages to theory con­
struction in accounting. However, the goal of deriving all accounting 
principles from one set of basic assumptions is not possible as Godel's 
proof has shown. Consequently, future accounting research efforts 
should be concentrated on individual theories in accounting rather 
than on attempting to determine the basic assumptions of all of 
accounting. This is an attainable and much more realistic goal.
Preview of Future Chapters 
A complete discussion of theory construction has been given.
The remaining chapters of this study illustrate that the techniques 
of theory construction can be applied in accounting. This is done 
in two ways. First, in Chapters 4 and 5, the theory construction
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techniques are employed in constructing an outline of a theory of 
financial accounting measurement. Emphasis is placed on identifying 
the five different types of basic assumptions that might appear in 
such a measurement theory. A few key theorems are also derived. 
Though key technical terms are explicitly defined, no attempt is made 
to determine primitive terms. This would require that a fully for­
malized theory of financial accounting measurement be given, and this 
is beyond the scope of this study.
Secondly, that the techniques of theory construction have 
wide applicability to accounting theory construction is shown in 
Chapter 6. A diverse sample of accounting topics is examined there 
in light of theory construction techniques.
Chapter 4
MEASUREMENT
The objective of Chapter 4 and 5 is to demonstrate that the 
techniques of theory construction are applicable to accounting theory 
construction. This is done by applying these techniques in con­
structing an outline of a theory of financial accounting measurement. 
But, in order to construct a theory of measurement in accounting one 
must know something about measurement theory. This chapter reviews 
some of the major writings on measurement theory.
This rather extensive summary of measurement theory is needed 
for two other reasons. First, a foundation must be laid in this 
chapter for showing in Chapter 5 that the theory of financial account­
ing measurement developed there is measurement on a ratio scale. 
Second, because several of the examples in Chapter 6 involve fiat 
measurement, this classification of measurement which is very impor­
tant in accounting needs to be explained.
In this chapter a definition of measurement is developed 
first. In order to do this an examination of certain areas of agree­
ment and of disagreement in the measurement literature is required. 
Secondly, two major measurement classification systems are studied. 
Criticisms and modification of the two systems are presented.
Included here is the background material necessary for showing that 
the financial accounting measurement rule, developed in Chapter 5, is
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measurement on a ratio scale and a brief description of fiat meas­
urement. Finally, the nature of the measurement unit is discussed, 
including the one commonly used in financial accounting: the dollar.
What Is Measurement?
The following section develops a general definition of 
measurement. In doing so a partial definition of measurement is 
offered, centering on existing areas of agreement concerning meas­
urement. Following this partial definition is an examination of a 
major area of disagreement concerning measurement: what kind of
rules constitute measurement rules. The opinions of several meas­
urement theorists are presented, as are the opinions of two major 
accounting authors who have studied measurement literature. Finally, 
the general definition of measurement assumed in this study is pre­
sented.
Measurement— A Partial Definition 
That measurement is the assignment of numerals to an object 
or event in order to represent a particular property of the object 
or event, is commonly agreed upon in measurement literature. Stevens 
points out measurement is possible only because an isomorphic rela­
tionship (a one-to-one correspondence) can be established between the 
property of an object or event measured on the one hand, and a number 
or series of numbers on the other.1
1-S. S. Stevens, "Mathematics, Measurement and Psychophysics," 
Handbook of Experimental Psychology, ed. S. S. Stevens (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1951), p. 1.
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An isomorphic relationship exists when there is a rule which 
associates one element of one system with only one element of another 
system. There are two types of isomorphism: partial isomorphism and
complete isomorphism. In partial isomorphism, the one-to-one corre­
spondence exists between only some of the relations and operations of 
the two systems. In complete isomorphism, the one-to-one correspond­
ence exists between all the relations and operations of the two 
systems.
In measurement, the isomorphism exists between a system of 
empirical operations and the system of numbers. Because not all 
relations among numbers have meaning in the physical world, the iso­
morphism is only partial. Many operations of mathematics have no 
counterpart in the physical world.
The assigned number becomes a surrogate for the property in 
question. This number is a most useful surrogate, because numbers 
are readily susceptible to mathematical operations. The mathematical 
operations appropriate in any given instance are derived from the 
nature of the property represented and the method of numerical 
assignment. Stevens reports:
The type of scale achieved when we deputize the numerals 
to serve as representatives for a state of affairs in nature 
depends upon the character of the basic empirical operations 
performed on nature. These operations are limited ordinarily 
by the peculiarities of the thing being scaled and by our choice 
of concrete procedures, but, once selected, the procedures 
determine that there will eventuate one or another of four types 
of scale: nominal, ordinal, interval, or r a t i o .2
2Ibid., p. 23.
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Stevens’ classification of measurement by scales is discussed shortly, 
along with other classification systems. A brief example highlighting 
the preceding discussion is now presented.
An Example
Assume that one has a metal rod. This rod possesses a number 
of properties, including a certain length, weight, and density. A 
scientist could assign a numeral to the metal rod representing the 
property of the rod’s length. Another numeral could be assigned 
representing the property of the rod’s weight. Still another numeral 
could be assigned representing the property of density. In each case 
a numeral is assigned to represent some property of the metal rod.
In the case of length or weight, a numeral representing one 
of these properties can be added to another numeral representing the 
same property. In other words, length and weight are additive prop­
erties. When two objects of equal length or weight are added, the 
result is an object twice as long or twice as heavy. Density is not 
an additive property. When two objects equally dense are combined, 
they do not yield an object twice as dense. Thus, the property of 
density is not additive.
Area of Disagreement
While there is agreement on the aspect of measurement dis­
cussed above, disagreement remains on what kind of rules constitute 
the measurement rules under which the numerical assignments can pro­
perly be made. The controversy centers on whether classification by 
numerical assignment is measurement.
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Stevens' View— Classification Is Measurement
Stevens takes the broadest view of measurement. He defines 
measurement as . . the assignment of numerals to objects or events 
according to rule---any rule."^ Stevens would allow the rule no 
matter how absurd it s o u n d s .4 "The only procedure excluded is 
'random' assignment: if there is no criterion for determining
whether a given numeral should or should not be assigned, it is not 
m e a s u r e m e n t. Random assignment, therefore, is assignment without 
a rule. "With no rule in force, the same numeral might be assigned 
to different classes, and different numerals might be assigned to 
the same class'1̂  in classification or nominal measurement. Others 
do not agree with Stevens' view that classification is measurement.
Classification Is Not Measurement
Classification, also termed measurement on a nominal scale 
according to Stevens, is objected to by many writers. Some consider 
classification a premeasurement concept.
Ellis— Restrictions Must Be Placed on Measurement Rules
Ellis feels that Stevens' concept of measurement is too
3s. S. Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility," 
Measurement: Definitions and Theories, eds. C. West Churchman and
Philburn Ratoosh (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), p. 19.
^Robert R. Sterling, Theory of the Measurement of Enterprise 
Income (Wichita, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1970), p. 69.




broad. He believes that some restrictions should be placed on the 
kinds of rules used to set up scales and hence that qualify as meas­
urement r u l e s .  ̂ According to Ellis, if one has a rule for making 
numerical assignments, it does not necessarily follow that one has 
an accompanying scale. The rule must at least prohibit different 
numerical assignments from being made to represent the same property, 
unless that property has changed to another determinative or specific 
form.
Ellis' Modification of Stevens' Definition.— Ellis then 
proposes to modify Stevens' definition of measurement. Ellis states:
For these reasons, then, it is necessary to modify 
Stevens' definition of measurement. In particular, it is 
necessary to place some restriction on the kinds of rules 
that are permissible. For we require that the rule must be 
capable of defining a scale; and we have a scale of meas­
urement only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(a) we have a rule for making numerical assignments;
(b) this rule is determinative in the sense that, 
provided sufficient care is exercised the same numerals (or 
ranges of numerals) would always be assigned to the same things 
under the same conditions;
(c) the rule is non-degenerate in the sense that it 
allows for the possibility of assigning different numerals 
(or ranges of numerals) to different things, or to the same 
thing under different conditions.
The conditions (b) and (c) are necessary to ensure that 
numerical assignments made according the the rule will be 
informative— the third condition being included in order to 
exclude such degenerate rules as "assign the number 2 to every­
thing."8
Based on the above, Ellis then offers the following
7Brian Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement (New York: 




(a) Measurement is the assignment of numerals to things 
according to any determinative, non-degenerate rule.
(b) We have a scale of measurement if and only if we 
have such a rule.
(c) Two procedures are procedures for measuring on the 
same scale, if and only if, whenever they are deemed to be 
applicable, they would always lead to the same numerical assign­
ments being made to the same things under the same conditions.9
Arbitrary Exclusion of Classification as Measurement.— Ellis 
admits, however, that even the above restriction does not logically 
rule out measurement on the nominal scale.^ In order to rule out 
nominal measurement Ellis has to take the admittedly arbitrary 
position that the nominal scale is not a scale for the measurement 
of a quantity.
A quantity is something either greater than, equal to, or less 
than something else in some respect. Examples of quantities include 
properties such as weight, length, density, intelligence, probability, 
and even prettiness.^
Ellis merely assumes away the problem. He simply includes 
a condition that specifically excludes nominal scale measurement 
among his conditions for having a scale for the measurement of a 
quantity. ̂  He rules out nominal scale measurement by requiring that 
when the things measured are arranged in order of the numerals assigned
9Ibid., pp. 41-42. 10Ibid., p. 42.
Brian Ellis, "Measurement," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press,
1967), Vol. 5, p. 242.
l^This requirement is Ellis' condition iii, see footnote 15.
88
to them, they are simultaneously arranged in order of the quantity, 
q, that is measured.Concerning this arbitrary exclusion of 
nominal scales as scales for the measurement of quantities, Ellis 
states:
. . . For there are such things as nominal scales which 
could conceivably be used for the measurement of quantities; 
and on such a scale the order of the numerical assignments 
need not correspond to the order of the quantity c[ being meas­
ured. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether we should describe 
this as a scale for the measurement of c[. It seems more likely 
that we should say that it is a scale for the measurement of 
equality or inequality in £. However, since scientific lan­
guage gives us no firm guide in the matter, we are at liberty 
to make whatever choice we please. My inclusion of condition 
(iii)[14] as a necessary one is, therefore, rather arbitrary; 
but it is defensible on the grounds that the line has to be 
drawn somewhere, and this is a convenient place to do it.-^
Ellis— Measurement Must Be Informative
Ellis also objects to certain measurement rules because they 
are not informative. Such rules as "assign to each object the first 
number that comes into your head" or "assign to each object in a 
series the next number in some monotonic increasing sequence of 
rational numbers" supply number surrogates carrying no informational 
content.̂
Sterling's Objections
Sterling voices similar objections to Stevens' definition of 
measurement. First, he objects to calling the nominal scale a
13Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement, op. cit., p. 43. 
l^See footnote 12. -^Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
l^ibid., pp. 39-40.
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measurement scale. He does so because the numbers assigned by a 
measurement rule on a nominal scale . . do not represent the order or 
rank of the scales.Secondly, Sterling points out that Stevens' 
definition of measurement is not delimiting. "All characteristics 
can be assigned numbers, and therefore everything can be m e a s u r e d , " 1 8  
if Stevens' definition is accepted. Sterling's third criticism of 
Stevens' definition of measurement questions the informational con­
tent of some measurement rules. This criticism is identical to that 
of Ellis'. As Sterling points out, a rule such as "... assign the far 
left object the numeral 1.7, and by adding a positive constant, assign 
greater numerals to the objects moving from left to right"19 yields 
very questionable informational content. An object's initial name 
(book or pencil) is more informative than a number assigned in the 
above manner. However, the lack of informational content in such an 
assignment probably is the result of a language bias.
Campbell's Probable View
Campbell, whose classification of measurement is discussed 
later with Stevens', also would probably object to nominal scale 
measurement. Sterling states: "Yet Stevens lists the numbering of
football players as a measurement on a nominal scale. . . . Campbell 
would certainly disagree, since he makes explicit his idea that num­
bering of houses (street numbers) is not a measurement."20 Campbell
■^Sterling, op. cit., p. 70. ^Loc. cit. ^Loc. cit. 
^Ibid., p. 69.
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begins one of his books by stating:
Measurement has been defined as the assignment of 
numerals to represent properties. But this definition is 
obviously too wide. The assignment of numerals to represent 
telephone numbers or the articles in a salesman's catalogue is 
not measurement; nor— and here is a more definite representation 
of properties— the assignment of numerals to colours in a dyer's 
list. 2-*-
The examples Campbell describes above are examples of classification 
or nominal scale measurement. Thus, Campbell rules out classification 
by itself as constituting measurement.
Exclusion of the Nominal Scale Is Arbitrary
There is considerable opinion that classification does not
constitute measurement. However, the arguments for excluding the
nominal scale are only based on opinion or preference. As Ellis
admitted in the earlier quote, his exclusion of the nominal scale was
". . . rather arbitrary; but it is defensible on the grounds that the line
9  9has to be drawn somewhere, and this is a convenient place to do it. 
Stevens also realized this and stated: " . . .  the oft-debated question
whether the process of classification underlying the nominal scale 
constitutes measurement is one of those semantic issues that depends 
upon taste."^3 There is no logical reason for ruling out the nominal 
scale.
^Norman R. Campbell, An Account of the Principles of 
Measurement and Calculation (London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd.,
1928), p. 1.
22Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
^^Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility," 
op. cit., p. 25.
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An Argument for Nominal Scale Measurement
Excluding nominal scale measurement cannot be justified for 
such arbitrary reasons as those given above. Good reasons exist for 
including the nominal scale as measurement. Mattessich presents this 
opposite view:
. . .  If one regards measurement, like Stevens . . .  it 
follows that the most basic measurement is classification, a 
fundamental discriminatory process, whereby the various cate­
gories can be identified and distinguished through numerals.
Such a broad definition seems not only justifiable but even 
desirable because it permits the preservation of a logical 
entity or continuity. ^
Later Mattessich again notes:
. . . the undeniable fact remains that every meas­
urement is classification. The answer to the reverse question, 
whether every classification is measurement, depends, as we 
have seen, on the viewpoint. Do we consider a "simple order" 
imposed upon subsequent classes as indispensable to measurement 
and are we prepared, as a price for our insistence, to dicho­
tomize what seems to be a logical entity? If so, do we not 
restrict measurement to too limited an area? Do we not impede 
progress, especially in the social s c i e n c e s ? 2 5
Thus, Mattessich prefers to consider classification as 
measurement because of the logical transition its inclusion offers.
As classification is inherent in all measurement, why not consider 
classification by itself a form of measurement? This logical 
transition is apparent in moving from classification to classification 
with rank ordering, to classification with rank ordering and equal 
intervals, and so on. It is not important that classification is a
^ R i c h a r d  Mattessich, Accounting and Analytical Methods 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1964), p. 58.
25Ibid., p. 61.
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relatively primitive and weak form of measurement. What is important 
is the logical entity the inclusion of classification offers. Also, 
its inclusion as measurement eliminates the necessity of putting 
arbitrary restrictions on what will be considered acceptable meas­
urement rules.
Measurement Defined
Because of the logical transition that the inclusion of 
nominal scales offers, this author prefers to consider classification 
as part of measurement. This position is admittedly arbitrary, but 
so is the alternative. Accordingly, the definition of measurement 
adopted in this study is as follows:
Measurement— The assignment by rules of numerals to objects 
or events in order to represent particular 
properties of the objects or events.
Alternative Systems for the Classification 
of Measurement
Stevens and Campbell offer two major systems for the classi­
fication of measurement. Ellis, Torgerson, and Coombs have offered 
modifications or classification systems similar to Stevens. Ellis 
and Torgerson have also offered modifications or measurement classi­
fication systems similar to that of Campbell. The purpose of this 
section is to briefly examine the suggestions of these measurement 
theorists. The examination permits classification of the financial 
accounting measurement system presented in Chapter 5. Furthermore, 
valuable insight is gained from observing how financial accounting 
measurement is classified according to each of these perspectives.
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Stevens' System^
In the previous section, Stevens* definition of measurement 
is presented and discussed. According to Stevens, measurement takes 
place when there is a rule, any rule, for assigning numerals to 
objects. Since numerals can be assigned to objects by different rules, 
it is possible that different measurement rules may lead to different 
measurement scales and different kinds of m e a s u r e m e n t .27
Basis of Stevens' Classification
Stevens describes five different kinds of measurement scales: 
nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio, and logarithmic interval. This 
classification of measurement scales is based on the mathematical 
properties of the scales. In particular, Stevens classifies scales 
by the range of mathematical transformations that leave the form of 
the scale invaria nt .T he  invariance can be either of two types.
If the statistic is dimensionless, its numerical value remains 
fixed whenever the scale is transformed by the appropriate mathematical
This discussion on Stevens' classification of scales is 
taken mainly from these articles:
S. S. Stevens, "On the Theory of Scales of Measurement," 
Science, Vol. 103 (1946), pp. 677-680.
S. S. Stevens, "Mathematics, Measurement and Psychophysics," 
Handbook of Experimental Psychology, ed. S. S. Stevens (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1951), pp. 1-49.
S. S. Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility,"
Measurement: Definitions and Theories, eds. C. West Churchman and
Philburn Ratoosh (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 18-63.
27stevens, "Mathematics, Measurement and Psychophysics,"
loc. cit.
^^Ellis, "Measurement," op. cit., p. 244.
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transformation for that statistic. Dimensionless statistics occur 
in a ratio in which the dimensions of the numerator are cancelled 
by the dimensions of the demoninator. If the statistic has a 
dimension, its numerical value changes as a result of the mathematical 
transformation. Stevens' classification of scales is shown in 
Table 2 on pages 95 and 96.
Five Types of Scales
Shown in Table 2 are the four most important scale types in 
Stevens' classification. His fifth type, the logarithmic interval 
scale, has no important applications at the present time.
Nominal Scale
Measurement on a nominal scale often is referred to as 
classification. Classification results when objects are grouped 
according to some property they hold in common. With measurement 
on a nominal scale, numbers are assigned to the objects based on the 
class to which they belong. A nominal measurement rule might be 
stated as follows: "Do not assign the same numeral to different
classes or different numerals to the same class."29 A typical 
example of this measurement type is the numbering of football players. 
In this instance each class contains only one object. At other 
times, several objects may be found in each class. Mattessich points 
out that a business firm's basic chart of accounts is a nominal
29S. S. Stevens, "On the Theory of Scales of Measurement," 











Nominal Determination of 
equality
Permutation group x' = f(x) 
[f(x) means any one-to-one 
substitution]
Ordinal Determination of 
greater or less
Isotonic group x* = f(x) 
[f(x) means any increasing 
monotonic function]




General linear or affine 
group x' = ax + b 
a > 0
Ratio Determination of 
equality of 
ratios
Similarity group x' = cx 
c > 0
*The basic operations needed to create a given scale are all 
those listed in column 2 down to and including the operation 
listed opposite the scale. In other words, the column 2 
listing of the basic operations needed to create each type of 
scale is cumulative: to an operation listed opposite a
particular scale must be added all those operations preceding 
it.
**Column 3 gives the mathematical transformations that leave the 
scale form invariant. Any numeral x on a scale can be replaced 
by another numeral x^, where x' is the function of x listed in 
column 3.
***Column 4 lists, cumulative downward, some of the statistics 











1. Numbering of football 
players
2. Assignment of type or 
model numbers to classes
Ordinal 1. Median
2. Percentiles
1. Hardness of minerals 
(Mohs scale)
2. Quality of leather, lumber, 
wool, etc.
3. Pleasantness of odors
4. Street numbers











Ratio 1. Geometric mean





2. Length, weight, density, 
work, resistance, time
3. Temperature (Rankine or 
Kelvin)
4. Pitch scale (Mels)
5. Loudness scale (Sones)
6. Brightness (Brils)
Sources:
Compiled from tables presented by Stevens in the following: 
S. S. Stevens, "On the Theory of Scales of Measurement," 
Science, Vol. 103 (1946), p. 678.
S. S. Stevens, "Mathematics, Measurement and Psychophysics," 
Handbook of Experimental Psychology, ed. S. S. Stevens (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1951), p. 25.
S. S. Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility," 
Measurement: Definitions and Theories, eds. C. West Churchman and
Philburn Ratoosh (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), p. 25.
scale.30
Concerning the nominal scale, Stevens points out: "The
nominal scale represents the most unrestricted assignment of numerals. 
The numerals are used only as labels or type numbers, and words or 
letters would serve as well."3^ Accordingly, the numeral assinged to 
a class has no significance other than that of designating a separate 
and distinct class. Numerals do not indicate order. The same 
numeral assigned to two objects indicates that the objects fall into 
the same class based on some property. A different number assigned 
to some objects indicates that the objects are different in respect 
to the property measured.
The least restrictive of any of Stevens' measurement scales 
is the range of mathematical transformations that leave the form of 
the nominal scale invariant. This range is shown in column 3 of 
Table 2. The nominal scale remains invariant under permutation group 
transformations. With n objects taken together, the number of 
permutations of the n distinct objects is nj_ or n(n-l)(n-2) . . .
(3)(2)(1). For example, suppose one has three distinct objects, A,
B, and C. And suppose someone wanted to assign three numerals, 1, 2, 
3, to these three objects to indicate they are in different classes. 
This may be done in six different ways [3! = (3)(2)(1) = 6]. The 
different assignments are shown in Table 3 on the following page.
onMattessich, op. cit., p. 63.
O l Stevens, "On the Theory of Scales of Measurement," op. cit.,
p. 678.
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Any of the numerical assignments indicates the objects are in dif­
ferent classes. The numerals assigned contain no informational 
content, with the exception that the objects are in different classes 
and hence differ in respect to the property measured. The fact that 
more information is conveyed by using a class name ("assets" or 
"mammals") instead of a numeral is the result of a language bias. If 
one were accustomed to using numerals instead of words, the opposite 
would be true.
Table 3
Permutation Group Transformations 
and the Nominal Scale
Assignment of Objects A, B, and C With Numerals 1, 2, and 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A = 1 A = 1 A = 2 A = 3 A = 2 A = 3
B = 2 B = 3 B = 1 B = 1 B = 3 B = 2




Stevens' ordinal scale not only allows one to determine if 
some objects are equal in respect to some property, but also to 
rank the objects in order of the property measured. There may be 
only one or several objects in a given class. On an ordinal scale 
the numeral assigned to each class of objects represents the position
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of that class with respect to the other object classes. When the 
objects are arranged in order of the property measured, they are 
also arranged in numerical order. The ordinal scale has no natural 
zero point, because the properties measured on such a scale have no 
natural zero point. In addition, each class does not necessarily 
have equal or regular class intervals.
The above can best be described by an example. Suppose 
objects A, B, and C have been assigned the numerals 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively, by a measurement rule on an ordinal scale. The numerals 
indicate that C is greater than B and B is greater than A in respect 
to the property measured. However, object C is not necessarily three 
times greater in possession of the property than object A.
Examples of the ordinal scale are given in Table 2 (pages 
95-96). Mohs1 scale for determining the hardness of minerals is an 
example typically cited. On Mohs1 scale numerals aife assigned to 
minerals, based on their hardness. If mineral B scratches mineral A, 
then mineral Bis harder than mineral A. It is consequently assigned 
a higher numeral. When the minerals are arranged in order of hardness, 
they are also arranged in numerical order. The quality of leather, 
lumber, wool, and other products is also measured on an ordinal scale.
Ordinal scales have the structure of the isotonic group. 
Numerals initially assigned, x-̂ , are determined by any monotonically 
increasing function. In a monotonic function a different value of x 
always leads to a different value of x'. If the function is mono- 
toncially increasing, then larger values of x always lead to larger 
values of x*. An example of a monotoncially increasing function would
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be x1 = 2x. In other words, the slope of a monotonically increasing 
function is always upward. Thus, the transformation of an ordinal 
scale by a monotonically increasing function does not change the 
order of the numerals initially assigned.
Interval Scale
Measurement on the nominal scale provides only for the deter­
mination of equality. With the introduction of the ordinal scale, 
the ability to determine greater than or less than relations makes 
the rank-ordering of properties possible. The interval scale intro­
duces equal class intervals. Equal differences can now be determined. 
However, the choice of a zero point is still arbitrary. Thus the 
equality of ratios cannot be measured.
Typical examples of the interval scale shown in Table 2, 
include the Fahrenheit and Centigrade temperature scales. The zero 
point on both scales is chosen arbitrarily. It does not represent 
the empirical property of zero temperature. Though the class inter­
vals on these scales are equal, the absence of a natural zero point 
prohibits the assumption that one temperature is twice, three times, 
and so on, another temperature.
Interval scales have the structure of the linear group. They 
may be transformed by any equation of the following form: x 1 = ax + b
where a > 0. This equation is simply the generalized form of a linear 
equation. For example, the transformation equation to convert from 
Centigrade, C, to Fahrenheit, F, is F = 9/5 C + 32.
Ratio Scale
The fourth type of scale discussed by Stevens is the ratio 
scale. They exist where equality, rank-order, equality of intervals, 
and equality of ratios in the underlying operations are possible.
Ratio scales do have a natural zero point.
Typical examples of ratio scales are shown in Table 2. 
Numerosity is the most common and simplest ratio scale. This is the 
scale of cardinal numbers used for counting. Length and weight also 
exemplify ratio scales. Temperature measured on the absolute scale, 
where absolute zero is not arbitrary, also is a ratio scale.
Stevens does not mention one very important example— the 
money system. Economic objects and events are measured on the ratio 
scale of dollars. "Dollars" is the name of the monetary unit. (More 
is said on the monetary unit later in this chapter.) The property of 
economic value is susceptible to the empirical operations of classi­
fication (determining equality), rank-ordering, and for determining 
the equality of intervals and ratios. Economic value has a natural 
zero point that has empirical meaning. Each of these last two state­
ments is empirical and is easily verified by one's own experience.
Multiplication by a constant is the only type of mathematical 
transformation that applies to ratio scales. It is the only trans­
formation that keeps the scale form invariant. An example of such a 
transformation is converting from yards, £, to feet, f_, by multiplying 
by 3; f = 3y. Two other examples include converting one currency into 
another and adjusting for general price-level changes by multiplying 
and/or dividing by price indexes.
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Logarithmic Interval Scale
Stevens also mentions the possibility of a fifth scale, the 
logarithmic interval scale. This scale remains invariant under the 
following mathematical transformation: x 1 = kx11 or the power group
where k and n are both positive. Concerning the logarithmic interval 
scale Stevens states: "The formal properties of such a scale may be
interesting, but, like many mathematical models, it has thus far
proved useless to the empirical business of science."32
Measurement Scales and Statistics
One final note in passing should be made concerning column 4
in Table 2. The basis of Stevens1 scale classification, namely
invariance under mathematical transformations, has important impli­
cations concerning statistical operations appropriate to each scale. 
Stevens points out: "The criterion for the appropriateness of a
statistic is invariance under the transformation in column 3,"33 it 
should be noted that column 4 is cumulative downward. That is, the 
statistics appropriate to an interval scale include all those listed 
for the nominal, ordinal, and interval scales.
For example, Stevens points out that on the nominal scale if 
the measurement results in assigning only one object to each class 
(numbering football players), the only relevant statistic is the
^^Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility," op. 
cit., pp. 31-32.
33stevens, "On the Theory of Scales of Measurement," op. 
cit., p. 678.
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number of players assigned a numeral.34 if more than one object is 
asigned to each class, then the mode could be calculated. Computing 
the mean or the standard deviation assumes that distance has meaning. 
But distance has meaning only on interval and ratio scales. There­
fore, calculating the mean, or standard deviation for a measurement 
made on nominal and ordinal scales is not appropriate.
Stevens sums up measurement and statistics as folows:
The basic principle is this. Having measured a set 
of items by making numerical assignments in accordance with a 
set of rules, we are free to change the assignments by what­
ever group of transformations will preserve the empirical 
information contained in the scale. These transformations, 
depending on which group they belong to, will upset some 
statistical measures and leave others unaffected. In other 
words, for guidance in setting bounds on the statistical 
treatment of empirical measurements, we must look to the 
principle of invariance. The empirical operations that 
underlie the scale determine what transformations can be 
made without the sacrifice of information, and the per­
missible transformations determine, in turn, the appropriate 
statistical measures, i.e., those that preserve the requisite 
invariance.35
Ellis offers a modification of the basis of Stevens' 
classification. The modification draws heavily upon Coombs' classi­
fication of measurement scales. Accordingly, Coombs' classification 
is discussed next, followed by Ellis' critique of Stevens'. This 
rather lengthy discussion is necessary because in Chapter 5 it is 
used to show that financial accounting measurement is measurement on 
a ratio scale regardless whether Stevens or Ellis is correct.




Accounting measurement must be done on a ratio scale if traditional 
methods of adjusting for general and specific price-level changes 
(multiplication by a constant) are to be allowed.
Coombs' System36 
Coombs has developed a classification of measurement scales 
quite similar to that of Stevens. In fact, many consider Coombs' 
system simply an expansion of Stevens'.
Basis of Classification
The basis of Coombs' classification is not invariance of the 
scale form under transformation. Rather, it is according to the kinds 
of application of arithmetic which the scales represent.^7 Coombs 
distinguishes between six major types of scales: nominal, partially
ordered, ordinal, ordered metric, interval, and ratio scales. Only 
his partially ordered and ordered metric scales are discussed here.
His other scales are quite similar to those of Stevens discussed 
earlier.
Partially Ordered Scale
As noted previously, the greater than or less than relation 
on an ordinal scale holds for all pairs of objects taken from different
Of.The following discussion of Coombs is taken from:
Clyde H. Coombs, "A Theory of Psychological Scaling," Engineer­
ing Research Bulletin No. 34 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Engineering
Research Institute, University of Michigan, May, 1952).
C. H. Coombs, "The Theory and Methods of Social Measurement, 
Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences, eds. L. Festinger and
D. Katz, (New York: Dryden Press, 1952).
37Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement, op. cit., p. 52.
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classes. In a partially ordered scale this greater than or less than 
relation holds for only some of the pairs of classes. For example, 
assume that the quality of a given raw material is graded based on 
two characteristics. First, a heavier weight indicates a better 
quality; second, a smoother finish indicates a better quality.
Object A being both heavier and smoother than object B is judged to 
be a better quality. Likewise, object B being both heavier and 
smoother than object C is judged a better quality. These three 
objects are measured on an ordinal scale: A greater than B greater
than C. However, if a fourth object, D, is added that is heavier 
than object B but lighter than object A, and smoother than object C 
but rougher than object B, the scale becomes a partially ordered 
scale. For without knowing the relation between smoothness and 
heaviness, it is impossible to rank-order object D.
Dual Basis of Scale Classification
Coombs breaks every scale down into two elements, the objects 
and the distance between objects. Both elements may be scaled on a 
nominal, partially ordered, or ordered scale. This breakdown allows 
Coombs to distinguish subclasses of the major scale types discussed 
above. Writing the scale that applies to the object first and the 
scale that applies to the distance between objects second, Coombs 







(5) partially ordered-partially ordered,
(6) nominal-ordered,
(7) ordered-partially ordered,
(8) partially ordered-ordered, and
(9) ordered-ordered.38
For example, an ordered-ordered scale is one on which both the objects 
and the distance between objects can be rank-ordered. In other words, 
it is possible to determine (1) whether A is greater than or less than 
B, and B is greater than or less than C; and (2) whether the distance 
between A and B is greater than or less than the distance between B 
and C. A nominal-nominal scale is pure classification.
Coombs points out that this breakdown of scale types could be 
greatly extended by considering second-order differences between 
objects. For example, one could consider the difference between the 
distance between objects A and B and objects B and C is greater than 
the difference between the distance between objects C and D and 
objects D and E.39
Metric Scale
Two of the scales listed, the ordered-partially ordered scale 
and the ordered-ordered scale, are referred to as an ordered metric
90Clyde H. Coombs, "A Theory of Psychological Scaling," 
Engineering Research Bulletin No. 34 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Engineer­
ing Research Institute, University of Michigan, May, 1952), p. 4.
^Loc. cit.
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scale. Coombs describes the ordered metric scale:
. . . By an ordered metric is meant a scale of which it 
can be said of any triplet of classes that a > b > c and also 
that for at least some intervals between classes, e.g., the inter­
vals ab, be . . . ij . . . kl, either ij > IcT or kf > ij, where 
in general, jk singifies the distance from j to k .^
Stevens, however, has pointed out that the ordered metric scale need 
not be considered a new scale. It is simply an unfinished interval 
scale.^ Thus, it is possible to distinguish different subclasses of 
interval scales. This is done in Table 4 on the next page, showing 
the major classes of Coombs' classification and the arithmetic formulas 
that apply to each class. In general, if a given set of formulas apply 
to some property, then it is possible to say that the property is meas­
urable on the particular type of scale the formulas indicate.
An Example of Coombs' Classification Criteria
As an example of the application of Coombs' criteria, consider 
the following. A calendar is considered an interval scale. Let a, b, 
c, and d be the calendar dates that events A, B, C, and D occurred, 
respectively. As is seen below the arithmetic formulas for interval 
scales have analytic interpretations.
(1) The temporal location of event A may be said to occur 
either later, at the same time, or earlier than event B.
(2) The temporal duration between the occurrence of events 
A and B may appropriately be greater than, equal to, or
40c. H. Coombs, "The Theory and Methods of Social Measurement," 
Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences, eds. L. Festinger and
D. Katz (New York: Dryden Press, 1952), p. 478.
^Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility," op. cit.,
p. 36.
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less than the temporal duration between events C and D. 
Thus, calendar time is measured on at least an interval scale. In 
order to show that calendar time is not measured on a ratio scale, 
one need only show that the formula a ^ nb has no analytic inter­
pretation, and this is the case. It makes no sense to say that the 
temporal location of event A is n times the temporal location of 
event B. With Coombs' system in mind, Ellis' critique of Stevens' 
measurement classification system is discussed.
Table 4
Coombs' Classification of Major 
Measurement Scales
Scale These Arithmetic Formulas Have
Analytic Applications
Nominal Scale a £ b
>
Ordinal Scale a — b<
Interval Scale: >Nominal-Interval a < b, | a-b I 7 1 c-d |> I |, > I jOrdinal-Interval a < b, |a-bjl ^ 1 c-d |
> . > —Ratio Scale a < b, 1 a-b |1 ^ j c-d|, a £ nb
(n = any rational number)
Sources:
Adapted from Brian Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 244-245; and
Brian Ellis, "Measurement," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press,
1967), Vol. 5, pp. 63-64.
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Ellis' Critique of Stevens'
Classification System
Ellis finds the basis of Stevens' classification of meas­
urement scale, invariance of the scale form under mathematical 
transformation, somewhat ambiguous.^ Ellis centers his attack on the 
contention held by Stevens". . . that a scale form is preserved under 
a given transformation if the new scale produced could serve 'all of 
the purposes' of the original s ca l e. [I t al i c s  not in the original.]
Stevens' Classification of the Fahrenheit 
and Centigrade Temperature Scales^
Ellis looks first at Stevens' classification of the Fahrenheit 
and Centigrade temperature scales as linear interval scales. Accord­
ing to Ellis, showing that Centigrade is converted to Fahrenheit or 
vice versa by means of a linear function does not show they are linear 
with respect to each other.^ In a similar manner, the fact that two 
scales used to measure some property are of the same type, e.g., both 
interval scales, does not mean they must be linear with respect to 
each other. The scales could be dissimilar.^
Ellis argues that in order to show that the Fahrenheit and Centi­
grade temperature scales are linear interval scales, one ". . . must
^Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement, op. cit., p. 58.
^Loc. cit.
4^The following discussion is taken from Brian Ellis, Basic 
Concepts of Measurement (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1966), pp. 58-63.
45Ibid., p. 60. 46Ibid., p. 67.
110
show that the purposes of these scales could not be served by a 
scale which is non-linear with respect to either. . . ."47 [Italics 
not in the original.] But Ellis believes that a non-linear scale, 
such as Dalton's, can serve all these p u r p o s e s .48
Ratio Scales
In the case of ratio scales, Ellis again finds fault with 
Stevens'. Ellis points out that length, mass, and time interval can 
all be measured fundamentally. They are also cited by Stevens as 
examples of ratio scales. However, it is possible to construct non­
linear scales for fundamentally measurable quantities which can serve 
all the purposes of linear scales. Hence, doubt arises as to whether 
they are really ratio scales by Stevens' criterion.49
Absolute Temperature Scale
In a similar manner, Ellis again questions Stevens' cate­
gorization of the absolute temperature scale as a ratio scale. Ellis 
can find no reason, except mathematical simplicity, why the absolute 
temperature scale cannot be transformed by any monotonically increas­
ing function. The fact that the absolute temperature scale has a 
natural zero point cannot be used as proof that it is a ratio scale. 
First, other non-ratio scales also have fixed zero points. Further­
more, transformations of the absolute temperature scale need not be
47ibid., p. 60. 482oc. cit.
49ibid., p. 61.
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limited to those transformation functions that leave the zero point 
unchanged. If other transformation functions yield new scales that 
can do the job, then zero preserving transformations are not
m a n d a t o r y . 5 0
In Defense of Stevens
Ellis has pointed out that Stevens, like Coombs, may actually 
have been thinking about the kinds of arithmetic application a scale 
represents.^ If this is the case, then Stevens’ criterion for scale 
form invariance may be restated as Ellis suggests.
Ellis reformulates Stevens’ criterion for scale form invar­
iance under mathematical transformation as follows:
If a scale X is transformed into a scale Y, then Y has 
the same scale form as X if and only if propositions belonging 
to the same classes of arithmetical formulae may be interpreted 
in the same way on both X and Y — those formulae which are 
theorems yielding analytic statements under the given inter­
pretations, and those which contradict theorems yielding self­
contradictory statements.52
This reformulation results in Stevens’ classification being 
derivable from Coombs'. Many of the problems with Stevens' classi­
fication system disappear.^3 Ellis, in applying his reformulations 
of invariance, shows the following to be true:
(1) Nominal scale:
(a) If a scale is classified a nominal scale by Coombs' 
classification, then it is also a nominal scale by
50ibid., pp. 6 2 - 6 3 .  51Ibid., p. 6 5 .  
52loc. cit. ^^Ibid., p. 66.
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Stevens' classification.
(b) If there is to be no change in the scale form 
under transformation, then only single-valued 
functions with a single-valued inverse can be 
used to transform the function. (A permutation 
transformation is a subclass of this type of 
function.)
(2) Ordinal scale:
(a) An ordinal scale by Coombs' classification is an 
ordinal scale by Stevens' classification.
(b) Transformation functions are restricted to strictly 
monotonically increasing functions.
(3) Interval scale:
(a) Both nominal-interval and ordinal-interval scales 
by Coombs' classification are linear interval 
scales by Stevens' classification.
(b) Transformation functions are restricted to linear 
increasing functions.
(4) Ratio scale:
(a) A ratio scale by Coombs' classification is a ratio 
scale by Stevens' classification.




Ellis has modified Stevens’ criterion for scale form invar­
iance. In so doing some of the problems with Stevens' classification 
of the absolute temperature scale as a ratio scale are r e m o v e d . ^5
Thus, showing that a scale for the measurement of a property 
is a ratio scale by Coombs’ classification, also shows it is a ratio 
scale by Stevens1. This assumes that Ellis’ criticism of Stevens1 is 
correct. However, it is possible that the criticism is not valid. 
Ellis admits to this possibility in pointing out that Stevens may 
have left unstated better reasons underlying his classification 
s y s t e m . ^6 If Ellis' criticism is invalid, then Stevens' criteria of 
invariance under mathematical transformation can be used to determine 
the scale type. Earlier in this chapter Stevens' criteria was 
employed to show that the dollar scale is a ratio scale. In the fol­
lowing chapter Coombs' criteria is also used to show that the dollar 
scale is a ratio scale.
Torgerson's Classification of Types of Scales^?
Torgerson offers another classification of scales similar to 
Stevens'. This is presented below. He further offers a classifi­
cation of different kinds of measurement similar to Campbell's. This 
will be presented after Campbell's classification is discussed. Tor­
gerson also wrote on multidimensional scaling, which will not be 
discussed in this study.
55Ibid., p. 66. 56Ibid., p. 63.
The following discussion of Torgerson's classification of 
measurement is taken from W. S. Torgerson, Theory and Methods of 
Scaling (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), pp. 15-21.
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Four Types of Scales
Torgerson distinguished four types of scales: ordinal,
ordinal with a natural origin, interval, and ratio. His classifi­
cation does not recognize the nominal scale as constituting meas­
urement, and therefore differs from Stevens’. Also, in contrast to 
Stevens, he recognizes an ordinal scale with a natural origin. Both 
Torgerson's ordinal scale with a natural origin and his ratio scale 
have a natural origin. His other ordinal scale and his interval 
scale do not. Like Stevens, the class size on his interval scale 
and ratio scale is equal; it is not on either of his ordinal scales. 
Torgerson's identification of ordinal scales that have a natural 
origin emphasizes the point made earlier by Ellis. The presence of 
a natural origin cannot be used as proof that a scale is a ratio 
scale. Some non-ratio scales also have natural zero points.
Transformations
Torgerson related his scales of measurement to transformation 
groups. His ordinal scale can be transformed by any monotonically 
increasing function. For the ordinal scale with a natural origin, 
transformation functions are limited to those monotonically increas­
ing functions that do not change the origin. On the interval scale, 
only linear transformations of the form y = ax + b, where ja is 
greater than zero, are permitted. For the ratio scale, only trans­
formations that do not change the natural zero point are permitted. 
This further restricts the selection of transformation functions to 
those of the form y = ax. The transformations applicable to
115
Torgerson's ordinal, interval, and ratio scales are identical with 
those for Stevens' ordinal, interval, and ratio scales.
Campbell's classification of measurement is taken up next.
His classification is considerably different from the ones presented 
thus far.
Campbell's Classification of Measurement^
Campbell distinguishes between two different kinds of meas­
urement: fundamental and derived. These are discussed first, fol­
lowed by a criticism by Ellis of Campbell's classification system.
Fundamental and Derived Measurement
Fundamental measurement does not depend on prior measurement. 
Magnitudes normally measured fundamentally include length, period of 
time, mass, number, and electrical resistance. Campbell points out 
other magnitudes such as volume, force, energy, and charge may also 
be measured fundamentally. However, normally in practice they are 
not so measured.
Campbell's second kind of measurement, derived measurement, 
depends on the prior fundamental measurement of other magnitudes. 
Stevens distinguishes between these two different kinds of measurement.
-*̂ The following discussion of Campbell's classification of 
measurement is taken from Norman R. Campbell, An Account of the 
Principles of Measurement and Calculation (London: Longmans, Green
and Co., Ltd., 1928).
Norman R. Campbell, Foundations of Science (Formerly titled: 
Physics: The Elements, 1921); (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,
1957).
Norman R. Campbell, What Is Science? (New York: Dover Pub­
lications, Inc., 1952— first published in 1921).
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He states:
The classical view of measurement, as Campbell presents 
it, is essentially the view that direct or "fundamental" meas­
urement is possible only when the "axioms of additivity" can be 
shown to be isomorphic with the manipulations we perform upon 
objects. Only a few properties, such as length, weight, and 
electric resistance, are measurable in this fundamental way.
Most other magnitudes dealt with in physics are measured by 
indirect or "derived" measurement— a process in which derived 
magnitudes are defined by means of numerical laws relating 
fundamental magnitudes. Thus density, the classical example, 
is measured by the ratio of mass to volume.^9
Torgerson points out that Campbell's classification of meas­
urement distinguishes only two different scales, the ordinal scale and 
the ratio scale. However, the ratio scale is the most important, 
since the ordinal scale is rarely used in the physical sciences.60
Ellis' Criticism of Campbell
Ellis criticizes Campbell's classification of measurement and 
proposes a modification to it. These points are discussed next.
Criticisms of Derived Measurement
By derived measurement, Campbell means measurement of con­
stants in numerical laws. A numerical law is the expression of a 
numerical relation between two or more magnitudes in the form y = f(x). 
The numerical relation may be expressed by any one of many different 
types of functions such as linear functions (y = ax + b), quadratic
^^Stevens, "Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility," op. 
cit., p. 22.
^W. S. Torgerson, Theory and Methods of Scaling (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 18.
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functions (y = ax2 + bx + c), trigonometric functions (y = a Sin bx), 
and others. In the above functions, a_, b^ and are numerical con­
stants, and x and 2. are variables. A numerical term is considered a 
constant in a numerical law only if:
(1) there are several other laws expressed by mathematical 
functions of the same form;
(2) the laws all express the same physical relationship; and
(3) the laws differ from each other only in the numerical 
value of the constant.
Each law expresses a uniform association of properties differing only 
in the numerical value of the constant. If, as Campbell, one defines 
a system as a uniform association of properties, then each different 
numerical law relates to a different system. Thus, several systems 
are all characterized by laws of the same form but differing from 
each other in the value of each law's numerical constant. The value 
of a numerical constant is considered both a property of a system, 
and a measure of the magnitude that the numerical law defines. For 
example, density, d_, is expressed as a numerical relation between two 
magnitudes, mass, m, and volume, v. These magnitudes may be expressed 
in a numerical law as follows: m = dv, where d is a numerical con­
stant. Thus, the measurement of a substance's density depends on the 
prior measurement of two other magnitudes, mass and volume. Density 
is an example of derived measurement. Density is measured by
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measuring the constant, d̂, in the above numerical l a w .61
Ellis points out that two or more quantities are always 
required to evaluate such constants. But, there are other quantities, 
temperature, for example, that are not fundamentally measurable. 
Their measurement depends on only one other quantity. Ellis further 
notes that even density can be measured by reference to the meas­
urement of only one quantity if a criteria of equality existed for 
the other quantity. Rather than changing Campbell's definition of 
derived measurement to provide for the one quantity case (such as 
temperature meaurement), Ellis adds a third kind, associative meas­
urement. Ellis then introduces the term "indirect measurement," 
which applies to measurement of a quantity depending on the prior 
measurement of one or more other q u a n t i t i e s.62 Ellis also finds 
fault with Campbell's fundamental measurement.
Criticisms of Fundamental Measurement
Ellis points out that Campbell, in requiring additivity for 
fundamental measurement, leaves out a type of measurement that is 
neither direct nor fundamental. For example, Mohs' measurement 
scale for the hardness of minerals is neither derived (it does not 
depend on the measurement of other quantities) nor fundamental (it 
is not additive). Ellis then introduces another term, "direct
6lNormal R. Campbell, Foundations of Science (Formerly titled: 
Physics: The Elements, 1921); (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,
1957), pp. 328-346.
6?Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement, pp. cit., pp. 53-57.
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measurement," of which fundamental measurement is one subclass. 
Direct measurement includes all forms of measurement that do not 
depend on any prior measurement. In addition, Ellis introduces 
elemental measurement, which is applicable any time a property can 
be rank-ordered.^3
In summary, Ellis distinguishes four kinds of measurement: 
elemental, associative, derived, and fundamental. These are listed 
in decreasing order as to their range of applicability with funda­
mental measurement applying to the narrowest range of properties.
Torgerson presents a second classification of measurement 
almost identical to Campbell's. Torgerson simply adds a new kind of 
measurement very important in the social sciences, which Campbell 
does not recognize. This modification is discussed next.
Torgerson's Classification of Kinds 
of Measurement
6ATorgersonOH presents a measurement classification system 
almost identical to that of Campbell's. Like Campbell, he distin­
guishes between fundamental and derived measurement. In addition, 
Torgerson also discusses a third kind, measurement by fiat, which is 
simply measurement by arbitrary definition. As in all measurement 
the property to be measured is linked to something observable. In 
particular, in fiat measurement the relation between the property to
^Loc. cit.
64The following brief description of Torgerson's classifi­
cation of the kinds of measurement is taken from Torgerson, op. cit., 
pp. 21-24.
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be measured and one or more observable properties is arbitrarily 
defined. The measurement of the observable property is taken to be 
the measurement of the underlying nonobservable property.
Torgerson points out that there is nothing wrong or logically 
incorrect about fiat measurement. The major difficulty with it lies 
in the tremendous number of ways in which a given concept can be 
connected to observable, hence measurable properties. For instance, 
Torgerson states: "We might measure strength of food drive by the
number of hours of food deprivation, by the amount of shock an animal 
is willing to take in order to reach food, by the amout of weight 
lost during a particular period of deprivation, and so on."66 Fiat 
measurement occurs frequently in psychology and other social sciences. 
A number of important instances of fiat measurement in accounting are 
presented in Chapter 6 .
The following section looks at the nature of a measuring unit. 
The necessity for adjustments of a measuring unit is also discussed. 
Understanding the nature of the measurement unit is important for 
financial accounting measurement, which uses the dollar as its unit 
of measure.
The Measurement Unit 
One of the first tasks in developing a measurement system is 
the determination of a measurement unit. A brief examination of 
temporal and length measurement provides valuable insight on the
65Ibid., pp. 23-24. 66Ibid., p. 24.
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nature of the measurement unit.
Temporal Measurement 
The purpose of the measurement of time is the assignment of 
a temporal location to an event. Lenzen explains: "The problem of
the measurement of time is to invent a procedure for assigning to 
events numbers, called the times or dates of events.
In the measurement of time some periodic process is needed.
In general, any periodic process will do. A pulse beat, a pendulum, 
the vibration of an atom, the passing of a bus past a particular 
location on its daily route, or the rotation of the earth are all 
more or less periodic processes. All could be used as standard units 
in measuring time. However, as will be seen shortly, certain types 
of periodic processes have distinct advantages over others for use as 
standard measurement units.
Length Measurement 
In the measurement of length, the objective is to assign to 
an object a number representing that object's property of length.
The unit of measure chosen does not have to be rigid, that is, one 
that will not change in length. A measuring rod on which the standard 
unit of measurement is marked could be made of wood, rubber, a 
variety of metals, plastic, or other substances. Each of these 
materials possesses a different degree of rigidness.
^Victor F. Lenzen, "Procedures of Empirical Science," 
Foundations of the Unity of Science, Vol. 1, No. 5, International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science, ed. Otto Neurath (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 15.
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The standard measurement unit of length in the metric system, 
the meter, for a long time was defined as the distance between two 
scratches on a metal bar kept in a Paris vault. Today, this standard 
has been replaced by another standard. The new metric system's 
standard of length, as established at the Eleventh General Conference 
on Weights and Measures, has become the wavelength of the orange-red 
light of Krypton 86.
Once a measurement standard has been established, such as 
for time or length, this standard can be used to measure the time 
of any event or the length of any other object possessing that pro­
perty. The advantages that invariant standard units of measure 
offer over others is discussed next.
Advantages of an Invariant Standard Unit
In measurement, the use of a fixed standard unit of meas­
urement, invariant over time, has obvious advantages over variable 
standard units of measurement. For example, a rubber measuring rod 
could be used as the standard for measuring the length of objects.
But the measurement unit's variability could lead to different meas­
urement results. Thus, it would be possible for different measurements 
to yield different numbers representing the length of a given object, 
although the object's length remains unchanged. This is obviously 
undesirable. Although the measurement rule would be very simple, 
involving instructions for placing the rod along the object measured, 
any scientific laws involving length measurement would be relatively 
complicated. Because in science simpler laws are preferred to more
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complicated laws, measurement standards that lead to simple laws and 
theories are preferred. Thus, one is encouraged to use relatively 
rigid rods for measuring length and processes with equal intervals for 
measuring time.
Carnap sums up these points as follows:
You will remember that, in our discussion of periodicity, 
we saw that there is no logical reason compelling us to base our 
measurement of time on one of the periodic processes belonging to 
the large class of equivalent processes. We chose such a process 
only because the choice resulted in a greater simplicity in our 
natural laws. A similar choice is involved here. There is no 
logical necessity for basing the measurement of length on a 
member of the one large class of relatively rigid bodies. We 
choose such bodies because it is more convenient to do so. If we 
chose to take a rubber or wax rod as our unit of length, we would 
find very few, if any, bodies in the world that were relatively 
rigid to our standard. Our description of nature would, there­
fore, become enormously complicated. We would have to say, for 
example, that iron bodies were constantly changing their lengths, 
because, each time we measured them with our flexible rubber 
yardstick, we obtained a different value. No scientist, of 
course, would want to be burdened with the complex physical laws 
that would have to be devised in order to describe such phenomena. 
On the other hand, if we choose a metal bar as a standard of 
length, we find that a very large number of bodies in the world 
are rigid when measured with it. Much greater regularity and 
simplicity is thus introduced into our description of the world.
This regularity derives, of course, from the nature of 
the actual w o r l d . 68
The Financial Accounting Measurement Unit 
For financial accounting measurement, the standard unit of 
measure is the dollar. The dollar can be used to measure the economic 
value of any object possessing that property. A dollar could be 
defined in terms of purchasing power in some given base year. This 
is unnecessary. Such a definition is in terms of some base year
68Rudolf Carnap, Philosophical Foundations of Physics (New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966), p. 93.
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whose choice is more or less arbitrary. Brandis has pointed out 
that the question "What is the value of the dollar?" is as meaningless 
as asking "What is the length of the meter?" The length of a meter 
is a meter, and the value of a dollar is a dollar. This is true by 
definition. 9̂ of course, it is possible to measure changes in the 
value of the dollar. However, this again involves taking as standard 
the purchasing power of the dollar in some base year.
Advantages of the Dollar
The dollar has several properties that make it an ideal choice 
as a standard for the measurement of value. It is a convenient medium 
of exchange, and thus relieves people of the trouble of having to 
trade goods for goods (barter). The dollar also serves as a store of 
value. Thus, goods and services can be sold for money, with the money 
used to immediately purchase other goods or services or held till a 
later time. The dollar also serves as a standard of deferred payment, 
whereby money can be borrowed and repaid rather than goods and ser­
vices being borrowed and repaid.
Adjustments of Measuring Units
Once a standard of measurement is established, the next pro­
blem is to determine whether that standard of measurement needs to be 
adjusted. This may be necessary if the forces acting on the standard
69Royall Brandis, Principles of Economics (Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), p. 89.
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distort it is some way. Carnap has stated:
Once we have chosen a standard of measurement, such as a 
steel rod, we are faced with another choice. We can say that 
the length of the particular rod is our unit, regardless of 
changes in its temperature, magnetism, and so on, or we can 
introduced correction factors depending on such changes.
The consequences of following the first alternative, namely 
not adjusting for distorting forces, leads to a simple measurement 
rule but a very complicated system of laws and theories describing 
the real world. The second alternative leads to a more complicated 
measurement rule, but a simpler system of laws and theories. Carnap 
further points out there is no logical reason impelling us to choose 
either alternative.However, if all other things are equal, 
scientists always prefer the simpler theory to the more complicated 
theory, one would again choose to adjust the standard of measurement.
Carnap describes the procedure that could be used in adjusting 
a standard of measurement, such as an iron rod. He states:
. . . Instead of stipulating that the segment between 
the two marks [such as the old international standard for the 
meter] will always be taken as having the selected length 10 
(say 1 or 100), we now decree that it has the normal length 1Q 
only when the rod is at the temperature T0, which we have 
selected as the "normal" temperature, while at any other 
temperature T, the length of the segment is given by the 
equation:
1 = 10 [ 1 + 3  (T - T0)]
where 3 is a constant (called the "coefficient of thermal 
expansion") that is characteristic of the rod's substance.
Similar corrections are introduced in the same way for other
70Carnap, op. cit., p. 94. ^Loc. cit.
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conditions, such as the presence of magnetic fields, that 
may also affect the rod's length. Physicists much prefer 
this more complicated procedure— the introduction of cor­
rection factors— for the same reason that they chose a
metal rod instead of a rubber one--the choice leads to a
vast simplification of physical laws.72
Adjustments of the Dollar
The dollar, conventionally accepted standard unit of meas­
urement for economic values, can also be adjusted in a similar manner 
for distorting influences. This country has for many years been 
faced with a steadily rising level of prices. This general increasing 
level of prices has had a similar effect on the dollar as rising tem­
perature has on a metal measuring rod. It causes the standard unit of
measurement to shrink. Without adjustment, the value of any object 
measured by the dollar is distorted.
Price-Level Changes
Non-cash assets of a firm can be adjusted for two price 
changes: general price-level changes and specific price-level
changes. These price-level changes are discussed below.
General Price-Level Changes.— Adjustments for general price- 
level changes reflect the changes in the general price levels or in 
the general purchasing power of money in the economy. These two are 
reciprocals.
A price index shows the relationship between prices in some 
base year to prices in other years. Once again, the choice of a base
72Ibid., pp. 94-95.
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year is usually arbitrary. But a particular base year may be chosen 
to accomplish some particular purpose.
The ideal way to measure changes in the general price-level 
is to average the changes in t;he prices of everything the dollar can 
buy. But this is too time-consuming. Instead a list of products is 
selected thought to be representative of the way people spend their 
money. Then, the selected products are weighted to reflect their 
relative importance in the spending patterns of people and a weighted 
average of the prices is determined. An index number is used to 
express this weighted average in later years as a ratio of the 
weighted average of prices in the base year.
Accounting financial statements are not usually restated to 
present the economic value of the firm in terms of one year's prices, 
but rather contain the value of items in terms of prices of different 
years. If the statements presented are restated to reflect price- 
level changes, they are restated to reflect prices in the most 
current year.
Adjustments for general price-level changes represent adjust­
ments for changes in the measuring unit. A measuring rod may be 
adjusted for expansion or contraction due to temperature changes. 
Likewise, the dollar can be adjusted for expansion or contraction in 
its purchasing power. If the economy is characterized by inflation 
or a rising general level of prices, the command of the dollar over 
products shrinks. In other words, the dollar buys less and less. If 
the economy is characterized by deflation or a general falling level 
of prices, the command of the dollar over products expands.
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Specific Price-Level Changes ."Specific price-level changes 
reflect changes in the prices of specific products either above or 
below the average change in the general level of prices. In account­
ing, recognizing specific price changes involves the use of current 
market prices in the financial statements. The following chapter 
looks at the propriety of using current market prices as a measure 
of current economic value.
Price-Level Adjustments
The main purpose of the preceding discussion was to briefly 
analyze the nature of the measuring unit. This discussion also con­
sidered the nature of adjustments to the measuring unit for distorting 
influences. Obviously, there are many instances when a measuring rod 
is not adjusted for the effects of temperature, magneticism, and so 
on. Whether adjustment should be employed in any particular instance 
depends on the purpose the measurement is to serve and the concomitant 
accuracy required. This is true in the case of a measuring rod, the 
dollar, or any other standard measuring unit.
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter looks at (1) the nature of measurement, (2) alter­
native systems for the classification of measurement, and (3) the 
measurement unit. This analysis of measurement theory is necessary 
before a theory of financial accounting measurement can be constructed 
to demonstrate the techniques of theory construction.
The discussion of the nature of measurement led to the
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adoption of the following definition of measurement:
Measurement-?— The assignment by rules of numerals to 
objects or events in order to represent 
particular properties of the objects or 
events.
This definition includes classification as measurement. To exclude 
classification from measurement is arbitrary and dichotomizes a 
logical entity.
Next, the two traditional measurement classification systems, 
Stevens' and Campbell's, are examined. Other systems discussed are 
modifications of these systems. Stevens' classification leads to the 
identification of four major different kinds of measurement scales: 
nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio. Ellis criticized the basis of 
Stevens' classification, invariance of the scale form under mathe­
matical transformation, and offers a modification to it. Ellis' 
modification draws heavily on Coombs' classification system which 
itself is an expansion of Stevens' system. Coombs adds a partially 
ordered scale and an ordered metric scale to Stevens' four major 
scale types and further breakdowns these scale types into subclasses.
Ellis' criticism casts doubt as to whether invariance under 
mathematical transformation can reliably be used to classify scales. 
Since the financial accounting measurement rule developed in Chap­
ter 5 requires a ratio scale, it was necessary to explore Ellis' 
criticism further. Ellis, through his reformulation of the basis of 
Stevens' scale classification system, was able to show that if a scale 
is classified a given type by Coombs, then it must be the same type 
under Stevens' system. In particular, if a scale is a ratio scale 
under Coombs’ classification system, it must be a ratio scale under
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Stevens'. In Chapter 5 this is used to show that whether Ellis' 
criticism of Stevens is correct or not, the financial accounting 
measurement rule developed is measurement on a ratio scale.
The other major measurement classification system, developed 
by Campbell, is discussed next. Campbell distinguished between fun­
damental and derived measurement. Campbell's system seems to exclude 
much of the measurement done in accounting and other social sciences. 
With present knowledge very few concepts dealt with in the social 
sciences are fundamentally measurable or capable of being linked to 
fundamentally measurable properties.
Ellis found several problems with Campbell's classification 
system. In particular, Ellis found that some quantities like tem­
perature are not fundamentally measurable according to Campbell's 
criterion. And, some properties that Campbell says may be measured 
by derived measurement can be measured by procedures that are neither 
derived nor fundamental. Rather, than modifying Campbell's definitions 
of fundamental and derived measurement, Ellis simply adds two other 
types of measurement: elemental and associative.
Torgerson presented a measurement classification system almost 
identical to Campbell's. In addition to fundamental and derived meas­
urement he identified fiat measurement. Fiat measurement, measurement 
by stipulation or definition, is used frequently in the social 
sciences. In Chapter 6 some of the selected examples used to further 
demonstrate the techniques of theory construction involve fiat meas­
urement .
Finally, the measurement unit is examined. It is highly
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desirable that any measurement unit be relatively rigid. This leads 
to simpler theories. In accounting, the measurement unit is the 
dollar. Like all measuring units the dollar is subject to distorting 
influences. General price-level increases can have the same effect 
on the dollar as rising temperature has on a metal measuring rod.
Both cause the standard unit of measurement to shrink. Adjustments 
for changes in the general purchasing power of the dollar can remove 
such distorting influences.
The following chapter continues on with the objectives of 
Chapters 4 and 5 to demonstrate that the techniques of theory con­
struction are applicable to accounting theory construction. In 
Chapter 5, the discussion of measurement theory is applied in a 
theory of financial accounting measurement. Accounting will be 
treated as a value measurement discipline.
Chapter 5
AN OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING MEASUREMENT
The objective of Chapters 4 and 5 is to demonstrate that the 
techniques of theory construction discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 are 
applicable to accounting. This is shown by applying those techniques 
in constructing an outline of a theory of financial accounting meas­
urement. However, to do so one must be knowledgeable about meas­
urement theory. Thus, a brief summary of measurement theory was 
presented in Chapter 4. In this Chapter the background material on 
measurement theory is combined with accounting and economic theory 
to develop some basic assumptions and theorems that might appear in 
a theory of financial accounting measurement.
In the first section of this chapter a number of existence 
and environmental assumptions are discussed. These assumptions are 
developed to determine why products and business firms have the 
property of economic value. Secondly, economic value in an absolute 
versus a personal sense is examined. A method of observing personal 
economic valuations is presented. Thirdly, the supply and demand of 
products is analyzed. An equivalence relationship is established 
between economic value and the market equilibrium price. Fourthly, 
the significance of the market equilibrium price is examined and an 
approximate measure of it is presented. The measurement of economic 
value is tied to financial accounting measurement. An assumption of
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value additivity is added. Then, a summary and brief discussion of 
each of the five different types of basic assumptions is presented. 
Relevant conclusions concerning the use of the techniques of theory 
construction in accounting are presented.
Existence and Environmental Assumptions 
To study financial accounting measurement, one must first 
look at the environment in which business firms operate. The des­
cription of the business-financial accounting environment that fol­
lows is idealistic. It is not meant to be a complete description of 
the real business world. It is only meant to be a generalized des­
cription of significant factors.
The following basic assumptions^ about the business-financial 
accounting environment can be made.
Existence Assumptions;
l.Ax.l - There exists a finite set of business firms.
I.Ax.2 - There exists a finite set of consumers.
I.Ax.3 - There exists a limited supply of productive resources.
I.P.l - There exists an activity called "financial accounting
measurement."
I.Ax.4 - There exists purely competitive markets.
These assumptions state some of the conditions under which this theory
^Each type of assumption, corresponding to the five types of 
assumptions presented in Chapter 2, is identified by one of the fol­
lowing symbols:
Obj. = objective 
I.Ax. = internal axiom
I.P. = internal postulate 
B.Ax. = bridge axiom 
B.P. = bridge postulate.
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applies. For example, I.Ax.4 limits the applicability of this theory 
to pure competition. Each assumption is discussed briefly in the 
following sections.
Pure Competition 
As used in economic theory, pure competition represents an 
idealization. It probably does not exist in its purest form in any 
market. Certain agricultural markets, and perhaps the securities 
market, most closely approximate purely competitive markets.
Characteristics of Pure Competition
Pure competition exists in a market characterized by the 
following conditions:
1. There are homogeneous products.
2. Each buyer and each seller is so small relative to the 
size of the market that he cannot individually affect the price of 
what he is buying or selling.
3. There are no barriers to entry or exit by a firm.
4. There are no artificial restrictions placed on the demand, 
supply, and/or prices of productive resources.
Reasons for Studying Pure Competition
Studying the idealization of pure competition is very useful.
Leftwich points out three important reasons why:
. . . First of all, the principles of pure competiton 
furnish a simple and logical starting point for economic 
analysis. Second, a larger measure of competition does exist 
in the United States today, although perhaps not in pure form. 
Third, the theory of pure competition provides a "norm" against
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which the actual performance of the economy can be checked 
or evaluated.^
Thus, through studying pure competition, one is better able to under­
stand competition that exists in the real world which is not pure 
competition. For the study of financial accounting measurement under 
other forms of competition, understanding it under pure competition 
is the logical starting place. Also, to the extent that pure com­
petition is approximated in any market, a purely competitive theory 
of financial accounting measurement is applicable.
Objectives of Financial Accoutning 
The most recent and comprehensive statement of the objec­
tives of financial accounting is contained in the Statement of the 
Accounting Principles Board No. 4, "Basic Concepts and Accounting 
Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises," 
issued in October, 1970. In it the APB stated: "The basic purpose
of financial accounting and financial statements is to provide 
financial information about individual business enterprises that is
Ouseful in making economic decisions. . . ."
Financial Accounting Objectives
Financial statements are generally regarded as the media by
^Richard H. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation 
(4th ed.; Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1970), p. 28.
^"Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Finan­
cial Statements of Business Enterprises," Statement of the Accounting 
Principles Board No. 4 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, 1970), p. 9.
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which this financial information is communicated. The way financial 
information is presented in financial statements is determined by 
generally accepted accounting principles. In turn, these principles 
are based on basic assumptions underlying financial accounting.
Giving rise to the generally accepted accounting principles are what 
APB Statement No. 4 calls "General Objectives." These general objec­
tives which determine the domain of financial accounting are sum­
marized below:
1. To provide users with reliable financial information
about economic resources and obligations of a business firm.
2. To provide users with information concerning changes in
net resources (resources less obligations) of a firm resulting from 
profit-oriented activities.
3. To provide users with financial information that assists 
them in estimating or predicting the earning potential of the enter­
prise.
4. To provide users with other information about changes in 
economic resources and obligations.
5. To provide users with all other needed relevant infor­
mation related to financial statements.^
The Financial Accounting Process
The APB subdivides the financial accounting process into 
several subprocesses or operations. There are summarized as follows:
1. Selecting those events affecting the economic resources
^Ibid., pp. 33-34.
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and obligations of a firm that will be accounted for.
2. Analyzing those events to determine their effect on a 
firm's financial position.
3. Measuring the effects of the events on the financial 
position of a firm.
4. Classifying the measured events according to the indi­
vidual assets, liabilities, owners' equity, revenues, and expenses 
affected.
5. Recording the measured effects according to the indi­
vidual assets, liabilities, owners' equity, revenues, and expenses 
affected.
6. Summarizing the individual measured, recorded effects 
of each asset, liability, owners' equity, revenue, and expense by 
aggregation and grouping.
7. Adjusting the records for events that are already
recorded, classified, and summarized by using remeasurements, new
data, corrections, or any other adjustments required.
8. Communicating the processed information to users in the
form of financial statements.^
The theory constructed in this study is concerned only with 
items 3 and 7, that is, the measurement and remeasurement of the 
resources and changes in the resources of business firms. In the 
theory of financial accounting measurement constructed here, financial 
accounting is viewed as a value measurement discipline. It is
■’ibid., pp. 68-69.
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concerned with measuring a property of resources called "economic 
value." Economic value is a type of value determined by supply and 
demand. It is distinct but related to other types of value such as 
social, ethical, and aesthetic value.
In this study a theoretical basis is provided for using 
current market prices of assets as a measure of the current value of 
a business firm. The historical purchase price of an asset repre­
sents its economic value only at the time of purchase. Subsequent 
events change the asset’s value. At any subsequent time, in order 
to measure the new value of the asset, one has to assign to that 
asset another number representing its new value.
In summary this study is concerned with one objective of 
financial accounting:
Obj.l - An objective of financial accounting is to measure 
the economic value and changes in the economic 
value that have occurred in a profit-oriented 
business firm in order to enable investors to 
predict the future economic value of the firm.
Prediction of the Future
Users want accounting information to predict the future value 
of a business firm. Users are interested in how well management per­
formed in the past as a guide to how well management will perform in 
the future. Accounting data is a means by which the future can be 
predicted. But, prediction of a firm's future is only a means. 
Investors use accounting information to increase their incomes and 
thus increase their consumption of goods and services and the con­
comitant satisfaction that consumption brings. A brief discussion of
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a number of important assumptions related to prediction follows.
I.Ax.5
I.Ax.5 - All prediction of the future is based on knowledge 
of the past.
This assumption is basic to all prediction. Man's only 
source of knowledge about what may occur in the future is what did 
occur in the past. Investors base their decisions on knowledge of 
what has occurred in the past. One such source is the financial 
statements prepared by business firms. Investors take the data pre­
sented in these statements and project it forward as an indication of 
a firm's performance in the future.
I.Ax.6
I.Ax.6 - The more complete one's knowledge of the past the 
better one's ability to predict the future.
If the past is man's only source of knowledge about the 
future, then it also seems that the more complete man's knowledge of 
the past, the better his ability to predict the future. If this 
assumption is correct, information on daily stock price changes would 
be a better predictor than information showing those changes at one 
month intervals. Or, reports showing economic value changes as they 
occur, as in current value accounting, would be better predictors of 
a firm's future economic value than historical cost-based financial 
accounting.
Elaborating on this second example, historical cost-based 
financial accounting presents a less complete picture of what has 
happened in the past than current value accounting. Many times in
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historical cost-based accounting only net value changes are reported; 
that is, value changes that may combine both component value increases 
and/or decreases. That values of certain items fluctuate is no reason 
to delay reporting these fluctuations. If I.A.5 and I.Ax.6 are true, 
then failing to report all value changes gives users less complete, 
possibly misleading information on which to base their predictions.
I.Ax.5 and I.Ax.6 are reflected in the previously stated objective 
for financial accounting of measuring the economic value changes that 
have occurred in a business firm.
I.Ax.7
I.Ax.7 - The past is uncontrollable.
The assumption that past events are no longer subject to one's 
control is readily observed in accounting. The idea that sunk costs 
are irrelevant in capital budgeting decisions reflects this assump­
tion. Another example is the case of economic value changes. Once 
such changes have occurred, they are no longer subject to one's con­
trol. They can be partially ignored as in historical cost-based 
accounting, or they can be reported as in current value accounting.
I. Ax.8
I.Ax.8 - The future is uncertain.
No matter how likely or unlikely the occurrence of some event 
may be, if it has not occurred, it may not occur. What happens in 
the future may be predicted but can never be known with certainty. 
Economic value changes can be ignored because they may not ultimately 
be realized in a sale. But, all fixture occurrences are uncertain.
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And, if as is assumed above, more complete data yield better pre­
dictions, ignoring "unrealized" value changes may yield less efficient 
predictions.
I.Ax.9
I.Ax.9 - Time is not efficacious.
This assumption asserts that things do not change merely 
because of the passage of time, but because of the actions of some 
other influence. For example, a child may grow six inches in a given 
interval of time. The child’s increase in stature is not caused by 
the passage of time. Rather, the cause is related to the physiological 
workings of human growth.
Economic value changes do not occur merely because of the 
passage of time. These value changes reflect supply of and demand for 
goods and services. And, supply and demand reflects the views of 
society on the economic value of goods and services. This idea is 
expanded in the sections that follow.
Sufficient Reason
Sufficient reason has been described as an assumption under­
lying reason itself.6
I.Ax.10 - Sufficient Reason - If something exists then there 
is a reason for its existence.
^Richard Taylor, Metaphysics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 86-87.
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An Example of Sufficient Reason
An example can be given similar to the one used by T aylor^ 
in illustrating this assumption. If someone walking through a 
forest came upon a perfectly round, shiny ball completely out of 
place in its surroundings, he would not immediately question its 
existence. Rather, he would question the reason for its existence.
He would assume there is some explanation behind the existence of 
the ball. Furthermore, he would assume that this explanation is 
capable of being discovered. Even if this individual never dis­
covered the explanation behind the existence of the ball, he would 
still in all probability believe there is some explanation. Indeed, 
this belief in an explainable or knowable reason behind things is 
one belief that has spurred scientists on in their attempt to explain 
the physical world. As Nagel has stated: " . . .  the distinctive aim
of the scientific enterprise is to provide systematic and responsibly 
supported explanations."^ This assumption can be applied to business 
activity in the following special way.
Sufficient Reason and Business Activity
Business firms owe their existence to man. For a business 
firm to exist, man must create it. For it to continue to exist, man 
must continually support it. It follows from the sufficient reason
^Ibid., pp. 85-87.
8Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc., 1961), p. 15.
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assumption that there must be a reason why business firms exist.
First of all, business firms exist because the products they supply 
are wanted and needed by consumers. Consumers want and need these 
products because their consumption provides satisfaction.
Secondly, business firms exist because they are supported 
by investors. As investors, people are like business firms. Their 
objective is to maximize the profits they receive from their invest­
ments. These profits enable people to increase their consumption of 
products and thus the satisfaction they obtain from that consumption.
Products, Land, and Labor
The basic resources man has to work with are creations of 
God. The products made from basic resources are creations of man.
If man creates a product then there must be a reason. This reason 
is to satisfy his wants and needs. This is true whether it is 
for consumer goods and services or industrial goods and services.
As Boulding points out, the satisfaction of a consumer’s wants and 
needs is the ultimate product of all economic activity.9
A product, which maybe a good or a ssrvice or both, is a 
nonobservable. One can observe a specific product, such as a desk, 
but one cannot observe the total product. The total product includes 
nonobservable characteristics such as the reputation of the firm, the 
psychological image of the product perceived by the consumer, and the 
product’s warranty.
^Kenneth E. Boulding, Economic Analysis (New York: Harper &
Brothers Publishers, 1941), p. 637.
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The goods and services produced by business firms represent 
bundles of the scarce productive resources: land, labor, and
capital.I® in consuming a product, a consumer is actually consuming 
a bundle of scarce productive resources. On the supply side, in 
producing a product, a producer is simply combining scarce productive 
resources. If productive resources exist in limited supply, so too 
must goods and services. The following corollaries and definitions 
are given.
Def.4 - Goods and Services - Bundles of scarce productive 
resources.
■fCor.l - All goods and services exist in limited supply.
Def.5 - Product - Either a good or a service or both.
Def.6 - Production - The process of combining scarce
productive resources in order to form a product.
Cor.2 - All products exist in limited supply.
People and Economic Activity
It is obvious that economic activity could not take place 
without people. It is not as obvious that people play two dis­
tinctive but related roles in economic activity. First, people act 
as consumers of goods and services. Second, people act as business
l^Land, labor, and capital are normally defined in economics 
as follows:
Def.1 - Land - The natural resources or gifts of nature in 
the state they are obtained from nature.
Def.2 - Labor - The human effort, both mental and physical, 
used in the production of goods and services.
Def.3 - Capital - The goods produced by man for use in 
further production.
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firms. As the owners of the scarce productive resources (i.e., 
land, labor, and capital) people act as business firms in supplying 
these scarce resources to other business firms.
A specific person is an observable entity. But, a business 
firm or a consumer is a nonobservable. In science, the existence 
of nonobservables is frequently assumed. Furthermore, the nonob­
servables are assumed to have certain characteristics. In Chapter 2 
theoretical concepts are described as nonobservable characteristics 
of nonobservable things. A number of nonobservable charactertistics 
of consumers and business firms are discussed below. These char­
acteristics constitute basic assumptions in the theory of financial 
accounting measurement presented in this chapter.
Nonobservable Characteristics of Consumers
Consumers may be characterized by the following objective:
Obj.2 - The objective of all consumers is to maximize the 
satisfaction of their wants and needs that they 
derive from the consumption of goods and services.
The characterization of consumers as maximizers of satis­
faction is an idealization. As an idealization, a description is 
offered of people under highly purified conditions, free from the 
influence of many other complementing and conflicting objectives. 
Under real world conditions these other objectives are assumed rela­
tively insignificant when compared to the dominant objective of max­
imizing satisfaction.
The world is characterized by a scarcity of productive 
resources. Business firms compete for the use of these scarce
V
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resources in order to produce various products. In contrast to 
the limited supply of productive resources, and hence products, there 
exists unlimited wants and needs on the part of consumers. Consumers 
always desire more products. But, the intensity of consumers' wants 
and needs for different products varies.
The ability of consumers to satisfy their economic wants and 
needs is dependent on their money incomes, which are limited. With 
unlimited wants and needs and only limited money incomes available 
to satisfy those wants and needs, consumers must make a choice. In 
keeping with the objective of all consumers, they will choose to 
satisfy their most intense wants and needs first if their money income 
is sufficient to do so. The greater the intensity of a particular 
want and need, the greater the satisfaction derived from satisfying 
that want and need. The following internal assumptions follow from 
this discussion.
I.Ax.11 - All consumers have unlimited wants and needs for 
products.
I.Ax.12 - All consumers have finite money incomes available 
to purchase products.
I.Ax.13 - The satisfaction a consumer derives from consuming 
different products or different combinations of 
products varies.
Def.7 - Combination of products - One subset of the set of
available products.
Theorem 1 (Th.l) follows from the preceding assumptions.
Th.l - Consumers can never completely satisfy all their
unlimited wants and needs for products because they 




A nonobservable entity whose existence is very important in 
our economy today is the profit-oriented business firm. Business 
firms have certain observable and nonobservable characteristics. 
Observable characteristics include the firm's physical plant or 
employees. Nonobservable characteristics that could be considered 
observable if they could be measured in a relatively simple way 
include the possession of assets, which have a certain value, and 
the ability to generate profits or incur losses.
Business firms also are frequently characterized as having 
the following objective:
Obj.3 - The objective of all business firms is to maximize 
profits.
Profit maximization is an idealization. Business firms have many 
other complementing and conflicting objectives. But, as an ideal­
ization, profit maximization is assumed to be the dominant objective 
of all profit-oriented business firms. This objective describes 
their behavior under highly purified conditions in which the relative 
influence of other complementary and conflicting objectives has been 
removed.
Business firms control certain scarce productive resources. 
This control may be through formal legal ownership or informally as 
in the case of the relationship between labor and the business firm. 
The term "control" simply means the right to use.
The value of any particular business firm is derived directly 
from its ability to satisfy the wants and needs of consumers. Even a
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business firm that sells only to other business firms derives its 
value from the wants and needs of consumers of the business firms 
which they supply. A business firm exists because it supplies 
final products or intermediate component products (capital) that are 
desired by consumers. The business firm’s ability to provide satis­
faction is in turn directly derived from its control of certain 
scarce productive resources. These resources can in turn be combined 
to form the scarce products that consumers and firms demand. These 
scarce resources include land, labor, and capital. Labor is as 
valuable to any business firm as land and capital. Without all 
three, a business entity could do nothing. The scarce resources 
under a business entity's control at any given time are part of its 
assets.
The following assumptions and definitions follow.
I.Ax.14 - The economic value of a business firm is derived 
from the ability of a business firm to satisfy 
the wants and needs of consumers for products.
I.Ax.15 - The ability of a business firm to satisfy the 
wants and needs of consumers for products is 
derived from the scarce productive resources 
under a business firm's control.
Def.8 - Control - The right to use.
Def.9 - Asset - A quantity of money or a claim to a
quantity of money or a scarce productive resource 
under a business firm's control at any particular 
time.
Money or a claim to money represents the ability to acquire 
productive resources. Thus, money or a claim to money can be con­
sidered like productive resources. From the above the following 
theorem follows.
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Th.2 - The economic value of a business firm is derived 
from the assets under a business firm’s control.
(From I.Ax.14, I.Ax.15, and Def.9)
In summary, the preceding discussion has attempted to
describe the essence of economic activity through a set of basic
assumptions. In the following section other assumptions are added
concerning the measurement of economic value.
Absolute Vs. Personal Economic Value 
Two alternative concepts of economic value are examined in 
this section. First, economic value in the absolute, perfect, or 
all-encompassing sense is discussed. Secondly, economic value as a 
personal concept is examined. It is this personal concept of 
economic value that has relevance for this study. The remainder of 
this section proceeds to determine how such a personal conept of 
economic value might be measured. Finally, a distinction is made 
between economic value and consumer satisfaction.
Absolute Economic Value 
The assumption of sufficient reason asserts that for every­
thing that exists, there is a reason for its existence. From this 
assumption it can be asserted that everything that exists has an 
economic value in an absolute sense. But there is no readily apparent 
method by which economic value in this absolute sense is measurable.
In an absolute sense economic value is thought of as the 
true economic value of some resource. This view asserts that while 
a resource may have a number of different economic values, there 
exists one true economic value. In order to know the true economic
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value of a resource, one would have to have perfect knowledge. Not 
just perfect knowledge as the term is used in economics, but truly 
"perfect" knowledge. Perfect knowledge here refers to knowledge of 
every factor that has or will affect the value of a resource. For 
example, one must know the total supply of some resource existing 
both presently and the amount that will exist in the future. One 
must know when, where, and how this resource will be obtained. On 
the demand side, one would have to know all possible present and 
future uses of the resource including when, where, and how it will 
be used. The economic value determined with such "perfect" knowl­
edge would clearly represent a perfect or true economic value. But 
such all-encompassing knowledge is clearly impossible. Economic 
value in this sense is too highly abstract to be of value for the 
purposes of this study.
Personal Economic Value 
Economic value may also be viewed in a personal way. In this 
sense, economic value is relative to the person doing the valuing at 
any given time. Thus, economic value is a personal thing. An indi­
vidual can value a resource based on the factors which he perceives 
as affecting it. Such a valuation clearly reflects the individual's 
personal wants and needs if he is acting as a consumer. And if he is 
acting as an employee of a business firm, such a valuation reflects 
both his personal wants and needs and the objectives of the business 
firm in which he is employed. The problem is to determine the per­
sonal economic value consumers and producers place bn resources.
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How to Observe Personal Economic Value
If economic value is a personal thing and hence lies in the 
eyes of the beholder, how will accountants be able to measure it? 
Stevens provides a clue. As an example of operationalism Stevens 
has stated:
. . .  I know nothing about your sensations except 
what your behavior tells me. But what is equally true, 
we know nothing about the charge of the electron except 
for what its behavior discloses. We must be thoroughly 
operational in both instances.H
Likewise, accountants can know nothing about how people value an
item except what their behavior reveals. And their behavior is
observable in their actions of buying and selling goods and services
in the market place. Thus, while economic valuations are a personal
thing, they are also observable in the behavior of people buying and
selling in the market place.
Why Personal Economic Value Exists
Economic value is a property of a product. It is a property 
that people give to a product because of their wants and needs.
Economic value exists because goods and services exist in limited 
supply and the demand for those goods and services is unlimited.
People always perfer more to less goods and services. Economic value 
becomes an observable property through the actions of buyers and 
sellers in an exchange transaction.
S. Stevens, "Measurement and Mail," Management Information: 
A Quantitative Accent, eds. Thomas H. Williams and Charles H. Griffin 
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Ind., 1967), p. 12.
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Boulding states: "This capacity which a thing has for being
exchanged is called its value, just as the capacity which a thing has 
for being extended is called its " l e n g t h . B r a n d i s  has also dis­
cussed this concept of economic value. He states:
A frequent delusion about money is based upon the 
notion that economic value exists in some sense outside of the 
economic system and cannot really be measured in money terms, 
that is, by prices. Economists, themselves, in the beginnings 
of the subject had difficulty here. They wrestled valiantly 
with the idea of "value-in-use" and "value-in-exchange" as two 
different things, the latter being the money value or price of 
something. We see now, however, that the only value that has 
economic meaning is "value-in-exchange." This value is 
expressed in money terms in a money-price system.
Thus, as used in this study, economic value refers to a value
determined in an exchange. Such a value is measurable in monetary
terms on what could be called a dollar scale. Measurement of the
economic value changes that have occurred requires measurement of the
current economic value of a firm’s assets. This, in turn, requires
measurement in current monetary terms or in terms of current exchange
values. And, it will be shown in an upcoming section that the
current exchange price shows the current valuation suppliers and
users place on a product.
A Bridge Assumption
The following bridge axiom connects the nonobservable economic
■^Boulding, op. cit., p. 256.
1 ̂ Royall Brandis, Principles of Economics (Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968), p. 113.
value to an observable activity.
B.Ax.l - A person's personal economic valuation of a product 
is observable in that person's behavior of buying 
and selling in the market place.
If the person is a consumer, then he is assumed to be attempting to
maximize his personal satisfaction. If the person is an employee of
a business firm, then he is assumed to be attempting to maximize the
profits of that business firm. In either case his actions reflect
the objectives of the role he is playing. And his actions, in an
exchange, reflect his personal economic valuation in accordance with
his objectives.
Economic Value and Consumer Satisfaction 
Economic value is not a measure of satisfaction. Satisfaction 
from consuming products would be obtained even if resources and prod­
ucts were free. That is, if every resource and product existed in 
such an abundant supply that it was free for the taking, it would have 
a zero economic value in an exchange but still provide the user with 
some positive level of satisfaction. The attainment of satisfaction 
is the objective of consumers. Economic value is a relative measure 
of how dear a particular good or service is to someone at a given 
time. The following section attempts to discover an observable 
measure of an asset's economic value.
The Measurement of Economic Value 
As described in the preceding section, economic value is a 
property given to products by people. In this section an attempt is
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made to find a way to measure economic value.
Demand, Supply, and Economic Value
In developing a theory of economic value measurement, buying 
and selling in two markets must be considered. These two markets 
are the market for consumer goods and services and the market for 
productive resources. From the assumptions underlying the theory of 
consumer demand, it is possible to derive individual and market 
demand curves for final products. Likewise, from the assumptions 
underlying production theory it is possible to derive individual and 
market demand and supply curves for productive resources (land, labor, 
and capital). The details of these derivations are not presented 
here. They are contained in any standard microeconomic theory text­
b o o k .  14 However, these assumptions are part of this theory of 
financial accounting measurement. The discussion here begins with 
the end result of those theories, that is, individual demand and 
supply curves.
Demand Curves for Consumers
A consumer attempts to maximize the satisfaction of his 
unlimited wants and needs with a limited income through the purchase 
of goods and services. What a consumer purchases is what he desires
l^For example, see William J. Baumol, Economic Theory and 
Operations Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inci, 1961); and C. E. Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory (rev. ed.; 
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969); and Richard H.
Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation (4th ed.;
Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1970).
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most of the products he is able to purchase. Thus, the prices he is
willing to pay represents his personal valuation of the economic
value of different products. Such prices are efficient in purely
competitive markets. They are efficient in the sense that a consumer
would not pay an inflated price if a lower price were available. In
doing so he would be attaining a lower level of satisfaction.
Demand traditionally is defined as follows:
Def.10 - Demand - The different quantities of a product that 
consumers or business firms are willing and able to 
buy at different prices with all other determinants 
of demand other than the price of the product in 
question held constant.
Leftwich has pointed out that the demand curve is a maximum concept.
A demand curve shows for different quantities the maximum prices that 
will be paid for a product per unit of time.-^ As such, a consumer's 
demand curve for a particular product represents his subjective, per­
sonal valuation of the maximum value of different quantities of a 
product.
Market demand represents the aggregate of all the individual 
consumers' demand curves. Market demand reflects the personal val­
uation of all users of a particular product. Thus, it represents a 
c o n s e n s u s ^  valuation of different quantities of a product.
Demand Curves for Business Firms
A business firm's demand for a particular scarce productive
■^Leftwich, op. cit., p. 31.
•*-̂As used here consensus refers to the collective opinion of 
a group of people.
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resource depends on the price and productivity of that resource, the 
price of what is to be made from that resource, the price and pro­
ductivity of alternative resources, and the limited amount of money 
the individual firm has available to acquire productive resources.
A firm's demand curve shows the maximum prices that the firm will 
pay for given quantities of the resource. Since each firm is a profit 
maximizer these prices are efficient prices. Each firm attempts to 
minimize its costs because in pure competition an individual business 
firm has no control over output prices. Of course, some firms will 
be more efficient than other firms.
A market demand curve shows the aggregate demand of all indi­
vidual business firms for a particular productive resource. As such, 
a market demand curve represents a maximum consensus valuation of a 
productive resource by all users of that resource.
Supply of Productive Resources and Finished Products
Both business firms and individuals act as suppliers. Business 
firms supply intermediate goods (capital) to other business firms, and 
they supply finished products to consumers. Individuals act as busi­
ness firms' suppliers of land, labor, and capital. In the case where 
individuals supply land or capital, the individuals are acting like 
business firms. Hence, the analysis of the supply of products by 
business firms applies. In the case where individuals act as sup­
pliers of labor to business firms, indifference curve analysis, like 
that used in consumer demand theory, can be used to analyze the supply 
of labor offered by individuals at different wage rates. What is
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involved is a trade-off between leisure time and money income.
The supply of a product is defined as follows:
Def.ll - Supply - The different quantities of a product 
sellers are willing and able to place on the 
market at all possible different prices with all 
other determinants of supply other than price held 
constant.
Leftwich points out that a supply surve shows the minimum price that 
a business firm is willing and able to accept for placing different 
quantities of a product on the market. Accepting lower prices for 
the quantities would make the firm less than normally profitable.
The supply curve of a business firm is a portion of its 
marginal cost curve. Hence, the quantity of a product supplied at 
each alternative price depends on a firm's business costs. And 
costs depend on the relative demand for scarce productive resources, 
which depends on the relative demand for final products.
The market supply curve for a particular productive resource 
or final product shows the aggregate supply offered by all supplying 
firms at each possible different price. As such, the market supply 
curve represents a consensus valuation of different quantities of a 
product by all suppliers of the product.
Significance of the Equilibrium Price 
Under Pure Competition
The discussion thus far has stressed the fact that aggregate 
market supply and aggregate market demand represents a consensus 
valuation of products on the part of suppliers and users of those
•^Leftwich, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
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products. This has important implications for economic value meas­
urement .
Market Supply and Market Demand 
The market supply schedule or curve shows at a given point
in time the quantities of a product that suppliers are willing and
able to supply at every different possible price. The market demand 
schedule or curve shows at a given point in time the quantities of a 
product that users are willing and able to take off the market at 
every different possible price. The different prices on the market 
supply curve represent the minimum unit price suppliers will accept 
to put different quantities of a product on the market. The dif­
ferent prices on the market demand curve represent the maximum unit 
price that users will pay for a given quantity of a product. The 
only point which lies on both the market supply and the market demand 
curve is known as the equilibrium point.
Equilibrium Point 
At the equilibrium point all market forces are in balance.
According to Samuelson, the equilibrium price represents the only price at
which " . . .  the amount that consumers are willing to go on buying 
be just matched by the amount that producers are willing to go on 
selling. S e l l e r s  will not accept a lower price for the equilibrium 
quantity. And buyers will not pay more. Because of the balancing of 
forces, once the equilibrium price and quantity are attained, there is
ISPaul A. Samuelson, Economics; An Introductory Analysis 
(6th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 67.
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a tendency for the market to remain at that place.
The equilibrium price represents a consensus valuation of 
the economic value of a particular quantity of a product by all 
buyers and sellers of that product. This consensus valuation 
reflects the objectives, constraints, and all the determinants of 
demand and supply existing in a particular market at a particular 
time. And the relative economic values of different products reflect 
all the above factors. Samuelson concludes concerning general 
equilibrium:
. . . The final competitive equilibrium is an 
"efficient" one. Output is being maximized, inputs 
minimized; people who like applies are not being given 
oranges, etc. From so efficient a final point, you can 
no longer make everyone better off.^9
Equilibrium Price and a Bridge Assumption 
to Economic Value
Thus, the equilibrium price and quantity represents a con­
sensus valuation of a product at a given time. With this in mind 
the following axiom may be stated.
I.Ax.16 - The market equilibrium price of a product is 
the economic value of a product.
This axiom is justified by the discussion of supply and demand for 
products presented thus far. The problem that now remains is to tie 
equilibrium price, an internal, nonobservable assumption, into some­
thing that is observable. In other words, a bridge assumption is 




At any given time a product may not be selling at its 
equilibrium price. The market may be in the process of adjusting 
to the supply and demand forces. Concerning the equilibrium price 
Kenneth Boulding has stated:
. . . The equilibrium price in not necessarily the 
actual price existing at a given instant of time. A price 
may exist— i.e., there may be transactions taking place at a 
certain ratio of exchange— and yet there may be forces operating 
in the market which tend to bring about a change in that price.
. . .  It is possible, even, that we may never reach the 
equilibrium price, that in fact no actual price is ever an 
equilibrium price. Before the forces which would bring together 
the actual and the equilibrium prices have had time to work 
themselves out, it is quite possible— indeed, almost inevitable—  
that the circumstances will have changed, and with them the 
equilibrium p r i c e . 2 0
Then, at any specific time there is no way of knowing whether the
market price is equivalent to the equilibrium price of a product.
However, under pure competition the tendency of the market price is
always to move around the equilibrium price. At any given time, this
may involve moving either toward or away from the equilibrium price.
In light of this, the following bridge assumption may be made.
B.Ax.2 - The current market price of a product is an
approximation of the market equilibrium price 
of a product.
Bridge axiom 2 and I.Ax.16 lead to a very important theorem.
Th.3 - The current market price of a product is an 
approximation of the economic value of a 
product. (From I.Ax.16 and B.Ax.2)
^^Boulding, op. cit., p. 62.
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The development of this single theorem has been the goal of this 
chapter up to this point. The application of this theorem in finan­
cial accounting measurement is discussed next.
Financial Accounting Measurement 
Financial accounting measurement is the assignment of a 
numeral to an object or event in order to represent the economic value 
of that object or event. The numeral assigned is the current market 
price the purchaser would have to pay to get an object under his con­
trol (Th.3). Economic value is measured on a monetary-dollar scale.
Scale Classification of the Dollar Scale 
Several systems of scale classification are discussed in the 
preceding chapter on measurement. These included the systems of 
Stevens, Coombs, Torgerson, Campbell, and Ellis.
Stevens, Coombs, Torgerson, and Ellis
Under Stevens', Coombs', and Torgerson's systems of class­
ification of measurement scales, the dollar scale is a ratio scale. 
This is an empirical question which is easily verified by reference 
to one's experience. It has already been shown in Chapter 4 that if 
Stevens' criteria is employed, the dollar scale is a ratio scale.
Since Torgerson adopted Stevens' criteria, the dollar scale is also 
a ratio scale by Torgerson.
If Coombs' criterion is employed, it must be shown for a 
ratio scale that the following arithmetic formula has analytic
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application:
a = b, |a-b| | |c-d|
a ^ nb, (n = any rational number);
where asset A has value â  
asset B has value b, 
asset C has value c_, and 
asset D has value d_.
Here, asset A is more valuable or less valuable than asset B only if 
a < b. Asset A is not more valuable and not less valuable than asset 
B only if a = b. The difference in value between assets A and B may 
be = the difference in value of assets C and D. And finally, the 
value of asset A may be ^ to 11 times the value of asset B.
Thus, all the arithmetic formulas do have analytic inter­
pretations. And the dollar scale is a ratio scale by Coomb's class­
ification. Furthermore, following Ellis' reformulation of invariance, 
the dollar scale is a ratio scale by Stevens' classification, since 
it is a ratio scale by Coombs.
Thus, the only kind of mathematical transformations that 
leave the dollar scale invariant is multiplication by a constant.
And multiplication by a constant is how the dollar scale is trans­
formed in foreign exchange rate conversions and in conversions for 
general and specific price-level changes.
Campbell, Torgerson, and Ellis
Campbell or Ellis undoubtedly would not recognize financial 
accounting measurement as described above in their measurement class­
ification systems. Torgerson would call it fiat measurement. That
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is, financial accounting measurement is measurement by definition or 
convention. Fiat measurement is quite common in accounting and the 
social sciences. Other instances of fiat measurement in accounting 
are discussed in Chapter 6.
Additivity of Asset Values
The following assumption regarding the additivity of asset
values is made in this study:
B.P.l - The total economic value of a business firm is
equal to the sum of the individual asset values.
This assumption can be stated in equation form as follows:
V t = Ct + P1tq1t + P2t<l2t + + • • • + Pn^n*1
where V*- = the value of the firm at time jt
I*C = the cash and claims to cash held by the firm 
at time _t
p^t = the market price of asset 1 at time t̂ 
q^1- = the quantity of asset î at time t:.
Whether economic value is additive is open to question.
This study includes as assets of a firm all productive 
resources (i.e., land, labor, and capital) under a firm’s control 
at a given time. This definition of assets includes items which 
today accountants are just beginning to consider as assets. For 
instance, assets as productive resources under a firm's control 
includes human resources, leased properties,, and purchase commitments. 
To omit such resources is not to deny additivity; but, rather, to 
omit important factors that should be considered when the firm is 
valued in its entirety.
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It seems intuitively clear to many people that the individual 
assets of a firm are not independent. Rather, the assets may all be 
related. This interrelationship is not included in the additivity 
assumption. That is, the total economic value of a firm is not 
V = f(x) + g(y) + h(x) + . . . + n(z) but V = f(x,y,z, . . ., n).
This objection to value additivity is difficult to answer.
Sterling assumes value additivity and also points out that 
the four schools on income measurement that he examined: the
Fisher tradition, the accounting tradition, present market price, 
and Boulding’s constant, all assume value additivity.^1 As used 
here and in these other studies the assumption of value additivity 
is an idealization. It is a valid assumption if under purified 
conditions, from which all distorting influences are removed, asset 
values are truly additive. As an idealization, value additivity is 
assumed to be the most significant assumption regarding a firm’s 
total value. All remaining distorting influences are considered 
relatively insignificant.
A Financial Accounting Measurement Rule
Financial accounting measurement may be defined as follows:
Def.12 - Financial Accounting Measurement - The assignment 
by rule(s) of numerals to the assets of a business 
firm to represent the property of economic value.
The numeral to be assigned is the numeral that represents the current
market price of the asset in question. Current market price includes
21 Robert R. Sterling, Theory of the Measurement of Enterprise 
Income (Wichita, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1970),
pp. 104-105.
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all costs necessary to get the asset from producer to user. This 
price may then be adjusted in order to determine the extent of dis­
tortion of the measuring unit caused by inflation or deflation. A 
general price-level index is used for this purpose. This was explained 
in Chapter 4. This adjustment allows separation of general and 
specific price-level changes. The following financial accounting 
measurement rule is given.
The Financial Accounting Measurement Rule - Assign to every 
asset that a given firm controls at a given time the 
numeral that represents the current market price of 
that asset at that particular time.
Summary and Conclusions
The objectives of Chapters 4 and 5 have been to demonstrate 
that the techniques of theory construction discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3 are applicable to accounting. This was done by constructing 
an outline of a theory of financial accounting measurement. Each of 
the five different types of basic assumptions are illustrated in this 
theory.
Objectives
Objectives, the first type of basic assumptions, indicate 
goals. Three objectives were stated in the theory of financial 
accounting measurement.
Obj.l - An objective of financial accounting is to measure 
the economic value and changes in the economic 
value that have occurred in a profit-oriented business 
firm in order to enable investors to predict the 
future economic value of the firm.
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Obj.2 - The objective of all consumers is to maximize the 
satisfaction of their wants and needs that they 
derive from the consumption of goods and services.
Obj.3 - The objective of all business firms is the maximi­
zation of profits.
In economics, the actions of consumers and business firms are 
described in accordance with their assumed objectives, Objectives 2 
and 3, respectively. Since this theory on financial accounting meas­
urement is tied so closely to the economic theory of consumer behavior 
and production theory, the objectives of these theories are also 
objectives of this theory. Objective 1 stated one assumed objective 
of financial accounting. Only this single objective was studied in 
the preceding theory. Objective 1 set the goal of this theory. The 
remaining assumptions indicate how this goal is accomplished.
Axioms and Postulates
The distinction between axioms and postulates is a conceptual 
distinciton. Axioms are assumptions borrowed from other disciplines. 
Postulates are assumptions originating in a discipline. Assumptions 
can be further divided into internal assumptions and bridge assumptions.
Internal assumptions describe a particular concept in terms of 
nonobservables. Because they contain nonobservables, they are not 
directly testable. If a theory was stated solely in terms of objec­
tives and internal assumtpions, it could never be tested or applied in 
the real world. Bridge assumptions provide the link with observable 
reality. Something is considered observable if it can be measured in 
a relatively simple way.
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Internal Axioms
A number of internal axioms, mostly borrowed from economic 
theory, were identified in the theory. These are shown below. All 
but one of the existence assumptions are classified as internal 
axioms. One existence assumption is classified as an internal 
postulate.
Assumptions concerning the objectives and characteristics of 
things, business firms, for example, are based on an added assumption 
that the thing itself exists. The existence assumptions assume the 
existence of the concepts dealt with in a theory.
Internal axioms are also stated about prediction, consumers, 
business firms, and economic value. The outstanding feature of all 
these internal axioms is that the objectives and characteristics 
they describe are not observable.
Existence Assumptions;
I.Ax.l - There exists a finite set of business firms.
I.Ax.2 - There exists a finite set of consumers.
I.Ax.3 - There exists a limited supply of productive
resources.
I.P.l - There exists an activity called "financial 
accounting measurement."
I.Ax.4 - There exists purely competitive markets.
I.Ax.5 - All prediction of the future is based on knowledge
of the past.
I.Ax.6 - The more complete one's knowledge of the past, the 
better one's ability to predict the future.
I.Ax.7 - The past is uncontrollable.
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I.Ax.8 - The future is uncertain.
I.Ax.9 - Time is not efficacious.
I.Ax.10 - If something exists then there is a reason for its
existence.
Some Assumptions About Consumers
I.Ax.11 - All consumers have unlimited wants and needs for 
products.
I.Ax.12 - All consumers have finite money incomes available 
to purchase products.
I.Ax.13 - The satisfaction a consumer derives from consuming 
different products or different combinations of 
products varies.
Some Assumptions About Business Firms
I.Ax.14 - The economic value of a business firm is derived
from the ability of a business firm to satisfy the 
wants and needs of consumers for products.
I.Ax.15 - The ability of a business firm to satisfy the wants 
and needs of consumers for products is derived from 
the scarce productive resources under a business 
firm’s control.
Economic Value
I.Ax.16 - The market equilibrium price of a product is the 
economic value of a product.
Bridge Axioms
Two bridge axioms are used in this theory. They are:
B.Ax.l - A person's personal valuation of a product is 
observable in that person's behavior of buying 
and selling in the market place.
B.Ax.2 - The current market price of a product is an
approximation of the market equilibrium price of 
a product.
B.Ax.l linked the nonobservable assumptions about the objectives and 
characteristics of consumers and business firms to the observable
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activity of buying and selling. B.Ax.2 linked the nonobservable 
equilibrium price to the observable market price. The market price 
of a product is observable because it can be measured in a relatively 
simple way.
Internal Postulate
The existence assumptions contain one internal postulate, 
that is, the assumption that the activity of financial accounting 
measurement exists. It is a postulate because such an assumption 
must originate within the discipline of accounting. Accountants 
then apply knowledge from other disciplines, such as economics, to 
develop a theory of financial accounting measurement. This postulate 
is an internal assumption because the activity of financial accounting 
measurement is not observable. Only the results of that activity are 
observable.
Bridge Postulate
The theory of financial accounting measurement contained the
following bridge postulate:
B.P.l - The total economic value of a business firm is
equal to the sum of the individual asset values.
As pointed out in the chapter, this assumption is made both in
accounting and economics. Therefore, it could be classified an
axiom or a postulate. It is classified a postulate because it is
one of the most important assumptions underlying modern accounting
practices.
The assumption of value additivity is also described as an
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idealization. Thus, if it were possible to conduct an empirical 
test of value additivity under conditions from which all distorting 
influences were removed, the test would show value additivity to be 
a true empirical statement.
There might be some question as to whether this assumption 
is really a bridge assumption. But, the economic value of individual 
assets has been linked to current market prices which are assumed 
observable. And, if current market prices can be considered observable 
because they can be measured in a relatively simple way, then their 
arithmetic sum can also be considered observable.
Theorems
Theorems, also called principles, are statements that follow 
logically when two or more assumptions are combined. No specific 
attempt is made to derive a great many theorems. However, a few of 
the more important theorems are presented. These are:
Th.l - Consumers can never completely satisfy all their 
unlimited wants and needs for products because 
they have finite money incomes. (From I.Ax.11 and 
I.Ax.12)
Th.2 - The economic value of a business firm is derived 
from the assets under a business firm's control.
(From I.Ax.14 and I.Ax.15)
Th.3 - The current market price of a product is an approx­
imation of the economic value of a product. (From 
I.Ax.16 and B.Ax.2)
The Financial Accounting Measurement Rule
All these assumptions and theorems lead to the following 
financial accounting measurement rule.
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The Financial Accounting Measurement Rule - Assign to every 
asset that a given firm controls at a given time the 
numeral that represents the current market price of that 
asset at that particular time.
Terms
A number of technical terms are defined in the preceding 
theory. These are shown below:
Def.l - Land - The natural resources or gifts of nature in 
the state they are obtained from nature.
Def.2 - Labor - The human effort, both mental and physical, 
used in the production of goods and services.
Def.3 - Capital - The goods produced by man for use in 
further production.
Def.4 - Goods and Services - Bundles of scarce productive 
resources.
Def.5 - Product - Either a good or a service or both.
Def.6 - Production - The process of combining scarce
productive resources in order to form a product.
Def.7 - Combination of Products - One subset of the set of
available products.
Def.8 - Control - The right to use.
Def.9 - Asset - A quantity of money or a claim to a quantity
of money or a scarce productive resource under a 
business firm's control at a particular time.
Def.10 - Demand - The different quantities of a product that 
consumers are willing and able to buy at different 
prices, all other factors held constant.
Def.ll - Supply - The different quantities of a product
sellers are willing and able to place on the market 
at all possible different prices, all other factors 
held constant.
Def.12 - Financial Accounting Measurement ^ The assignment by 
rule(s) of numerals to the assets of a business firm 
to represent the property of economic value.
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No effort is made to distinguish primitive terms from defined 
terms because only an outline of a theory of financial accounting 
measurement is presented. Without completing the theory it would be 
impossible to say that a given set of primitive terms are capable of 
defining all technical terms in the theory. Also since no set of 
primitive terms is unique, alternative sets of primitive terms could 
be given.
With these limitations in mind a number of terms that might 
appear as primitive terms in this theory include: satisfaction,
money, right, and financial accounting. This list, though incomplete, 
does indicate the types of terms that could be used as primitive 
terms in a theory of financial accounting measurement.
Conclusions
The preceding discussion demonstrates how the techniques of 
theory construction might be applied in constructing a theory of 
financial accounting measurement. In so doing these techniques are 
shown to be applicable to accounting theory construction. The theory 
is by no means complete. Additional assumptions could be given 
directly underlying the topics discussed in the theory. Additional 
assumptions could also be given in related areas such as the assump­
tions underlying the ratio scale. But the objective of constructing 
this theory is not to propose a theory of financial accounting meas­
urement. The objective is to demonstrate the applicability of theory 
construction techniques to accounting theory construction. And this 
has been done. The uses of the different types of basic assumptions
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is demonstrated along with the use of idealizations. The following 
chapter shows that the techniques of theory construction have wide 
applicability to accounting theory construction.
Chapter 6
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTING 
THEORY CONSTRUCTION: SOME
SPECIFIC EXAMPLES
In Chapters 1, 2, and 3 theory construction was discussed in 
detail. In Chapters 4 and 5 this discussion was applied in devel­
oping a theory of financial accounting measurement. In this chapter 
the discussion of theory construction is applied to a number of 
specific cases taken from recent accounting literature. These cases 
include the materiality concept in accounting, depreciation accounting, 
two recent APB opinions, a criticism of Chambers’ Accounting, Eval­
uation and Economic Behavior^ by Leftwich, and a conceptual comparison 
with Moonitz's "The Basic Postulates of Accounting." Many more cases 
could be cited. But these cases are representative of the broad spec­
trum of accounting problems to which the conclusions of this study 
are applicable.
Nonobservables and Fiat Measurement
One of the most important implications of this study is the 
discovery of the need for internal assumptions and bridge assumptions 
in theory construciton. Internal assumptions deal with nonobservables. 
The great majority of the concepts dealt with in social sciences are
^Raymond J. Chambers, Accounting, Evaluation and Economic 
Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966).
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nonobservables. In order to have testable theoies these nonob­
servables must be linked to observables. Bridge assumptions are 
used for this purpose. Fiat measurement is one example of the use 
of bridge assumptions.
In fiat measurement nonobservables are linked to observables 
by definitions. A concept is defined by a bridge assumption to be 
measured in a certain way. Fiat measurement is common in social 
sciences. The strength of fiat measurement is evident in the power 
of prediction it affords. In psychology, intelligence, a nonob­
servable, is linked by appropriate definition to something observable, 
ultimately an intelligence test score. The example of a theory of 
economic value measurement presented in this study also involves fiat 
measurement. Economic value is defined by fiat by an appropriate 
bridge assumption to be measured in a certain way.
Frequently with fiat measurement different theories are 
encountered as to how a concept should be measured. For instance, 
there are a number of ways to measure hunger or intelligence. In 
accounting economic value can be measured in many different ways.
For example, economic value can be measured by discounted future 
value, replacement value, historical cost value, or liquidation value. 
These value concepts can be considered observables to the extent that 
they are measurable in a relatively simple way.
The use of bridge assumptions to link observables to nonob­
servables is applicable to other areas in accounting. Whenever 
nonobservable concepts are encountered, bridge assumptions are 
needed to measure these nonobservables.
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Materiality
An example of an inherently nonobservable concept is mate­
riality. An event or a stimulus may be considered material if it 
brings about a response from a decision-maker. Materiality has long 
been a troublesome area for accountants. It is especially trouble­
some because of the many forms materiality takes in accounting. 
Examples include what is a material financial interest in a firm; a 
material departure from generally accepted accounting principles; a 
material source of revenue; a material gain or loss; and a material 
change in revenues, expenses, gains, or losses. There is nothing 
inherent in the concept of materiality that helps accountants deter­
mine when something is material. Social scientists rarely deal with 
concepts as precise as are many of the concepts dealt with in the 
physical sciences.
Development of a General Theory of Materiality
A well-constructed theory of materiality should contain 
internal assumptions concerning materiality and bridge assumptions 
linking materiality to observables. Many theories concerning mate­
riality are, of course, possible. The most desirable theory of 
materiality would be one applicable to all areas of accounting, 
possibly even areas outside of accounting. But initially determining 
such a general theory of materiality is unlikely. More likely, there 
could be developed initially a number of specific theories concerning 
specific instances of materiality in accounting. Then, ultimately, 
a link between some or all of these specific materiality theories
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might be found. And a general theory of materiality could evolve.
Such a general theory of materiality would probably incor­
porate axioms from psychology concerning perception of material 
relationships. Of course, such a theory may have to await the devel­
opment of such axioms in psychology. The broader the materiality 
theory, the greater the number of testable implications. For example, 
one testable implication of a theory of materiality might involve 
predicting investor reactions to fluctuations in net income where 
material fluctuations might evoke certain types of reactions.
An Example of Some Possible Assumptions in a 
Descriptive Theory of Materiality
A theory of materiality could be approached from either a 
normative or a descriptive viewpoint. The two would yield the same 
results only if it can be assumed that what is, should be.
A particular descriptive theory concerning materiality and 
earnings per share might contain assumptions such as the following:
Statement 1 - If a change in earnings per share is material, 
then investors will react to the change.
Statement 2 - If earnings per share changes by 6.5%, then a 
change in earnings per share is material.
Theorem 1 - If earnings per share changes by 6.5%, then
investors will react to such a change.2
^Proof: Let A = "a change . . . material,"
B = "investors . . . change,"
C = "earnings . . . 6.5%."
Then if C, then A (Statement 2) and if A, then B 
(Statement 1), then if C, then B (Theorem 1).
178
Each of these statements^ is analyzed below.
Statement 1
If Statement 1 appeared in a theory of materiality and 
earnings per share, it would be considered an internal assumption.
It relates to nothing observable. Yet it provides significant insight 
concerning the concept of materiality.
Statement 2
Statement 2 is a bridge assumption. It provides an observable
way to measure when a change in earnings per share is material. State­
ment 2 ties the nonobservable Statement 1 into something observable in 
the real world. One might next wonder if Statement 2 is an example of 
fiat measurement.
Fiat measurement is measurement by arbitrary rule or stipu­
lation. In other words, if fiat measurement was involved a 2% change 
or a 10% change could just as easily have been used in Statement 2.
The question centers around how the 6.5% change was determined.
In this particular case the 6.5% change is based on empirical
evidence. Thus, fiat measurement is not used. Rose, Beaver, Becker, 
and Sorter determined empirically in a study of earnings per share 
that the change in the intensity of a stimulus that is needed before 
the stimulus can be detected is a constant 6.5%. They based their 
findings on the Weber-Fechner law used in psychophysics. Psychophysics
^These statements, as well as the assumptions used in other 
examples in this chapter, could be stated in terms of two or more 
simpler assumptions. But, this is true of any assumption in any 
theory.
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is the study of response of organisms to stimulus. The Weber- 
Fechner law states that the change in intensity of a stimulus needed 
before it can be detected by an organism is a constant function of 
the amount of the stimulus present. Their study was based on the 
measurement of differential thresholds.^
Of course, the 6.5% is based on rather limited empirical 
evidence. As with all empirical evidence it is possible that a 
future empirical test of Theorem 1 may disprove Statement 2.
Statement 2 should be contrasted with another bridge assump­
tion frequently used by accountants in dealing with material events. 
Although relying heavily on judgment many accountants use the 
following assumption:
Statement 2a - If earnings per share changes by 10%, then 
a change in earnings per share is material.
In this case the 10% change is not based on empirical evidence.
Rather, it is determined by fiat.
Finally one other question must be raised. Statement 2 is
an idealization. As such, it is meant to be applied under highly
purified conditions. But is it a proper use of an idealization?
The answer is yes. Statement 2 ignores other influences
that may distort what actually happens from what is predicted by
Theorem 1. Statement 2 is considered the most significant factor.
Of course, some of these other factors could be incorporated into an
^J. Rose, W. Beaver, S. Becker, and G. Sorter, "Toward an 
Empirical Measure of Materiality," Empirical Research in Accounting: 
Selected Studies 1970, Supplement to Volume 8 of The Journal of 
Accounting Research, pp. 138-148.
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expanded version of the theory as basic assumptions. They might be 
incorporated as constraints oh Statement 2.
Theorem 1
Theorem 1 is derived with the aid of logic from Statement 1 
and Statement 2. If one accepts the rules of logic, then Theorem 1 
is valid, if statements 1 and 2 are valid. The empirical confirmation 
does not prove the validity of the statements. It only serves to 
gather evidence. Empirical research never proves anything to be true.
If the test should show Theorem 1 to be invalid, then state­
ments 1 or 2 or both have been proven invalid. However, it must be 
remembered that Statement 2 is an idealization. Therefore, one must 
be careful in evaluating the outcome of any such empirical test. If 
other factors not accounted for by the theory caused the negative 
confirmation, then the assumptions of the theory must still be regarded 
as valid. It may be necessary to expand the theory to take in some 
of those external factors.
Depreciation Accounting
Depreciation accounting is an area in which bridge assumptions 
can be applied. The Committee on Terminology after careful consid­
eration describes depreciation accounting as follows:
Depreciation accounting is a system of accounting which 
aims to distribute the cost or other basic value of tangible 
capital assets, less salvage (if any), over the useful life of 
the unit (which may be a group of assets) in a systematic and 
rational manner. It is a process of allocation, not of valuation.^
^Committee on Terminology, "Review and Resume," Accounting 
Terminology Bulletin No. 1 (New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, 1953), p. 25.
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There are many different theories concerning patterns of cost 
expiration. These theories include increasing charge, decreasing 
charge, equal charge, and production-based depreciation methods. Each 
of these theories is based on slightly different interpretations of the 
most significant factors involved in the fixed asset’s cost expiration. 
Some of these factors include time, output, and repairs.
Cost expriration is a nonobservable. The pattern of cost 
expiration must be determined by fiat. In this case, the particular 
depreciation formula used, such as straight line or sum-of-the-years' 
digits, provides the observable bridge.
Some Assumptions in a Possible Theory 
of Depreciation Accounting
A particular theory of depreciation accounting might contain 
among its basic assumptions the following three statements:
Statement 1 - If the estimated useful life of a tangible 
capital asset extends over one accounting 
period, then the cost or other basic value of 
a tangible capital asset, less salvage, should 
be allocated to operations over the estimated 
useful life of the tangible capital asset.
Statement 2 - If the cost or other basic value of a tangible 
capital asset, less salvage value, should be 
allocated to operations over the estimated use­
ful life of the tangible capital asset, then 
any allocation of the cost or other basic value 
of a tangible capital asset should be in pro­
portion to the economic benefit received from 
the asset.
Statement 3 - If any allocation of the cost or other basic
value of a tangible capital asset should be in 
proportion to the economic benefit received from 
the asset, then whenever the economic benefits 
of an asset are greater during the earlier life 
of the asset a decreasing charge depreciation 
formula should be used.
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From these statements the following theorems can be derived:
Theorem 1 - If the estimated useful life of a tangible capital 
asset extends over one accounting period, then any 
allocation of the cost or other basic value of a 
tangible capital asset should be in proportion to 
the economic benefit received from the asset.6
Theorem 2 - If the estimated useful life of a tangible capital 
asset extends over one accounting period, then 
whenever the economic benefits of an asset are 
greater during the earlier life of the asset a 
decreasing charge depreciaton formula should be 
used.7
An Analysis of the Assumptions 
Statements 1 and 2 are internal assumptions. They relate to 
nothing observable. Statement 3 is a bridge assumption. Statement 3 
provides an observable method of measuring depreciation expense. When­
ever the economic benefits of an asset are relatively greater during the 
earlier life of the asset, a decreasing charge depreciation method is 
utilized. Through an appropriate definition the phrase "decreasing 
charge"depreciation method can be replaced by a specific formula for 
such a depreciation method. Examples of such formulas include formulas 
for the sum-of-the-years' digits depreciaton method and the double 
declining balance method. Fiat measurement is also involved. The 
choice of a particular depreciation formula is solely by stipulation.
6proof: Let A = "the estimate . . . period,"
B = "the cost . . . asset,"
C = "any . . . asset."
Then if A, then B (Statement 1) and if B, then C 
(Statement 2), then if A, then C (Theorem 1).
^Proof; Let D = "whenever . . » used."
Then if A, then C (Theorem 1) and if C, then D
(Statement 3), then if A, then D (Theorem 2).
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Except that the formulas do yield a decreasing depreciation expense, 
the depreciation formulas themselves are quite arbitrary.
An entire theory of depreciation would contain other assump­
tions and theorems. But any such theory would still generalize con­
cerning the cost expiration of capital assets. No theory is likely 
to encompass all the possible aspects of capital asset cost expiration. 
Thus, all such theories would probably employ idealizations.
APB Opinion 15
Another example of applying bridge assumptions in fiat meas­
urement occurs in APB Opinion 15. The APB applied fiat measurement 
in the recent Opinion 15 on Earnings per Share. The APB makes the 
following assumption in that Opinion.
Internal Assumption - All common stock equivalents should be
regarded as common stock in computing 
earnings per share.®
They define a common stock equivalent as follows:
. . .  A common stock equivalent is a security which is 
not, in form, a common stock but which usually contains pro­
visions to enable its holder to become a common stockholder and 
which, because of its terms and the circumstances under which 
it was issued, is in substance equivalent to a common stock.^
®"Earnings per Share," Opinions of the Accounting Principles 
Board No. 15 (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1969), p. 229. Actually this statement is an over­
simplification of the APB’s statement. They are concerned only with 
common stock equivalents that have a dilutive effect (dilutions in 
earnings per share of 3% or greater— see APB 15, p. 221). The above 
assumption could be expanded or other assumptions added to incorporate 
this qualification.
^"Earnings per Share," op. cit., p. 225.
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One particular type of common stock equivalent, convertible securities, 
is analyzed in this section, illustrating the use of internal and 
bridge assumptions in Opinion 15.
Two Assumptions in APB Opinion No. 15
The following two statements are made or implied by the APB 
in Opinion 15.
Statement 1 - If the cash yield to the holder of a convertible 
security at the time of issuance is signifi­
cantly below what would be a comparable rate for 
a similar security of the issuer without the 
conversion option, then the convertible security 
should be considered a common stock equivalent.
Statement 2 - If at the time of issuance the cash yield of a
convertible security based on its market price 
is less than 66-2/3 % of the then current bank 
prime interest rate, then the cash yield to the 
holder of the convertible security at the time 
of issuance is significantly below what would 
be a comparable rate for a similar security of 
the issuer without the conversion option.
Statement 1 and Statement 2, if combined logically, yield a third
statement, Theorem 1, shown below.
Theorem 1 - If at the time of issuance the cash yield of a
convertible security based on its market price 
is less than 66-2/3 % of the then current bank 
prime interest rate, then the convertible 
security should be considered a common stock 
equivalent.̂ 0
■^Proof: Let A = "cash yield . . . conversion option,"
B = "the convertible security . . . equivalent,"
C = "at the time . . . rate."
Then if C, then A (Statement 2) and if A, then B
(Statement 1), then if C, then B (Theorem 1).
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These two statements and Theorem 1 are discussed individually below.
Statement 1
Statement 1 is paraphrased directly from Opinion 15.^  The 
order of the statement here has simply been reversed. Statement 1 is 
an internal assumption in the theory concerning earnings per share 
that the APB is developing. This statement is an internal assumption 
because it relates to nothing directly observable. It is a basic 
assumption statement because it describes the conditions under which a 
convertible security should be considered a common stock equivalent.
Statement 2
Statement 2 is not found directly in Opinion 15. Rather, it 
is implied by other statements in the Opinion. Statement 2 is an 
example of a bridge assumption. It provides an observable way to 
measure whether the cash yield on a convertible security is signi-= 
cantly below what would be a comparable rate for a similar security 
without the conversion option. It is also an example of fiat meas­
urement. Nothing is inherent in the 66-2/3 % cutoff rate that makes 
it the one correct rate to use. That rate is simply determined by fiat.
Finally Statement 2 is also an idealization. The APB states:
The Board believes that the current bank prime interest 
rate in general use for short-term loans represents a practical, 
simple and readily available basis on which to establish the 
criteria for determining a common stock equivalent, as set forth 
in the preceding paragraph. The Board recognizes that there are 
other rates and averages of interest rates relating to various 
grades of long-term debt securities and preferred stocks which
^''Earnings per Share," op. cit., p. 229.
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might be appropriate or that a more complex approach could be 
adopted. However, after giving consideration to various 
approaches and interest rates in this regard, the Board has 
concluded that since there is a high degree of correlation 
between such indices and the bank prime interest rate, the 
latter is the most practical rate available for this 
particular purpose.^
One must question whether Statement 2 reflects a proper use 
of an idealization. All idealizations describe conditions which 
are not found precisely in nature. Idealizations are true statements 
only under highly purified conditions where many distorting influences 
are simply ignored.
Two criticisms are leveled at Statement 2 in Appendix B of 
Opinion 15. These criticisms of what has been called the cash yield 
method are that ". . .it does not differentiate between issuers— that 
is, it is based on the same borrowing rate for all issuers, without 
regard for their credit ratings or other risks inherent in their 
activities. Second, it is based on the current bank prime interest 
rate, which is essentially a short-term borrowing rate."-^
Risk is obviously involved in the first criticism. Risk also 
plays a predominate role in the second criticism. One reason why a 
short-term borrowing rate would be different from the long-term bor­
rowing rate is risk. Long-term borrowing requires long-term prediction 
of future events. The future is uncertain. And, in general, the 
further the future horizon, the greater the uncertainty. And, the 
greater the uncertainty the greater the risk.
Of course, risk is only one factor giving rise to a difference
•*-̂ Loc. cit. -̂ ^Ibid., p. 258.
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in long-term and short-term interest rates. But the above exam­
ination does serve to point out that the APB may he properly using 
an idealization. They are simply using the cash yield method under 
highly purified conditions. These conditions ignore risk and other 
factors responsible for the difference. While not a literally true 
statement, neither is this idealization literally false. Such uses 
of idealizations are quite common in science.
Finally, Theorem 1 is paraphrased in reverse order directly 
from Opinion 15.^ It is shown above that Theorem 1 is a theorem 
derived from one stated assumption and one unstated assumption in 
Opinion 15. Before drawing any conclusions, another APB opinion is 
analyzed.
APB Opinion 18
Another example of the application of bridge assumptions in 
fiat measurement appears in APB Opinion 18, "The Equity Method of 
Accounting for Investments in Common S t o c k . T h e  following section 
examines the APB's criteria for determining when the equity method 
should be used.
Some Assumptions Behind APB Opinion 18
Two statements are made or implied by the APB in Opinion 18 
concerning when the equity method should be used. From these two
14Ibid., p. 229.
15"The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common 
Stock," Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board No. 18 (New York: 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1971), pp. 355-356.
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statements a third statement, Theorem 1, may be derived as follows:
Statement 1 - If an investor has the ability to exercise signif­
icant influence over the operating and financing 
decisions of an investee, then the equity method 
of accounting for investments in common stock 
should be used.
Statement 2 - If an investor directly or indirectly holds 20%
or more of the voting common stock of an inves­
tee, then an investor has the ability to exercise 
significant influence over the operating and 
financing decisions of an investee.
Theorem 1 - If an investor directly or indirectly holds 20%
or more of the voting common stock of an inves­
tee, then the equity method of accounting for 
investments in common stock should be u s e d . -*-6
Statement 1
Statement 1 is an internal assumption in the APB theory on the 
equity method of accounting for common stock investments. It is not 
stated directly in Opinion 18. Rather, it is implied by other statements. 
This is not to say that Statement 1 is a theorem. It is one of the APB's basic 
assumptions that is needed to derive some of their other statements.
Statement 2
Statement 2 is a bridge assumption. It provides an observable 
way to measure whether an investor has the ability to exercise signif­
icant control over an investee.^ It is paraphrased directly from
lbProof; Let A = "an investor has . . .  investee,"
B = "the equity . . . used,"
C - "an investor directly . . . investee."
Then if C, then A (Statement 2) and if A, then B 
(Statement 1), then if C, then B (Theorem 1).
17Actually Statement 2 is a simplication of the APB's position. 
They add the qualification that in the absence of evidence to the con­
trary Statement 2 holds. This qualification could he handled by other 
assumptions indicating the conditions under which the statement does 
not hold.
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Opinion 18.1® The assumption is directly stated whereas Statement 1 
was not. Statement 2 also is an example of fiat measurement. There 
is nothing sacred in the adoption of the 20% cutoff point. Other per­
centages of ownership could have been used instead. The 20% point 
was simply determined by fiat.
Statement 2 is also an example of an idealization. In this 
case the APB recognized that the ability to exercise influence over 
an investee may be indicated in several ways other than simply the 
extent of ownership by an i n v e s t e e . 19 But they are ignoring these 
other criteria. The 20% criteria is apparently deemed to be the most 
significant factor in determining influence over an investee. In 
general, any other factors which might result in such influence appar­
ently are assumed to be present only when the 20% ownership criteria 
is also present.
Theorem 1
Theorem 1 is the direct result when Statement 1 and Statement 
2 are combined logically. This theorem is not stated directly in 
Opinion 18. Rather, it is simply implied.
Leftwich and Chambers
Chambers attempted to construct a broad theory of accounting 
in his book Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior. This book 
represents one of the most significant and extensive attempts at
l®”The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in Common 
Stocks,” op. cit., p. 355.
19 Loc. cit.
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theory construction undertaken in accounting to date. As in any 
first attempt at theory construction, improvements can undoubtedly 
be made.
Richard Leftwich criticizes Chambers' book on two counts: 
his rationality assumption and his homeostasis assumption. These 
two criticisms are now evaluated in light of the discussion of 
theory construction presented in this study.
Rationality
Chambers presents a picture of man as a rational human being. 
Man possesses limited capacities and always considers the cost versus 
the benefits of obtaining additional data concerning alternative 
courses of action. Chambers' rational man is an optimizer who con­
tinually adapts his behavior to maximize his utility.
Leftwich's Objections
Leftwich objects to Chambers' assumption of rationality on 
two grounds. First, Leftwich believes that the picture Chambers 
presents of man as an optimizer is invalidated by the limitations of 
man that Chambers specifically recognizes in his basic assumptions. 
Secondly, Leftwich points out that empirical evidence shows that man 
is not a maximizer but only a s a t i s f i e r . 2 0
Before Leftwich discusses Chambers' concept of rationality, he
^Richard W. Leftwich, "A Critical Analysis of Some Behavioral 
Assumptions Underlying R. J. Chambers' Accounting, Evaluation and 
Economic Behavior," University of Queensland Papers (St. Lucia, 
Australia: University of Queensland Press, Vol. 1, No. 7, August 12,
1969), p. 233.
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examines three contexts in which the term "rationality" could be 
used: in an idealistic context, a normative context, or in a des­
criptive context. He concludes that Chambers uses rationality in a 
descriptive context. And since empirical evidence shows that man is 
not rational in the sense in which Chambers uses the word, Leftwich 
concludes that Chambers' assumption of rationality is invalid. Left­
wich rejects rationality in the idealistic sense because he believes
it conflicts with Chambers' assumptions regarding man's limited 
9 1capabilities.
An Evaluation of Leftwich's Objections
This author disagrees with Leftwich's contention that Chambers 
uses rationality in a descriptive sense. Chambers' assumption of 
rationality is an idealization. Chambers mixes an idealized concept 
of rationality with less idealized descriptions of some of man's 
other limited capabilities. This fact is not grounds for saying 
Chambers' concept of rationality is not idealistic. Chambers' 
idealistic assumption of rationality is simply a generalization of an 
aspect of man's behavior that is too complicated to completely 
describe.
Unrealistic Assumptions
Leftwich discusses the use of idealistic concepts. He quotes 
Nagel's distinction of three senses in which unrealistic assumptions 
are used in theory construction.
21lbid., pp. 228-236.
These three senses are as follows:
1. A statement can be said to be unrealistic because 
it does not give an "exhaustive” description of some object,
so that it mentions only some traits actually characterizing the 
object but ignores an endless number of other traits also pre­
sent . . . .
2. A statement may be said to be unrealistic because 
it is believed to be either false or highly improbable on the 
available evidence. . . .
3. In many sciences, relations of dependence between 
phenomena are often stated with reference to so-called "pure 
cases" or "ideal types" of the phenomena being investigated.22
Leftwich contends that Chambers' rationality assumption is unrealistic
in the second sense.
The Trivial Case
Leftwich rejects the rationality in the first sense saying 
"Chambers' assumption of rationality is immune from the lack of 
realism of the first type because it is a comprehensive description 
of human action."^ But all assumptions are unrealistic in this sense. 
Nagel states in the sentence immediately following the one Leftwich 
quotes: "However, no finitely long statement can possibly formulate
the totality of traits embodied in any concretely existing thing; and 
it is difficult to imagine what a statement would be like that is not 
unrealistic in this sense, or what conceivable use such a statement 
could h a v e . "24 Thus, Leftwich rejects the use of unrealistic assump­
tions in the first sense. But he does so for the wrong reason.
22ibid., p. 230 or Ernest Nagel, "Assumptions in Economic 
Theory," American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings (May, 
1963), pp. 214-215.
^Leftwich, op. cit., p. 230. 24jjagel, pp< cit., p. 214.
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The Idealistic Case
Leftwich also rejects the possibility that Chambers was 
using unrealistic assumptions in the third sense. Leftwich states:
. . .  It might appear that Chambers’ assumption can be 
defended on the grounds that it describes the behavior of man 
under a set of idealistic conditions in accord with Nagel's 
third type of unrealistic assumption. However, even if Chambers 
does use his assumption as a "pure case", it is not valid 
because he neglects to set up the ideal conditions under which 
it holds true. The most crucial element of his non-ideal 
conditions is the explicit recognition of the limitations of man.
In Chambers' model, the use of any idealistic assumption 
with regard to human behavior is also out of place for the very 
reason that the use of normative assumptions is out of place, i.e. 
because Chambers is attempting to deduce a theory of accounting 
from the environment as it is, not as it could or should be.25
The fact that Chambers mixes assumptions regarding man's
limitations with an unrealistic assumption that man is rational is no
reason to reject Chambers' use of unrealistic assumptions in the
idealistic sense. Undoubtedly, Chambers is using rationality in the
same sense, idealistically, that it has been used in economic theory.
Nagel points out that any difference between the actual
results and the results predicted by a idealistic theory can be
attributed to the factors that an idealistic theory leaves out.
While idealistic assumptions are not literally true of anything,
neither are they literally false.^6
Leftwich notes above that Chambers fails to mention the
idealistic conditions under which rationality applies. This is a
fault in Chambers' theory, hut one easily corrected. Hempel and
25Leftwich, loc. cit. 2f>Nagel, op. cit., pp. 215-216.
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Nagel have both discussed the needs for such statements of initial 
conditons. They disagree as to whether there must be at least one 
statement of initial conditon, which specifies the circumstances in 
which the other assumptions in the theory apply. Hempel does not 
require at least one statement of initial c o n d i t i o n , 27 Nagel does for 
reasons of formal logic. As Nagel points out, it is impossible to 
derive the statement "x is B" from the simplest form of universal law, 
"for any x, if x is A, then x is B̂. So from a logical point of
view, Chambers should have included as statements of initial conditons 
the circumstances under which his theory applies.
The Third Case--Empirically False Assumptions
If the assumptions of a theory conflict with empirical evidence, 
then the theory is inadequate no matter how well it predicts. It is 
a rather thin line between assumptions that are unrealistic because 
they conflict with empirical evidence, and assumptions that are unre­
alistic because they are used idealistically.
No further attempt is made here to justify rationality.
Chambers’ theory assumes axioms from economic theory describing man's 
behavior. Hence, rationality must be interpreted idealistically, as 
it is used in economic theory. If, as Leftwich suggest, man is not 
rational, then the assumption of rationality is unrealistic because
2?Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: 
The Free Press, 1965), p. 248.
^Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, Inc., 1961), p. 32.
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it is untrue. And, if this is the case, then Chambers' theory, and 
most of economic theory, must be changed. Leftwich's second criticism 
of Chambers is discussed next.
Homeostasis
Leftwich criticizes Chambers' assumption of homeostasis. 
Leftwich points out that:
. . . Firstly, the validity of the homeostasis model is 
not universally accepted as a general theory in psychology. 
Secondly, irrespective of its validity, the homeostasis model 
is not particularly useful as a general descriptive or explan­
atory tool in p s y c h o l o g y . 29
In light of what has been said in this study, if Leftwich is 
right then his criticism is valid. Two of the objectives of science 
are description and explanation. If a theory does not adequately 
serve these two functions, it must be of doubtful utility in accom­
plishing the third objective of science, prediction.
If homeostasis is used idealistically in psychology as
rationality appears to be used in economics, then homeostasis may be
accepted as a valid axiom in Chambers' study. On the other hand, if 
as Leftwich implies, homeostasis is viewed in psychology as an 
empirically false statement, then it should be removed from Chambers' 
theory.
This concludes a brief evaluation of Leftwich's two criticisms
of Chambers. The true validity of Leftwich's criticism awaits future
empirical evidence regarding man's rationality and homeostasis.
29Leftwich, op. cit., p. 227.
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Conceptual Comparison With Moonitz
Moonitz in Accounting Research Study No. 1, "The Basic
onPostulates of Accounting," presented concepts that from the tradi­
tional viewpoints are considered basic assumptions underlying finan­
cial accounting. Other au t h o r s ^ !  have also presented their respective 
lists of accounting's assumptions. Some of their assumptions mesh, 
some conflict, and some supplement Moonitz's assumptions. But con­
ceptually, most of the types of concepts that are identified as basic 
assumptions underlying accounting are similar to Moonitz's.
His postulates are as follows:
Postulate A-l. Quantification. Quantitative data are 
helpful in making rational economic decisions, i.e., 
in making choices among alternatives so that actions 
are correctly related to consequences.
Postulate A-2. Exchange. Most of the goods and services 
that are produced are distributed through exchange, and 
are not directly consumed by the producers.
Postulate A-3. Entities (including identification of the 
entity). Economic activity is carried on through specific 
units or entities. Any report on the activity must 
identify clearly the particular unit or entity involved.
Postulate A-4. Time period (including specification of 
the time period). Economic activity is carried on during 
specifiable periods of time. Any report on that activity 
must identify clearly the period of time involved.
Postulate A-5. Unit of measure (including identification 
of the monetary unit). Money is the common denominator
S^Maurice Moonitz, "The Basic Postulates of Accounting," 
Accounting Research Study No. 1 (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 1961).
31For example, see most of the studies listed in Chapter 1,
p. 2.
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in terms of which goods and services, including labor, 
natural resources, and capital are measured. Any report 
must clearly indicate which money (e.g., dollars, francs, 
pounds) is being used.
Postulate B-l. Financial statements. (Related to A-l.)
The results of the accounting process are expressed in a 
set of fundamentally related financial statements which 
articulate with each other and rest upon the same under­
lying data.
Postulate B-2. Market Prices. (Related to A-2.) Account­
ing data are based on prices generated by past, present or 
future exchanges which have actually taken place or are 
expected to.
Postulate B-3. Entities. (Related to A-3.) The results 
of the accounting process are expressed in terms of 
specific units or entities.
Postulate B-4. Tentativeness. (Related to A-4.) The 
results of operations for relatively short periods of 
time are tentative whenever allocations between past, 
present, and future periods are required.
Postulate C-l. Continuity (including the correlative con­
cept of limited life). In the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, the entity should be viewed as remaining in 
operation indefinitely. In the presence of evidence that 
the entity has a limited life, it should not be viewed as 
remaining in operation indefinitely.
Postulate C-2. Objectivity. Changes in assets and lia­
bilities, and the related effects (if any) on revenues, 
expenses, retained earnings, and the like, should not be 
given formal recognition in the accounts earlier than the 
point of time at which they can be measured in objective 
terms.
Postulate C-3. Consistency. The procedures used in 
accounting for a given entity should be appropriate for 
the measurement of its position and its activity and should 
be followed consistently from period to period.
Postulate C-4. Stable unit. Accounting reports should be 
based on a stable measuring unit.
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Postulate C-5. Disclosure. Accounting reports should 
disclose that which is necessary to make them not mis­
leading. 32
Internal and Bridge Axioms and Postulates 
The conception of the nature of basic assumptions developed 
and applied in this study is somewhat different from that employed by 
Moonitz and others. Moonitz did not make the distinction between 
axioms and postulates made in this study. Axioms represent assump­
tions borrowed from other disciplines. Postulates represent a dis­
cipline's own original assumptions. This is only a minor point 
because the axiom-postulate dichotomy described here represents only 
a conceptual distinction.
Of greater importance is the distinction between internal 
assumptions and bridge assumptions employed in this study. Such a 
distinction is necessary if a set of assumptions is to be applicable, 
at least in principle, to the real world.
In rejecting the axiomatic approach Moonitz stated: "This
method, however, will probably prove incapable of dealing with the 
empirical part of accounting, especially with respect to valuation 
problems."^3 It is the use of bridge assumptions that enables account­
ants to deal with the empirical part of accounting. Bridge assumptions 
tie internal assumptions of a theory into empirically verifiable and 
measurable facts.




It might be argued that the above criticisms of Accounting 
Research Study No. 1 are not valid because Moonitz did not follow the 
axiomatic approach. In fact, in the quote just cited he rejected the 
axiomatic approach. Moonitz described his approach as the problem- 
oriented 34 approach. But in reality this approach is the deductive 
approach. And the deductive approach is synonymous with the axiomatic 
approach.
Moonitz's postulates represent concepts that are important in 
accounting. However, they are not the fundamental and basic assump­
tions of accounting as the term "basic assumption" is used in this 
study. Moonitz simply identified concepts he felt are important in 
accounting. He did not thoroughly employ reduction to determine the 
assumptions underlying these concepts. This point is expanded in 
the following section.
Selected Examples From ARS No. 1 and ARS No. 3
ARS No. 3, "A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Principles for 
Business Enterprises,"35 is an attempt to determine the principles 
underlying accounting for business enterprises. It is designed as a 
companion to ARS No. 1. Like its companion, ARS No. 3 is in part
34ibid., pp. 2 and 4.
35Robert T. Sprouse and Maurice Moonitz, "A Tentative Set of
Broad Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises," Accounting
Research Study No. 3 (New York; American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, 1962).
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normative. The authors describe accounting as they think it should 
be. Their concept of accounting differed in certain respects from the 
concept of accounting evidenced by then current practice. Thus, the 
assumptions and theorems they reductively derived differ from those of 
current practice.
Basic Assumptions in Accounting
Accountants could call any set of statements describing and 
explaining what accountants do, or should do, as the basic assumptions 
of accounting. For instance, the detailed rules and procedures applied 
in accounting practice could be called accounting’s assumptions. How­
ever, accountants prefer to look further into their practices. They 
prefer to look past the rules and procedures, past the principles, and 
back to more fundamental concepts that underlie accounting practices. 
These they call the basic assumptions of accounting.
Underlying the broad principles of Accounting Research Study 
Ho. 3 are the assumptions of Accounting Research Study No. 1. If the 
ARS No. 1 assumptions are the assumptions of accounting, then this 
must be the case. But as the following examples show, Moonitz*s 
assumptions in ARS No. 1 are insufficient to derive all the ARS No. 3 
principles.
First Example— The ARS No. 3 "C" Principle
One of the ARS No. 3 principles,, called "Principle C" in 
that study, is that "all assets of the enterprise . . . should be 
recorded in the accounts and reported in the financial statements."^
36lbid., p. 5 5 .
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This principle cannot be derived from the ARS No. 1 assumptions 
without the aid of at least one additional assumption. ARS No. 1
assumption C-5 can be restated as follows, preserving Moonitz’s
apparent intended meaning:
Assumption C-5 - If accounting reports are to be useful
in making rational economic decisions, then
accounting reports should disclose all that
is necessary to make them not misleading.
This assumption (C-5) is an internal assumption. It relates to
nothing observable. In order to derive the above Principle C, a
second assumption must be added.
Statement 1 - If accounting reports should disclose all that
is necessary to make them not misleading, 
then accounting reports should report all 
the assets of a business enterprise.
This assumption serves as a bridge assumption.
Statement 1 does not appear anywhere among the ARS No. 1
assumptions. Nor do any other assumptions in ARS No. 1 appear to be
sufficient to derive Principle C. When assumption C-5 and the above 
second assumption, Statement 1, are combined logically, the result
is the following principle (theorem).
Principle 1 - If accounting reports are to be useful in
making rational economic decisions, then 
accounting reports should report all the 
assets of a business enterprise.^
This principle seems to be consistent with the intent of ARS No. 1 and
37p;roof: Let A = "accounting reports . . . decisions,"
B = "accounting reports . . . misleading,"
C = "accounting reports . . . enterprise."
Then if A, then B (Assumpiton C-5) and if B, then C 
(Statement 1), then if A, then C [Principle 
(Theorem) 1].
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ARS No. 3. Only with the addition of Statement 1 or some similar 
type statement is the derivation of the ARS No. 3's Principle C 
possible.
Second Example— The ARS No. 3 "A11 Principle
Another of the ARS No. 3 principles is that "profit is 
attributable to the whole process of business a c t i v i t y . T h i s  
principle is not derived from any of the stated ARS No. 1 assumptions. 
However, one of those assumptions could be changed slightly.
A Modified ARS No. 1 Assumption
Moonitz's assumption A-4 is that: "Economic activity is
carried on during specifiable periods of time."-^ He uses the term
"economic or business activity" as follows:
Economic activity— The production and exchange of goods and
services.
Assumption A-4, an internal assumption, could be changed as follows:
Statement 2 - If the production and exchange of goods and
services requires the transformation of goods 
services, then the production and exchange of 
goods and services is carried on over time.
Moonitz uses the term "transform" as follows:
The term "transform" is used in the broadest possible 
sense to denote conversion or combination or rearrangement. It 
includes physical transformation, as in manufacturing, but also 
covers, for example, the activities of professional men in 
applying their knowledge and skill to the solution of a client's 
problems.
3®Sprouse and Moonitz, loc. cit.
"^Moonitz, op. cit., p. 52. ^Ibid., p. 13.
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Considering the definitions of the terms "revenue" and 
"expense" in ARS No. 3,^1 it appears that Principle A is true by 
definition. The terms "revenue" and "expense" are defined in 
ARS No. 3 as follows:
. . . Revenue is the increase in net assets of an enter­
prise as a result of the production or delivery of goods and 
the rendering of services. Expense is the decrease in net 
assets as a result of the use of economic services in the 
creation of revenues or of the imposition of taxes by govern­
mental units.^2
Net profit is the difference between revenues and expenses (and gains 
and losses). Revenues and expenses result from the production and 
exchange of goods and services. Thus, if the production and exchange 
of goods and services is carried on over time, then profit (or loss) 
must also be earned over time. If the ARS No. 1 assumption A-4 is 
changed as suggested above, then one may question wheth„er this leaves 
a gap in the ARS No. 1 assumptions. In one respect a gap is created. 
In another respect a gap is not created.
Some Other Needed Assumptions
Moonitz states the following "corollary" to assumption A-4: 
"Any report on that [economic] activity must identify clearly the 
period of time involved."^3 What Moonitz calls a corollary to 
assumption A-4 is in fact a theorem combining another of his assump­
tions and an unstated assumption.
^Gains and losses are defined in a similar manner in terms of 
increases and decreases in net assets. See Sprouse and Moonitz, op. 
cit., p. 54.
^Loc. cit. ^Moonitz, op. cit., p. 52.
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The C-5 assumption on disclosure could be reworded as follows 
without losing any of Moonitz’s intended meaning:
C-5 - If accounting reports are to be useful in making rational 
economic decisions, then accounting reports should dis­
close all that is necessary to make them not misleading.
According to Statement 2, the production and exchange of goods 
and services is carried on continually over time. Accounting reports 
may be defined generally as including reports on the production and 
exchange of goods and services. Thus, the corollary that follows from 
Statement 2 is not that accounting reports must identify the time 
period covered in accounting reports. Rather, the corollary is that 
accounting reports may be prepared as of or for any period of time 
during which the production and exchange of goods and services (eco­
nomic activity) occurs.
The statement that accounting reports must identify the time 
period reported on is derived from Moonitz's Statement C-5 shown 
above and the following bridge assumption:
Statement 3 - If accounting reports should disclose that
which is necessary to make them not misleading, 
then accounting reports should disclose the 
period of time reported on in accounting 
reports.
When Statement C-5 is combined with Statement 3, the result is the 
following:
Theorem 2 - If accounting reports are to be helpful in
making rational economic decisions, then
205
accounting reports should disclose the period 
of time reported on in accounting reports.^4
In both cases in the preceding discussion where assumptions 
were added. Statements 1 and 3, the added assumptions, were bridge 
assumptions. Statement 2 was an internal assumption. However, it 
was simply a reformulation of Moonitz's assumption A-4. It is 
bridge assumptions that tie nonobservable assumptions to observable 
events in the real world. Hence, in the areas examined Moonitz’s 
assumptions are not applicable in the real world. However, with the 
addition of Statements 1 and 2 above application of Moonitz's 
assumptions in the real world can begin.
Incompleteness in the ARS No. 1 Assumptions
The preceding discussion demonstrates two ways in which 
Moonitz's ARS No. 1 assumptions are incomplete. First, they are not 
sufficient to permit the derivation of some of the ARS No. 3 princi­
ples. But these principles were intended to be based on the ARS 
No. 1 assumptions.
Secondly, and more important, the ARS No. 1 assumptions are 
incomplete statements of the assumptions actually employed in ARS 
No. 1. In the areas examined above, Moonitz correctly uses deductive 
logic in the related background discussion of the ARS No. 1 assump­
tions. However, his attempts at reductively determining the
4^Let A = "accounting reports are . . . decisions,"
B = "accounting reports should . . . misleading,"
C = "accounting reports should . . . reports."
Then if A, then B (Statement C-5) and if B, then C
(Statement 3), then if A, then C (Theorem 2).
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assumptions underlying his deductive description of accounting 
yielded a mixture of stated assumptions, unstated assumptions, and 
theorems. The result in ARS No. 1 is not a presentation of the 
assumptions of accounting. Rather, what results is simply a list 
of important concepts in accounting. This criticism is not intended 
to take away anything from the importance of the ARS Nos. 1 and 3.
Such studies are an important first step in developing deductive 
theories in accounting. Had the correct nature of basic assumptions 
in deductive theories been understood, ARS Nos. 1 and 3 could have 
been more complete and consistent with each other. And, thus more 
useful to the accounting profession.
The Nature of Basic Assumptions 
As has been pointed out in Chapter 1 ^  and preceding sections 
of this chapter, Moonitz apparently did not investigate the nature of 
basic assumptions. He simply accepted the description of assumptions 
given by the Special Committee on Research Program. They, in turn, 
did not study the nature of assumptions either. Rather, they simply 
described the term "assumption" as it had been employed in traditional 
accounting literature.
But just because the term "assumption" had been employed in a 
certain way over the years, this does not mean it should continue to 
be employed in that way. The examination in this study of theory 
construction revealed much about the nature of basic assumptions that
^^See Chapter 1, pp. 11-12 for a more detailed discussion on 
these points.
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Moonitz and others have not considered. For instance, the discovery 
of the need for bridge assumptions to tie the.nonobservable internal 
assumptions to real world phenomena is mentioned above. Also, the 
use of idealizations in basic assumptions in needed because of the 
complexity of the real world. The real world is too complicated to 
be totally described. Only the aspects of the real world that 
represent significant influencing factors in a theory are normally 
considered.
Other Forms of Incompleteness 
As shown above, Moonitz's ARS No. 1 assumptions are not 
complete for purposes of deriving the ARS No. 3 principles. This 
type of incompleteness could not have been intentional, because the 
ARS No. 3 study was to serve as the companion to the ARS No. 1 
study. Moonitz admits that his list of assumptions is not complete 
in two other ways. Each of these forms of incompleteness is 
acceptable.
In his discussion of the accounting environment Moonitz
states:
That there may be more than five basic postulates 
referring to the environment is readily conceded. For one 
thing, each of the five is a complex assertion and could be 
restated in the form of two or more simpler statements. In 
other words, these propositions are not as basic as might 
appear from their brevity and relative simplicity of statement.
For another thing, other aspects of the environment, 
not covered in these five propositions, could be expressed 
in suitable fashion. In this sense, the list is open-ended, 
and admits of indefinite extension.
4<3Moonitz, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
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That one of his assumptions may in fact be a combination of two 
or more other assumptions is certainly true. This is true of any 
basic assumption. No assumption is unique. Any basic assumption of 
any theory could be derived as a theorem from another set of basic 
assumptions.
Secondly, Moonitz points out that his environmental assump­
tions are not complete. That is, additional environmental assump­
tions could be added. One assumes this also can apply to the B and 
C group assumptions.
As the analysis of Godel’s proof in Chapter 3 points out, no 
set of assumptions underlying a deductive theory can be both complete 
and consistent. There will always be some true statement one can 
make about a concept that is not derivable from any finite set of 
basic assumptions. Thus, as Moonitz says, his assumptions are 
open-ended.
Postulates for All of Accounting
Finally, Moonitz attempted to set forth the assumptions for 
all of accounting. But this is too ambitious an undertaking. Not 
until there is agreement on the boundaries of accounting can one 
purport to have determined all the assumptions of accounting. And 
today, it is unlikely to find even a few accountants who would com­
pletely agree on any particular concept of accounting.
Furthermore, accounting is continually expanding because of 
new challenges from users. The expanding application of knowledge 
in related disciplines is continually changing the scope of account­
ing. Thus, the possibility of finding a finite number of assumptions
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which everyone would agree are the basic assumptions of accounting 
is highly unlikely.
Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the techniques of 
theory construction presented in earlier chapters have broad appli­
cability to a great many problem areas in accounting. The broad 
spectrum of accounting is sampled. Different examples from this 
broad spectrum are chosen. These examples are: (1) evaluated in
light of the theory construction techniques presented in this study 
and (2) used to demonstrate the range of applicability of the theory 
construction techniques. Pertinent conclusions are summarized in 
Table 5 on the following page.
Materiality
First, materiality, a long-time problem area to accountants, 
is examined. Internal assumptions and bridge assumptions as might be 
found in a particular theory of materiality concerning earnings per 
share are stated. Two alternative bridge assumptions are proposed. 
One is determined by stipulation. Thus, it is an example of fiat 
measurement in accounting. The second alternative bridge assumption 
is based on the findings of an empirical study. In this second case 
fiat measurement is not involved. Both of the bridge assumptions are 
idealizations. As with all idealizations they ignore other factors 
that might account for investor reaction. The earnings per share 
change is considered the dominant causal factor.
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Secondly, the techniques of theory construction are applied 
to depreciation accounting. Internal assumptions, bridge assumptions, 
and theorems are stated as might be found in a particular theory of 
depreciation. In this particular example observable formulas can be
introduced by appropriate definitions.
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Two APB Opinions 
After demonstrating theory construction techniques in these 
areas, these same techniques are used in analyzing selected aspects 
of several current accounting theories. Two recent Accounting Prin­
ciples Board Opinions are studied. In Opinion 15 on earnings per 
share the area examined concerns determining when convertible 
securities are common stock equivalents. In Opinion 18 on the equity 
method of accounting for investments, the assumed criteria covering 
when the equity method should be used is studied.
A comparison of the types of statements directly stated in 
Opinions 15 and 18 is revealing. The APB is inconsistent in the 
manner in which it presents its theories. In Opinion 15 the APB 
states an internal assumption and a theorem. The bridge assumption 
that is needed to develop the theorem is only implied indirectly. On 
the other hand, in Opinion 18 the APB states only the bridge assump­
tions used. An internal assumption and the theorem, which is the 
APB's apparent objective, are only indirectly implied.
In both cases the bridge assumptions arrived at by the APB are 
examples of fiat measurement. In both cases no discussion is presented 
as to how these assumptions are arrived at. This is a distinct short­
coming of the theories presented. Both of these bridge assumptions 
appear to be arbitrary conclusions. More research is needed regarding 
both.
213
Leftwich's Criticisms of Chambers 
The two criticisms by Leftwich' concerning Chambers’
Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior are examined next.
First, Chambers’ assumption of rationality is examined. It is con­
cluded that Chambers uses rationality as the concept is used in 
economics. That is, Chambers uses rationality in an idealistic 
sense. Two other possible ways rationality could be used are also 
considered. Rationality in a trivial sense, though rejected by
Leftwich, applies to all theories. A thoroughly comprehensive des-
/cription of the real world is impossible. Rationality, as an 
empirically false assumption, conflicts with extensive usage of the 
concept in economics. The predictive ability of economic theories 
which assume rationality gives evidence that the rationality assump­
tion is not empirically false.
In contrast, Chambers* assumption of homeostasis may be 
improper. Leftwich points out that as a concept homeostasis is not 
accepted in psychology. If Leftwich is correct and homeostasis is not 
an idealization but an empirically false concept, then Chambers' 
inclusion of it in his theory is incorrect.
Conceptual Comparison With Moonitz 
Finally a conceptual comparison with selected aspects of 
Moonitz's ARS No. 1 is offered. Such a comparison necessitated 
analyzing the companion ARS No. 3 principles study. This is done in 
order to determine if the ARS No. 3 principles are derived from the 
ARS No. 1 assumptions.
214
First, ' : approach Moonitz used in ARS No. 1 is analyzed.
The approach in ARS No. 1, though called a problem-oriented approach 
by Moonitz, in reality is the deductive approach. And the deductive 
approach is synonomous with the axiomatic approach which he mis­
takenly rejected.
Next, two principles are selected from the ARS No. 3 study.
An attempt is made to derive these principles from the ARS No. 1 
assumptions. In the case of Principle C, an additional assumption 
has to be supplied. In the case of Principle A, one of Moonitz's 
assumptions must be modified. In addition, one statement identified 
as a corollary by Moonitz in reality is a theorem (principle). Its 
derivation also requires the addition of an unstated bridge assump­
tion. Furthermore, in the two areas examined, Moonitz's assumptions 
are both internal assumptions. Bridge assumptions had to be added 
in order to apply his assumptions to the real world.
The ARS No. 1 assumptions are found incomplete in a number 
of ways. First, taken alone, they are not capable of yielding all 
the ARS No. 3 principles. Since the ARS No. 3 principles are 
intended to be based on the ARS No. 1 assumptions, this is a serious 
shortcoming. Second, Moonitz reductively derived the ARS No. 1 
assumptions from a concept of accounting, also described by him in 
ARS No. 1. In reality the assumptions he identified are only a few 
of the assumptions actually underlying his concept of accounting. In 
order words, Moonitz's reduction is inadequate.
Additionally, Moonitz chose too large a concept of accounting 
to work with. The reduction of all the assumptions of an entire
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discipline in nearly impossible. Had Moonitz more fully understood 
the nature of basic assumptions and the techniques of theory con­
struction, most of the above criticisms could have been avoided.
Moonitz's assumptions are incomplete in two other ways, both 
of which are acceptable. First, each of Moonitz's assumptions could 
itself be derived as a theorem from two or more assumptions. This is 
true of all assumptions. Secondly, as Godel's proof verifies, all 
sets of assumptions are open-ended. Some true statement concerning 
accounting could always be made that itself was neither an assump­
tion nor a theorem of a given set of basic assumptions.
Conclusions
The examples in this chapter serve to show that the techniques 
of theory construction are applicable to a great many problem areas in 
accounting. Indeed, these examples are a type of empirical evidence. 
While it can never be proven that these techniques are applicable to 
every aspect of accounting, evidence is provided demonstrating their 
applicability in some areas. This author, and hopefully the reader, 
can see their applicability in a great many other areas. This author 
is confident that great advances in accounting research can result if 
these techniques of theory construction are applied to the problem 
areas of accounting.
Chapter 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objectives set for this study in Chapter 1 were as
follows:
(1) To describe the nature and function of basic assump­
tions in a theory or discipline by a detailed analysis 
of the techniques of theory construction;
(2) To demonstrate that the above is applicable to 
accounting by constructing an outline of a theory of 
financial accounting measurement; and
(3) To demonstrate the wide applicability of theory con­
struction techniques in accounting by applying these 
techniques to a diverse sample of accounting topics.
These objectives were accomplished in the following ways.
Basic Assumptions in Deductive Theories 
The objective of Chapters 2 and 3 (Objective 1 above) was an 
examination of the nature and function of basic assumptions in deduc­
tive theories. Chapter 2 concentrated on the basic assumptions them­
selves. In Chapter 3 the relation between basic assumptions and the 
other components of a deductive theory was explored.
The Nature of Basic Assumptions 
Extensrive library research in the area of the philosophy of
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science was undertaken to determine how basic assumptions are employed 
in theory construction. This research was necessary because previous 
accounting studies aimed at determining accounting’s basic assumptions 
analyzed the nature of basic assumptions in deductive theories only 
superficially, if at all. This research led to a number of conclusions 
regarding the nature of basic assumptions and theory construction 
which largely had not been recognized in accounting.
Determination and Characteristics of 
Basic Assumptions
A theory is essentially a deductive description of some 
concept. Every theory is based on some basic assumptions in order 
to avoid either an infinite series of statements or circular rea­
soning. Reduction is used in determining the basic assumptions 
underlying a particular concept. With reduction, an attempt is made 
to identify the basic assumptions underlying a concept which when 
combined logically yield the concept. Once this is done, an attempt 
can be made to combine these same basic assumptions in "new" ways 
with the hope of yielding "new" knowledge about the concept.
Basic assumptions are generally required to have certain 
characteristics. They should be consistent with the other assump­
tions present and completely capable of logically yielding the 
desired concept. In addition, it is desirable that basic assumptions 
be independent of the other assumptions present, reproductive or 
capable of yielding many theorems, and have the aesthetic quality of 
simplicity.
The basic assumptions of many theories appear trivial. And
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because of the use of idealizations they frequently are not exact 
descriptions of the real world. But idealizations are acceptable if 
under purified conditions they are true assumptions about a concept. 
The basic assumptions of a theory describe only the most significant 
influential factors underlying a concept. Many distorting influences 
thought to be immaterial are ignored. The real world is too complex 
to completely specify all the assumptions underlying a concept.
Five Types of Basic Assumptions





(4) internal postulates, and
(5) bridge postulates.
A conceptual distinction was made between objectives, axioms, and 
postulates. Objectives indicate the goals which axioms and postulates 
attempt to describe and explain. Axioms are assumptions borrowed from 
theories in other disciplines and applied to accounting theories. 
Postulates are assumptions originating in accounting which serve to 
make accounting a distinct discipline. Axioms and postulates were 
further subdivided into internal and bridge axioms and postulates.
Internal assumptions contain dispositional and theoretical 
concepts. These concepts are nonohservable characteristics of 
observable things Cdispositionals) and nonobservable characteristics 
of nonobservable things (theofeticals). Both concepts play a
currently indispensable role in scientific theories.
Since both concepts involve nonobservables neither they nor 
the assumptions and theorems containing them can be directly empir­
ically verified. Instead of direct testing, bridge assumptions are 
sought connecting the nonobservable internal assumptions with 
observable phenomena. Verification of the observable phenomena is 
used as supporting evidence of the internal assumptions. Because such 
indirect confirmations are not valid logically they are not considered 
proofs. Rather, these indirect confirmations serve as evidence 
increasing one’s confidence in accompanying internal assumptions.
Obtaining General Acceptance for 
Basic Assumptions
Several other alternative methods of obtaining general 
acceptance for basic assumptions were examined. For different reasons 
none were accepted. These methods included (1) relying on self­
evidence to support basic assumptions, (2) limiting basic assumptions 
to analytic statements, or (3) demonstrating basic assumptions by an 
appeal to another deductive system (theory).
Because basic assumptions contain idealizations, relying on 
self-evidence to support those basic assumptions is risky. Kant’s 
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements seemed prom­
ising. Analytic statements are true because of their logical form.
If one understands all the terms of an analytic statement, then one 
can judge its truth value. Unfortunately, analytic statements do not 
contain sufficient content to convey anything meaningful. Thus, they 
are of limited utility in theory construction. On the other hand,
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synthetic statements can be rich in content* But knowledge apart 
from the statement itself is necessary in order to confirm synthetic 
statements- Thus, confirmation must rest on empirical testing.
Finally, appeal to another deductive system was considered. 
Here a basic assumption of one theory could be derived from the basic 
assumptions of a second theory. If the second theory is generally 
established, then one's confidence in the derived basic assumption 
is strengthened. However, nothing has been proven- Ultimately, one 
set of basic assumptions must be accepted as given.
The Nature of Deductive Theories 
The objective of Chapters 2 and 3 was an examination of the 
nature and function of basic assumptions in a theory ordiscipline. The 
nature of basic assumptions in deductive theories was analyzed in 
Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 this analysis was expanded to include the 
entire structure of a deductive theory: basic assumptions and
theorems. This analysis was accomplished by library research in the 
area of logic, in the use of the deductive approach in mathematics, 
accounting, and other selected areas, and by a continuation of the 
study of theory construction.
Components of a Deductive System
Following a brief examination of the origin and significance 
of the deductive approach, the components of a deductive theory were 
briefly discussed. These components included:
(1) a set of basic assumptions (five types were discussed 
in Chapter 2),
221
(2) a set of derived statements (alternatively called 
theorems or principles),
(3) rules of logic,
(4) a set of primitive terms,
(5) a set of defined terms,
(6) a set of universal terms,
(7) rules of definition, and
(8) rules of grammar.
The rules of logic are part of a deductive theory since they 
must be assumed in order to derive theorems from basic assumptions. 
Both basic assumptions and theorems are statements composed of terms. 
Three types of terms were identified: primitive, defined, and
universal. Primitive terms are the undefined terms of a theory. They 
are unique only for a given theory. Some terms must remain undefined 
in order to avoid circular definitions or an infinite series of 
definitions. The similarity with basic assumptions is obvious. 
Although not explicitly defined in a theory, the primitive terms are 
implicitly defined by the way they are used in a theory.
In contrast, defined terms are explicitly defined in a theory. 
They are defined utilizing other defined terms, primitive terms, and 
certain universal terms. Universal terms are similar to primitive 
terms in that they too are not defined. However, universal terms are 
limited to non-^technical terms which should be universally understood.
In order to define a term certain rules of definition must be 
followed. These definitional rules are also part of a deductive 
theory. Explicit definitional rules are used in deductive theories.
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Finally, terms must be combined to form statements which serve as 
basic assumptions. Rules of grammar specify permissible combinations 
of terms.
All of the above components of deductive theories are present 
whether the theory is formalized with symbolic logic or stated, as is 
normally the case outside of mathematics, in ordinary language. Care­
ful attention must be paid in theory construction to each of these 
components. Else, a theory’s basic assumptions may not convey the 
theorist's intended meaning.
Characteristics of Deductive Systems
Deductive theories have characteristics beyond the charac­
teristics of basic assumptions discussed in Chapter 2. First, it is 
desirable that all theories be fully formalized. This requires that 
every statement in the theory is either a basic assumption or a 
theorem, every technical term must be either a primitive or a defined 
term, and every possible meaningful theorem that could be derived from 
the basic assumptions is derived. Though desirable, this charac­
teristic is rarely attained, especially in relatively new theories.
The benefits of full formalization may not be worth the costs of 
delaying the application of the theory.
It also seems desirable that deductive theories be both 
consistent and complete. Consistency means no contradictions are 
contained in either the assumptions or the theorems. Since theorems 
do not contain anything that is not in the underlying assumptions, 
consistency of the entire theory is simply consistency in the basic 
assumptions. Inconsistency destroys a theory.
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Completeness includes full formalization and adds the require­
ment that all true statements about a concept expressible in the 
primitive terms of the theory be derivable from the basic assumptions. 
Godel’s proof has shown that deductive systems cannot be both con­
sistent and complete. Completeness must then be abandoned in favor 
of consistency.
Finally, several advantages of deductive theories were dis­
cussed. First, theorists are forced to recognize all their assump­
tions and to rigorously define their terms. Second, pursuing basic 
assumptions to their logical ends helps eliminate inconsistencies in 
a discipline. Third, deductive theories represent a convenient 
breakdown of a subject. This breakdown serves as a useful teaching 
device.
This completed the analysis of the nature and function of 
basic assumptions in theories. Conclusions concerning this analysis 
are presented later in this chapter. The following two sections 
summarize the effort to show the techniques of theory construction 
were applicable to accounting theory construction.
Some Basic Assumptions in a Theory of 
Financial Accounting Measurement
The objective of Chapters 4 and 5 was to demonstrate that the 
techniques of theory construction are applicable to accounting by con­
structing an outline of a theory of financial accounting measurement.
If theory construction techniques are to be of benefit in accounting 
theory construction, they must be capable of application in accounting. 
To demonstrate this capability the theory construction techniques were
224
applied to one currently important topic in accounting: financial
accounting measurement.
A Summary of Measurement Theory
One entire chapter was devoted to the study of measurement 
theory for three reasons. First, in order to develop a theory of 
financial accounting measurement, one has to be knowledgeable of 
measurement theory. Secondly, the theory of financial accounting 
measurement developed in Chapter 5 involved the use of index numbers 
to adjust for general and specific price-level changes. And, it was 
necessary to show that financial accounting measurement is on a ratio 
scale in order to use index number adjustments. Thirdly, several of 
the accounting examples analyzed in Chapter 6 involved fiat meas­
urement. Thus, it was necessary to describe and classify fiat meas­
urement according to measurement theory literature.
In Chapter 4 extensive library research was undertaken on 
measurement theory. Three major topics were discussed:
(1) the nature of measurement,
(2) alternative systems for the classification of meas­
urement , and
(3) the measurement unit.
What Is Measurement?
Measurement was defined in this study as follows:
Measurement - The assignment by rules of numerals to 
ohjects or events in order to represent 
particular properties of the objects or 
events.
This definition included classification as measurement. Several of
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the authors examined (Ellis, Torgerson, Sterling, and Campbell), con­
sidered classification a premeasurement concept. Despite a rigorous 
reformulation of the kind of rules that can qualify as measurement 
rules, Ellis admitted that classification could be excluded from meas­
urement only by arbitrary convention.
On the other hand, Mattessich pointed out that the exclusion 
of classification dichotomizes a logical entity since classification 
is inherent in all higher forms of measurement. Because the exclusion 
of classification is arbitrary and because its inclusion preserves a 
logical entity, no restrictions to exclude classificaiton were placed 
on the measurement definition adopted in this study.
Alternative Systems for the Classification 
of Measurement
Two major measurement classification systems, Stevens’ system 
and Campbell's system, were examined next along with criticisms and 
modifications of each system. Of particular importance to the theory 
of financial accounting measurement presented in Chapter 5 was ratio 
scale measurement and fiat measurement.
Stevens’ Classification Systems and 
Its Variations
Stevens' classification system identified four major meas­
urement scales: nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio, A fifth
possible scale, the logarithmic interval scale, has no important 
applications at the present time. The basis of Stevens’ classification 
is invariance of the scale form under mathematical transformation.
Coombs presented an expansion of Stevens' classification.
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Coombs added to Stevens' four major scales a partially ordered scale 
and an ordered metric scale, which was simply an unfinished interval 
scale. Since Coombs distinguished between two aspects of each scale, 
the object and the distance between objects, his classification 
yielded many subclasses. The basis of Coombs' classification was the 
kinds of application of arithmetic that the scale represents.
Ellis criticized the basis of Stevens' classification as 
ambiguous and questioned its reliability for classifying scales. Ellis 
pointed out that Stevens may have been thinking about the kinds of 
application of arithmetic and not mathematical invariance alone as the 
basis of his scale. However, Ellis admitted that Stevens may have had 
better reasons for his classification of which Ellis was not aware.
Through his reformulation of Stevens' invariance criterion 
Ellis showed that Stevens' classification system could be derived 
from Coombs' system. Ellis showed that a nominal, ordinal, interval, 
or ratio scale under Coombs' classification was classified the same 
under Stevens'. Thus, a given scale type can only be transformed as 
Stevens suggested. Based on this, it was possible to show in Chapter 
5 that irregardless of whether Ellis' criticism of Stevens' system was 
correct or incorrect, the concept of financial accounting measurement 
presented in Chapter 5 was measurement on a ratio scale. Thus, scale 
transformations involving multiplication by a constant are permitted.
Torgerson offered a modification of Stevens' scale classification 
system. Torgerson did not recognize Steven's nominal scale as 
measurement. Additionally, Torgerson recognized two kinds of ordinal 
scales, one with a natural origin and one without a natural
227
origin. Like Stevens, the basis of Torgerson's classification was 
invariance under mathematical transformation.
Campbell's Classification System and 
Its Variations
The second major measurement classification system examined 
was Campbell's. He distinguished between fundamental and derived 
measurement. Fundamental measurement, which depends on no prior meas­
urement, requires that the property measured be additive. Derived
measurement depends on prior fundamental measurement of two or more 
quantities. With present knowledge very few properties in accounting,
or other social sciences, are fundamentally measurable, or capable of
being linked to fundamental measurements. Thus, Campbell's class­
ification system had little application to accounting measurement.
Ellis offered a modification of Campbell's measurement system 
which recognized elemental and associative measurement in addition to 
Campbell's fundamental and derived measurement. Elemental measurement 
is measurement of rank-order. Associative measurement is measurement 
that depends on the prior measurement of only one quantity. Ellis' 
modification does not recognize much of the measurement done in 
accounting and other social sciences.
Finally, Torgerson's modification of Campbell's measurement 
classification system was presented. In addition to fundamental and 
derived measurement Torgerson identified fiat measurement: measurement
by stipulation, convention, or definition. Fiat measurement is used 
frequently in the social sciences and in accounting. Selected examples 
of fiat measurement in accounting were analyzed in Chapter 6 where the
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techniques of theory construction were applied to a number of 
accounting topics. The type of financial accounting measurement 
described in Chapter 5 was classified according to these different 
systems of measurement in Chapter 5.
The Measurement Unit
Finally, the nature of the measurement unit was discussed. 
Measurement units that are relatively invariant are normally chosen 
by scientists because they lead to simpler theories. Once a given 
measurement unit has been chosen, a decision must be made as to whether 
it needs to be adjusted for distorting influences. The typical meas­
urement unit used for business activity is the dollar. The dollar can 
be adjusted with index numbers for the effects of general price-level 
changes. These adjustments are for distortions in the dollar caused 
by inflation or deflation. Though the adjustments for distorting 
influences complicate measurement rules, they lead to simpler theories.
An Outline of a Theory of Financial 
Accounting Measurement
In Chapter 5 the techniques of theory construction were com­
bined with the background material on measurement theory to demonstrate 
that theory construction techniques can be applied to accounting 
theory construction. An effort was made, to demonstrate the use of the 
five different types of basic assumptions (objectives, internal 
axioms, bridge axioms, internal postulates, and bridge postulates), 
the use of theorems, and the use of idealizations in accounting theory 
construction.
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One Financial Accounting Objective
The financial accounting measurement theory presented was
built around the following assumed objective of financial accounting:
an objective of financial accounting is to measure the economic value
and changes in the economic value that have occurred in a profit-
oriented business firm in order to enable investors to predict the
future economic value of the firm. This objective is only one of
many financial accounting objectives. It reflects a concept of
accounting similar to the one described in APB Statement No. 4.
The end result of the theory was the following financial
accounting measurement rule that could be used to measure the economic
value of a business firm;
The Financial Accounting Measurement Rule - Assign to every 
asset that a given firm controls at a given time the 
numeral that represents the current market price of 
that asset at that particular time.
The development of this rule is briefly summarized below.
Some Initial Assumptions
The development of the theory commenced with a number of 
internal assumptions concerning the existence of business firms 
(I.Ax.l), consumers (I.Ax.2), scarce resources (I.Ax.3), purely com­
petitive markets (I.Ax.4), and an activity called financial accounting 
measurement (I.P.l). The assumption of purely competitive markets was 
an example of an assumption specifying the conditions under which a 
theory holds. All the above assumptions were internal assumptions 
because none of the concepts involved were observables. All were 
axioms except the assumption of the activity of financial accounting
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measurement. It was a postulate because it is an assumption orig­
inating within accounting.
Since the assumed objective of financial accounting was aimed 
at supplying information that investors could use in predicting the 
future value of a business firm (Obj.l), a number of assumptions 
regarding prediction were made. All were classified as internal 
axioms. It was first assumed that man's only source of knowledge 
about the future is knowledge about the past (l.Ax.5). Then, it was 
assumed that the more complete man's knowledge of the past, the better 
predictor that knowledge is of the future (I.Ax.6), These assumptions 
justify the financial accounting objective of presenting information 
on all economic value changes that have occurred. Current value 
accounting presents information on economic value changes as they 
occur. Historical cost-based accounting frequently reports only com­
ponent net value increases or component net value decreases.
The objectivity of current value accounting was implied by 
three additional internal assumptions. One stated that the past is 
uncontrollable (I.Ax.7). This means that past economic value changes 
are uncontrollable. Secondly, the uncertainty of the future was 
assumed (I.Ax.8). This means that future economic value changes may 
not occur. Thirdly, the assumption that time is not efficacious 
(I.Ax.9) means that economic value changes occur not merely because 
of the passage of time hut because of something inherent in the nature 
of economic value.
Another internal axiom was then added. This assumption stated 
that there is a reason for everything that exists (I,Ax.10). Thus,
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there must be a reason why products exist. This reason was found to 
be because ultimately all products produced by man contribute either 
directly or indirectly to the attainment of satisfaction by consumers. 
Consumer satisfaction is the ultimate product of all economic activity. 
The reason business firms exist is that they produce products that 
provide satisfaction to consumers. Economic value must be a property 
people give to products.
Assumptions About Consumers and 
Business Firms
A number of assumptions about consumers and business firms were 
given. Consumers have unlimited wants and needs (I.Ax.11) but only 
finite money incomes available to satisfy their wants and needs 
(I.Ax.12). The intensity of consumer's wants and needs varies 
(I.Ax.13). Thus, the satisfaction a consumer receives from consuming 
different products or combinations of products varies. And since con­
sumers maximize the satisfaction they receive from consuming products 
(Obj.2), consumers must buy what they value most.
The objective of all business firms is to maximize profits 
(Obj.3). Business firms exist ultimately to provide products to con­
sumers. Thus, the economic value of a business firm is derived from 
the business firm's ahility to satisfy the wants and needs of consumers 
for products (I.Ax.14). And the ability of a business firm to produce 
a product is derived from the scarce resources under the business 
firm's control (I<Ax.15).
Depicting consumers, and business firms as maximizers showed 
the use of idealizations. As such, these objectives describe their
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behavior under purified conditions free from distortions caused by 
their other complementing and conflicting objectives. Maximization 
was assumed the dominant objective.
Measuring Economic Value
Economic value is a nonobservable property that people give 
to products. When talking about business firms and consumers, one 
is really talking about people. And the economic valuations of 
people are observable in the activity of people buying and selling 
products in the market place (B.Ax.1).
After determining how a person’s valuation of a good could be 
observed, it was necessary to determine what number should be assigned 
to represents economic value. This number was found to be the market 
equilibrium price for a product which is determined by the intersection 
of the market supply and the market demand curves for a product.
According to economic theory a supply curve shows the minimum 
prices that business firms are willing and able to accept for placing 
different quantities of a product on the market. A firm's supply 
curve reflects the firm's business costs which reflect the relative 
demand for productive resources which in turn reflects the relative 
demand for final products. The aggregate of all the individual firm 
supply curves is the market supply curve. The market supply curve 
reflects a consensus of opinion as to the economic value of a product 
by all suppliers of the product,
The market demand curve shows the different quantities of a 
product users are willing and able to take off the market at every 
different possible price. These prices represent the maximum unit
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prices users will pay for a given quantity of a product. Thus, aggre­
gate market demand represents a maximum consensus valuation of a pro­
duct by all users of that product.
At the intersection of the market demand curve and the market 
supply curve, the equilibrium price, there is a balancing of forces. 
The equilibrium price represents a consensus valuation of the economic 
value of a product by all buyers and sellers of the product. Since 
the equilibrium price is a nonobservable, the following bridge axiom 
was needed:
B.Ax.2 - The current market price of a product is an approx­
imation of the market equilibrium price of a product.
Financial Accounting Measurement of the 
Economic Value of a Business Firm
A method of measuring the economic value of a product was 
determined. This measurement was found to be on a ratio scale. Then 
the use of index numbers is allowed for foreign currency conversions, 
for specific price-level adjustments (conversions to current market 
prices), and for general price-level adjustments* (corrections for dis­
tortions in the measuring unit). Financial accounting measurement 
was also described as fiat measurement which, as Chapter 6 showed, is 
a very important in accounting.
Finally, the assumption was added that the total economic value 
of a firm is the sum of the individual asset values (B.P.l). This 
assumption was classified as a hridge postulate reflecting its impor­
tance in present day accounting theory. It was also an idealization.
In summary it was shown in Chapters 4 and 5 that the techniques
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of theory construction are applicable to accounting theory con­
struction. Each of the five types of basic assumptions, along with 
theorems, idealizations, and explicit definitions, were illustrated 
in the theory of financial accounting measurement. A concept of 
financial accounting measurement and business activity was described, 
and reduction was used to identify some of the basic assumptions 
underlying that concept. The wide applicability of theory con­
struction techniques to accounting theory was shown in Chapter 6.
The Applicability of Theory Construction 
Techniques in Financial Accounting
The objective of Chapter 6 was to demonstrate the wide appli­
cability of theory construction techniques in accounting by applying 
these techniques to a diverse sample of accounting topics. Topics 
were selected from the broad spectrum of financial accounting and 
evaluated in light of the techniques of theory construction presented 
in Chapters 2 and 3. This evaluation showed that theory construction 
techniques are widely applicable to accounting theory construction. 
Aspects of the general topics of materiality and depreciation 
accounting were examined first. Then selected aspects of a number of 
specific published works were examined. These were APB Opinions 15 
and 18, Leftwich's criticism of Chambers' rationality and homeostasis 
assumptions, and some of the ARS Nos. 1 and 3 assumptions and prin­
ciples. An attempt was, made to supply any unstated. assumptions 
omitted in the areas examined.
Materiality and Depreciation Accounting 
First, the techniques of theory construction were applied to
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materiality and depreciation accounting. Internal and bridge assump­
tions that might be found in a specific aspect of each theory were 
stated. Theorems were derived. In the case of materiality two 
alternative bridge assumptions were stated and contrasted. One 
involved fiat measurement and the other was based on an empirically 
determined measurement. In the depreciation accounting example only 
fiat measurement was involved. Both examples employed idealizations 
since they accounted for only what was thought to be major causal 
factors. Distorting influences thought to be insignificant were 
ignored.
APB Opinions 15 and 18 
Aspects of two APB Opinions were examined; Opinion 15 on 
earnings per share and Opinion 18 on the equity method of accounting 
for common stock investments. In both cases the APB omitted some of 
their key assumptions. In Opinion 15 the APB stated an internal 
assumption and a theorem but did not state the bridge assumption 
they used. This apparent bridge assumption that the APB used was 
supplied by this author. In Opinion 18 the APB stated only a bridge 
assumption. The connecting internal assumption and the resulting 
theorem were both supplied by this writer. Both cases involved fiat 
measurement. Idealizations appeared to have been used properly. It 
was concluded that the APB and its successor, fhe Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASR), should attempt to state all their major 
assumptions and provide a narrative description of their reasoning 
process giving rise to their assumptions. This conclusion is elab-- 
orated on later in this chapter.
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Two Criticisms of Chambers' Accounting,
Evaluation and Economic Behavior
Leftwich's criticisms of Chambers' assumptions of rationality 
and homeostasis in his book Accounting, Evaluation and Economic 
Behavior were examined next. Both assumptions were internal axioms.
The assumption of rationality was borrowed from economic theory. Since 
rationality appears to be fairly well established in economic theories, 
Leftwich's criticism seems to be incorrect, and rationality is a proper 
use of an idealization. Of course, if rationality is subsequently 
proven false, then Leftwich's criticism would be valid.
The assumption of homeostasis was borrowed from psychology. 
Leftwich pointed out that homeostasis was not generally accepted in 
psychology because it was thought to be empirically false. Thus, 
Leftwich's criticism of Chambers' homeostasis assumptions appears to 
be correct and homeostasis was an improper use of an idealization.
Moonitz's Basic Assumptions of Accounting
Finally two principles from Sprouse and Moonitz's Accounting 
Research Study No. 3 "A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Principles 
for Business Enterprises" were examined. The ARS No. 3 principles 
were supposed to be based on the assumptions developed by Moonitz in 
Accounting Research Study No. 1, "The Basic Postulates of Accounting." 
In both, cases examined the ARS No. 1 assumptions were insufficent to 
derive the ARS No. 3 principles. Also, one statement called a cor­
ollary by Moonitz was actually a theorem. Moonitz had followed what 
he called the "problem oriented" approach. In reality, this was the 
deductive or axiomatic approach which Moonitz mistakenly had rejected.
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Moonitz had rejected the axiomatic approach because he thought 
it was not capable of application in the real world. In every case 
examined the assumptions that Moonitz stated were internal assumptions. 
Bridge assumptions had to be supplied in order to derive the ARS No. 3 
principles. Since it is bridge assumptions that allow a theory to be 
applied in the real world, Moonitz's assumptions, in the areas examined, 
could not be applied in the real world.
Thus, the techniques of theory construction are applicable to 
accounting theory construction. However, these techniques have not 
been adequately applied in previous accounting research. This and 
other conclusions are elaborated on in the final section of this study.
Conclusions and Implications for Accounting Research 
This study has demonstrated that the techniques of theory con­
struction are applicable in accounting theory construction. This has 
been demonstrated in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. This important conclusion 
has significant implications for future accounting research.
Basic Assumption Studies 
Attempts at specifying the basic assumptions underlying the 
accounting discipline span a period of over fifty years. Moonitz's 
Accounting Research Study No. 1, "The Basic Postulates of Accounting," 
identified concepts similar to those traditionally considered the basic 
assumptions of accounting. But is was clearly seen from the exam­
ination of several principles from Accounting Research Study No, 3 
that the assumptions Moonitz identified were not all the basic assump­
tions of accounting: In both cases where ARS No. 3 principles were
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examined, the ARS No. 1 assumptions were not sufficient to derive 
the ARS No. 3 principles. However, in both cases assumptions were 
added demonstrating these principles could be derived.
Both assumptions added by this researcher were bridge postu­
lates. Moonitz's omission of bridge assumptions is especially 
revealing. Bridge assumptions tie the nonobservable concepts of a 
theory to observable reality. Thus, it is the bridge assumptions 
that permit a theory to be tested and applied in the real world. The 
assumptions examined in ARS No. 1 were insufficient to allow 
Moonitz's theory to be applied in the real world.
Moonitz did not study the nature of basic assumptions. He 
simply accepted the description of basic assumptions implied in pre­
vious studies on the basic assumptions of accounting. Had Moonitz 
and these other accounting researchers studied the nature of basic 
assumptions, they would have discovered the need for bridge assump­
tions in theory construction. Accounting Research Studies Nos. 1 
and 3 and much of the previous research on the basic assumptions of 
accounting might have been more useful to the accounting profession.
Overambitious Attempts at Theory Construction 
Moonitz and similar studies (see pages 2 and 3) that attempted 
to determine the basic assumptions of all of accounting were over- 
ambitious. Accounting is a very broad discipline. It consists of all 
the axioms, postulates, and objectives of all the theories that are 
generally accepted in accounting. It is highly unlikely that all the 
basic assumptions of accounting could be named in any one study.
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Axioms
In this study the assumptions borrowed from other disciplines 
and applied in accounting theory construction are called "axioms."
The ARS No. 1 assumptions given by Moonitz hardly touched on the axioms 
of accoutning. For example, no reference is made to logic in Moonitz's 
assumptions. Does this mean that accountants do not use logic? Of 
course not, Moonitz's list is merely incomplete. Other obvious areas 
omitted from Moonitz's list include, for example, axioms of arithmetic, 
measurement theory, communications theory, ethics, and human behavior. 
The interdisciplinary aspect of accounting is apparent. The account­
ing discipline cannot be fully developed without assumptions in these 
and other areas.
Objectives
Objectives along with the axioms and postulates serve to give 
direction to a discipline. Objectives help to delimit and implicitly 
define what is the domain of accounting. The following question might 
be posed: Should accountants attempt to determine all the objectives
of the accounting discipline? In light of the preceding discussion 
this author must answer no.
The objectives of accounting should be determined on a theory 
by theory basis. As seen in the preceding discussion, accounting is 
a large discipline. It is. composed of all theories generally accepted 
within accounting. For this same reason it is unlikely that all the 
accounting axioms and postulates could be determined. It is also 
unlikely that all the accounting objectives could be determined.
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Accounting is simply too large a discipline.
Objectives Change
The accounting discipline is constantly exposed to new dis­
coveries both in accounting itself and in other disciplines. The 
expectations of society regarding accounting, as evidenced by the 
demands society places on accounting, are also changing. The 
objectives of accounting change in response to these influences.
Even if it would be possible to determine all the objectives 
of accounting, this may not be desirable. Instead of acting as a 
stimulus, such a list of objectives could act as a constraint on future 
accounting research by excluding certain areas from accounting.
Reflecting on the preceding discussion, it is evident that in 
an absolute sense the accounting basic assumptions are not few in 
number. In reality, there are many basic assumptions of accounting 
without which the accounting discipline cannote be adequately 
developed.
Unrealistic Theories
Theories are sometimes criticized for being unrealistic or 
for being incomplete descriptions of a concept. The discussion in 
this study regarding idealizations has important insight concerning 
these criticisms.
Idealizations are frequently employed in theory construction 
in the sciences and social sciences. The real world is too complex 
to be fully described in any theory. What a theorist attempts to 
do is to identify only the most significant causal factors that
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account for the concept examined. This involves ignoring many dis­
torting influences which the theorist believes are insignificant 
individually and as a group when compared to the significant factors 
accounted for in a theory. The factors accounted for in a theory are 
empirically true under highly purified conditions free from all rela­
tively insignificant distorting influences.
Criticisms of theories for being unrealistic because they 
employ idealizations in the above way are invalid. Such theories do 
an adequate job of describing, explaining, and predicting. On the 
other hand, if the factors described in a theory fail to describe the 
concept because the idealized descriptions are empirically false, then 
these idealizations are not acceptable for use in theory construction.
A Deductive Framework for Accounting Theory 
This study has provided accounting with a deductive theory 
structure. Accounting literature has long reflected the deductive 
approach in narrative discussions. This study takes this approach one 
further step and requires that such discussions ultimately be refor­
mulated as deductive systems in which all basic assumptions are 
explicitly stated. The systemization of a discipline offered by the 
deductive approach along with its other concomitant advantages should 
result in the more rapid and efficient development of accounting 
theory.
Implicit in the deductive approach is the deductive framework. 






The Structure of Accounting Theory
Source:
Original.
Figure 1 could represent the structure of a single accounting theory 
or the entire accounting discipline. In the latter case the structure 
is more properly viewed as many theories with overlapping basic 
assumptions and theorems. As previously discussed, the basic assump­
tions are not few in number. But relative to the larger number of 
derived theorems, the basic assumptions might be considered "few in 
number."
Future Research in Accounting 
The era of research started in 1957 at the suggestion of Alvin 
Jennings is drawing to a close. The Accounting Principles Board, which 
has contributed significantly to accounting theory development, is 
currently being replaced this year (1973) with a full time body, the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. The FASB will continue and 
expand the efforts of the APB in attacking current problem areas in
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accounting. Should the FASB fail in its efforts, the result could be 
governmental control of accounting.
Ongoing Theoretical Research
The Opinions issued by the APB and its successor, the FASB, 
represent ongoing theoretical research within the accounting profes­
sion. This research is especially important because of its influence 
on current accounting practice. In this research accounting theories 
are being constructed. The Board is not espousing alternative 
accounting theories; they are determining what is generally accepted 
accounting theory. The assumptions on which the Board's Opinions are 
based are part of the basic assumptions of accounting.
Selected parts of two APB Opinions, Opinions 15 and 18, were 
examined in Chapter 6. Not all the Board's assumptions were stated. 
But bridge assumptions were either stated explicitly or implicitly 
implied enabling these Opinions to be applied to accounting practice. 
Both bridge assumptions involved fiat measurement.
The materiality example in Chapter 6 showed that bridge 
assumptions could be based on empirical measurements or on fiat meas­
urements. Bridge assumptions based on empirical measurements are 
empirically confirmable. Empirical tests are conducted to increase 
one's confidence in empirically based bridge assumptions by providing 
additional positive confirmations. Though such, tests can never prove 
assumptions true, they do serve as additional evidence.
Since fiat measurement is measurement by arbitrary stipulation 
or convention, bridge assumptions based on fiat measurements are also 
arbitrary. It would be only coincidental if empirical tests exactly
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confirmed bridge assumptions based on fiat measurements. Empirical 
testing of fiat measurements is undertaken not to confirm such meas­
urements. Rather, empirical testing is employed to determine empir­
ical measurements. Thus * fiat measurements are refined into empir­
ically determined measurements that one is confident enough to give 
the status of "laws.”
Implications for Research by the FASB
In its future research efforts the FASB should strive to 
develop bridge assumptions based on empirical measurements. This 
should represent a major research effort by the FASB and its research 
staff. But gathering sufficient empirical evidence for bridge 
assumptions takes time. And the FASB cannot always afford to delay 
the issuance of opinions until such empirical evidence is collected. 
One major criticism of the APB was that it took too long to issue 
some opinions. If this criticism applies to the FASB, they run the 
risk of Congress, the courts, and the SEC stepping in and legislating 
accounting theory.
Until sufficient empirical evidence can be gathered, the FASB 
should continue, as the APB has done in Opinions 15 and 18, to 
develop accounting principles on a theory by theory basis through the 
use of fiat measurements. These fiat measurements should be based on 
the hest informed judgment available at the time, supplemented by 
whatever empirical evidence is available. As an efficient method for 
obtaining this informed judgment, the FASB should continue the pro­
cedures started by the APB of holding public hearings and circulating
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exposure drafts of proposed opinions to all interested parties. Fiat 
measurements based on such group judgment draws on the knowledge and 
experience of practicing accountants, business representatives, govern­
ment representatives, accounting educators, and others.
Though dissents from FASB opinions probably can never be 
eliminated, giving consideration to the opinions of all interested 
parties can help to reduce criticism of the FASB, Drawing on the 
knowledge and experience of these groups, hopefully, would increase 
the likelihood that the fiat measurements would approximate future 
empirical measurements.
The Refining Process
After each FASB opinion involving fiat measurement is issued, 
the FASB's research staff and other accounting researchers should 
attempt to empirically refine these fiat measurements. Then this 
empirical evidence can be used to justify making any needed changes 
in the FASB opinions. This empirical refining process should not 
be delayed because there is the danger that accounting assumptions 
determined by fiat could become permanent.
Undoubtedly, the refining process may take considerable time. 
Many tests of a set of assumptions will be necessary before the 
accounting profession is satisfied to call them "laws” of accounting. 
But this is a goal of sciences—to discover the regularities of nature. 
And until sufficient evidence is collected to enable accountants to 
give their assumptions the status of "laws," criticisms of those 
assumptions will continue.
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An Integration With Knowledge in 
Other Disciplines
Much of the refinement process will involve integrating 
accounting assumptions (postulates) with assumptions (axioms) from 
other disciplines. For example, consider the empirically based 
bridge assumption in the materiality example from Chapter 6. That 
empirical test drew on knowledge from psychology, specifically the 
area of psychophysics. Heavy reliance was placed on the Weber- 
Fechner law. Should accounting ultimately adopt an empirical measure 
of materiality based on this law, then the Weber-Fechner law would 
represent an accounting axiom.
In some cases the process of refining fiat measurements may 
have to await theoretical advances in other disciplines. Other 
refinements, such as the materiality example, can be made with present 
knowledge. In the future, accounting researchers will almost have to 
specialize in particular non-accounting areas such as psychology, 
mathematics, communications theory, logic, measurement theory, and 
theory construction. Otherwise, existing knowledge in these areas 
could go unnoticed.
Accountants cannot expect researchers in other areas to search 
out and apply their expert knowledge to accounting problem areas. 
Accountants do not necessarily have to be experts in these other 
areas. But they must be able to recognize when existing knowledge and 
new discoveries, made in other disciplines, can be applied in accounting 
theory construction. In-depth, knowledge can be provided by researchers 




What degree of formalization should the FASB strive for in 
their opinions (theories)? Rudner stated in Chapter 3 (page 72) that 
requiring full formalization of new theories is too rigid a require­
ment. Overemphasis on full formalization may be detrimental to 
other goals of theory construction such as implementing and testing 
a theory. Implementing FASB theories could mean using the theory to 
make predictions or using the theory to eliminate unsound accounting 
practices.
The major effort of the FASB should be directed at attempting 
to solve current accounting problems. Extensive efforts by the FASB 
at refining their theories would only delay their work on other 
important problem areas. The FASB should attempt to state all the 
major assumptions underlying their opinions. A narrative explanation 
indicating their reasoning should also be provided. Based on this
other researchers can concentrate on rigorously reformulating the
FASB opinions as deductive theories.
Attempts at reformulating the existing APB Opinions as 
deductive theories should begin immediately. As each new problem 
area is examined, the FASB should first examine the assumptions under­
lying previous Opinions, to see if these assumptions can contribute to
the solution of other accounting problems. Gradually, as more assump­
tions are explicitly recognized, other accounting problem areas may be 
partially and, hopefully, fully solved by the application of pre­
viously determined accounting assumptions. This approach would
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eliminate any needless duplication of effort in accounting research. 
Alsoj accounting would be less likely to yield inconsistent theories.
A list of the basic assumptions of accounting would be gradually 
compiled. And these assumptions would gradually be developed to 
their logical ends. Such a list of assumptions would be open-ended.
In summary, future research by the FASB should proceed on a 
theory by theory basis. As new problem areas and challenges are 
encountered, such as accounting for a business firm's contribution to 
society, accounting research should be undertaken to determine what, 
if any, are the objectives of accounting in that new area. Once 
determined, these objectives would serve to direct the accounting 
theory construction efforts at determining the axioms and postulates 
of accounting in these areas.
Where empirical measurements are lacking, fiat measurements 
should be used to determine the bridge assumptions which will link 
nonobservable aspects of theories to observable ones. This should be 
followed by empirical studies aimed at determining empirical meas­
urements that can be used to refine the fiat measurements.
Precious research funds should not be expended on attempts to 
list the basic assumptions of all of accounting. After many theories 
of accounting have been well-constructed, accountants can look to the 
assumptions in these theories and then identify some of the basic 
assumptions of accounting. This researcher is confident that great 
advances in accounting theory construction can be made through the use 
of the theory construction techniques described in this study.
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